SOVIET CHANGES
WHY STALIN BECAME PREMIER. R LONDON, May 9. d “Nobody inside or outside the Soviet Union foresaw Stalin’s assumption l e of the Premiership this week, yet rc- * trespectively it appears to be a move 't I that is consistent with Stalin’s metiiy ods,” says the Stockholm edrresponddent of the Times. “By luck or une canny instinct Stalin, directly after I the Revolution, acquired and held ® what for 20 years has proved to be the . most important key position in Rus- ‘ sia—the secretary-generalship of the Communist Party—which put his rivals into Stalin’s hands while he himself remained practically unassailable, j “The army was the party’s 6ole potential rival, but the Communist Party’s grip was also firm there in peacetime,” the correspondent writes. _ necessarily possess greater freedom of action, less embarrassed by the party’s 1 control and also formally responsible t directly to the Government rather than f the party. It is conceivable that under the stress of war the head of the Gov- . ernment might short-circuit the , party's secretary and act too directly I and also too independently with the army, thus undermining the party , secretary’s authority and, possibly, ’ producing rivals: , “The Premiership, therefore, during ; a major war possesses greater directive power than the party leadership; i so Stalin becomes the Premier and ' . ready to face any emergency. The pro-1 motion of Stalin can be interpreted as i reflecting that he considers that par- F tieipation in the war is not improb-i 1 able and is determined to figure as 1 the real and formal head of the Gov- J ernment, functioning in accordance J with the so-called Stalin Constitution. , “The Soviet Union is unlikely to en- ( ter the war directly against Britain, 1 and. it is scarcely likely that Stalin will begin war unless lie is quite convinced 1 that it is inevitable; then he may take 1 the initiative rather than allow Hitler f !to choose the time and place. Diplo- a matic circles in Moscow believe that r , Stalin, in order to maintain the Sov- s iet policy of peace and neutrality, is a personally settling the Russian-Ger- >■ man differences over the German pene- a tration of the Balkans.” |° The diplomatic correspondent of the £ Times says: “The latest Soviet action „ can he interpreted as a broad hint to tl Britain, who has not recognised the Si inclusion of the Baltic States in the 1; Soviet Union. Moscow considers this to be the main obstacle to better rela- " lions between England and Russia.” ,
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Bibliographic details
Manawatu Standard, Volume LXI, Issue 138, 13 May 1941, Page 6
Word Count
417SOVIET CHANGES Manawatu Standard, Volume LXI, Issue 138, 13 May 1941, Page 6
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