Japan's Strategic Situation

Manawatu Times, Volume 66, Issue 192, 14 August 1941, Page 4

Japan's Strategic Situation

Japan complains of encirclement. If that be a just complaint then may every other nation on earth likewise complain of being encircled for actually no nation except the U.S.A. enjoys splendid isolation. The nearest potential threat of violence to the Japanese homeland is from Vladivostock by bombing planes, and this is 600 miles distant over the Japan Sea. Shanghai, in China, is a like.distance, but Japan controls all the China coast and the hinterland for a depth of 1000 miles. That is all the threat faced from the mainland of Asia.

Southwards is the pacific Ocean and there Japan holds a screen of islands, believed fortified or fitted us air and naval bases, providing a safeguard 2000 miles south to the Equator. Away to the cast are the vast spaces of the Pacific stretching 6000 miles to America, with a nearest possible hostile point, Hawaii, 3600 miles away. On that is based the major part of the American fleet. It is as distant from Tokio as New York is from Hamburg. Westwards Japan controls the coast of China and Indo-China stretching for a distance of 2500 miles. And beyond that is Singapore distant 3000 miles—-as far from Japan as is Gibraltar from America. Incidentally, New Zealand is 5000 miles from Japan, a two and a-half weeks’ voyage, though only 3000 miles from the Japanese-controlled Caroline and Marshall islands. But between these and ourselves are a series of British-controlled islands and archipelagos stretching some 1500 miles. The whole area is believed to be under constant aerial reconnaissance. From a strategic viewpoint Japan is in a position of remarkable defensive strength and one made more so by her possession of a navy second only to that of Britain and America; estimated to be 60 per cent, as strong as either. Naval experts consider that only the combined strength of the whole American fleet plus that of a full half of the British fleet could force a defeat upon the Japanese Navy if it remained in its home waters. Japan’s defensive situation is as good as would be that of Britain were Britain situated where Iceland is and had she possession of all that portion of the Continent from Denmark to Spain inclusive and inland as far as the Alps. A mere glance at a map would clearly convey an understanding of the natural defensive strength of such a position occupied by a State with a great navy and a quite considerable air force. Really it must appear that Japan’s cry of encirclement ill becomes her. It may be viewed as a round-about excuse for aggression or else the result of sheer hysteria, but it cannot be viewed as a rational claim.