REPLY BY JAPAN

Manawatu Standard, Volume LIV, Issue 303, 20 November 1934, Page 7

REPLY BY JAPAN

BRITISH NAVAL SUGGESTIONS. THE “CEILING” LIMIT PLAN. GREAT BRITAIN’S DIFFICULTY. (United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph.—Copyright.) (British Official Wireless.) Received November 20, 10.55 a.m. RUGBY, Nov. 19. The reply of the Japanese Government to' the British suggestions for overcoming the deadlock in the naval talks in London has been communicated by the Japanese Ambassador in London to Sir John Simon. The reply cannot be regarded as offering any immediate solution of the difficulties, but it carries the conversations a step further.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary will report to Cabinet and an. early opportunity will be sought to inform the American delegation of the Japanese attitude. it will will be recalled that the British suggestions were directed towards reaching an alternative form of agreement in view of the refusal of the Japanese to accept a continuance of the rigidly defined 5-5-3 ratio of naval strengths, as laid down in the Washington Treaty for Britain, America, and Japan respectively. The Japanese proposals demanded the acceptance of two principles as the basis of an agreement—first, non-aggression and non-menace, and, secondly, equality in national security. In developing these .demands during the conversations, the Japanese delegation urged that the upper limit in naval construction, picturesquely called the “ceiling,” might be fixed to apply to all parties, which, however, would not necessarily build up to it. Japan, for example, conceded that Britain’s overseas responsibilities might well involve building up to the “ceiling,” whereas she, while being free to do so, might not in fact undertake such a heavy programme. Japan, on the other hand, questioned the American need for tho naval superiority hitherto conceded. As parity between Britain and America’s naval strength is recognised here as axiomatic, the effect of Japan s claim to equal naval strength with America would apparently involve the Japanese building up to the “ceiling,” and would place Britain, with all the special responsibilities of her Empire, in the position of being unable to make any special naval provision beyond that made by other Bowers with less responsibilities. Britain had, therefore indicated that she could not accept the principle of a common upper limit. The suggestions put forward in the Anglo-Japanese conversations included the possibility of a general acknowledgement of an equal status among the naval Powers, coupled with a continuance of the regulation of the size of navies, and ail agreement among the Powers to declare their programmes for a certain number of years in advance and thus check unregulated competition. There are other points of difference between the parties’ conversations; for instance, in regard to the size . and types of capital ships and the abolition of aircraft carriers and submarines. It was with a view to overcoming some of these formidable differences that the suggestions referred to above were made by the British when the Japanese proposals were under consideration.