NEW BRITISH STRATEGY.

Manawatu Standard, Volume LIX, Issue 100, 28 March 1939, Page 7

NEW BRITISH STRATEGY.

DELAYS LIKELY. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. LONDON, March 15. In discussion outside as well as inside Parliament, the new British military strategy is being examined more critically than last week, when universal gratification left little room for criticism. Factors which almost certainly will delay the arrival of the proposed expeditionary force of 19 divisions at its oversea destination are being examined. Air Force officers point out that it is unlikely that the force' would attempt to embark before the end of the period of intense aerial warfare which, according to air force authorities throughout the world, will be the preliminary to military and naval action in the next war. This aerial warfare would prevent decisive military or naval action before it slackened off through the defeat of one side or the other or through mutual exhaustion of supplies or personnel. The suggestion of the Secretary for War (Mr Hore-Belisha) that the 13 Territorial divisions of the expeditionary force would not be ready for six months shows that there would be time to organise the extra squadrons of army co-operation ’planes required. Small satisfaction is to be gained, however, from the reflection that one delay obscures another. OFFICERS AND ARMS WANTED. Soldiers point out that at least one general headquarters, two army headquarters, and seven corps headquarters would have to be formed after the mobilisation of the, proposed force. They recall the ill effects caused in 1914, when the War Office was drained to provide staffs for an expeditionary force one-third the size of the force now planned. The new force would require also a sudden vast expansion of highly skilled corps such as signals, ordnance, and medium and heavy artillery. The supply of material is still admittedly far from complete. During the coming training season the Territorials will be equipped only for training and not on a combatant scale. Even the Regular Army’s equipment is still incomplete. One of the most encouraging notes in Mr Hore-Belisha’s recent speech on the new British strategy was his statement that the new Middle East Army would be equipped eventually with its own reserves of munitions, vehicles, and supplies, and should be selfsufficient. Such reserves have a limited value, however, without factories to reinforce them. Here, the efforts to make Australia a large-scale munitions supplier are seen in their true perspective as a move of major importance to Imperial defence.