The Times. THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 1941. Great Britain’s Sea

Manawatu Times, Volume 66, Issue 80, 3 April 1941, Page 6

The Times. THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 1941. Great Britain’s Sea

After the audacious attack by the Western section of the Mediterranean Fleet on Genoa early in February, Mr. Churchill expressed the hope that the reverberations from this uncontested success might reach the ears of ‘‘our French comrades in their grief and misery,” cheering them with the knowledge that friends were at hand and that “Britannia rules the waves.” It is an ironic and indeed a pathetic circumstance that, in the same day’s despatches which recorded an even more striking proof of Great Britain’s sea mastery, there was a report also of a French attack upon British ships of war. The incident bad no serious consequence in the material sense, and the Government at Vichy has attempted to claim justification for an unprovoked assault upon vessels carrying out legitimate duties. But a gesture could scarcely have been more gratuitously unfriendly than this wanton blow at the Power which has accepted the cause of France as its own cause, and is pledged to restore to the French peoples their former prestige and liberties. Moreover, it was an ill-timed gesture.

The engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean in which the Italian navy took the heaviest punishing that has been admini- , stered to a modern lleet in the present war puts beyond the realm of debate the question of the control of Signor Mussolini’s “Mare Nostrum.” The severely practical side of the encounter, as measured in terms of ships sunk and ships damaged, itself spells disaster for the Italy navy. The loss of probably four cruisers and three destroyers, added to the previous tally of vessels sunk or put out of action, reduces the effective naval strength of their country to a point at which the Italians have become possessed of other reasons than poor morale for avoiding contact with the British Fleet. In fact, it might be said, in view of the one-sided nature of all the Mediterranean engagements, that the great achievement of the British naval units was in forcing the Italian vessels into action, the rest being inevitable.

The resounding result of this engagement is, however, of considerable significance apart altogether from the devastating and humiliating defeat that has been inflicted upon the Italians. It marks a decisive point in the contest between the Axis and the British in a sea which is equally essential to the war purposes of both sides in this struggle. In asserting control of the Mediterranean Great Britain has been protecting a vital interest, the loss of which would have made the maintenance of the second front in the war extremely difficult.

The capitulation of France, with the loss of ports available to Great Britain at Toulon and in the French African possessions, was a severe blow, from which the action at Oran provided only a partial recovery. But since that time, with the acquisition of the Libyan ports and a base at Crete, the British Fleet has been enabled to arrange its Mediterranean dispositions satisfactorily. It required only the series of actions culminating in the engagement now reported to prove to the Axis the vanity of any hope which may have been halfheartedly held by its members that the Italian navy, perhaps differently manned would be capable of challenging the British in this zone.