THE CLAIMS OF HUMAN REASON.

Manawatu Standard, Volume LIV, Issue 120, 20 April 1934, Page 6

THE CLAIMS OF HUMAN REASON.

(To the Editor.) Sir,—lt is surely not necessary to point out to your readers that Mr Mason’s letter of April 18t>li is too ridiculous for words; and, sir, that is just tho trouble; one is at a loss to find suitable words' with which to reply; but I am going to mako an attempt. One thing is very obvious; your correspondent is an adept at evading issues—but at what a price 1 It would be as well to remember that this controversy began over Mr Mason’s statement that “There can be no disturbance of any kind, not only organic but inorganic, which does not originate in mind or thought . . and that he has not as yet told us why lie believes this or given us any excuse for accepting liis statement as true. The fact is, sir, that lie is one of those to whom Coleridge’s statement: “You do not believe, you only believe that you believe” may be legitimately applied. If he wants to know why, it is for this reason: That commonsense—that is to say, common experience—tells us so. It is of little use. Pm afraid, trying to reason with your correspondent, for it is obvious that he is unaware of the first principles of reason. There are three definite laws of thought, aud these are called those of (a) identity, (2) _ noncontradiction, and (3) excluded middle. (I regret that I have not the space in which to explain them.) These “laws of thought” are descriptive of the ways in which thought should proceed; when it doesn’t, the conclusion reached is not valid. No one, not even Mr Mason, can contest the validity of these laws without contradicting themselves. The kind of belief that vour correspondent takes a delight in is “invalid belief”; it is the kind of belief that- certain persons once held when they believed that the earth was the centre of the universe. _ The cold facts produced by Copernicus, however, corresponding as they did with the proposition that the earth wasn’t the centre of the universe, put their superstitious ideas out of action. Their proposition had no fact with which to correspond. Thus, the proposition that the world moves, having a fact with which it corresponds, is a true proposition. Mr Mason shouldn’t refer to me as demanding facts to bolster up my opinions; I’m certainly not stupid enough te think that I can validly. Ihilieve a “proposition” unless I know the fact with which it corresponds. He says: “. . . that which is new is not true, and that- which is true is not- new." He should have said: “. . . • that- which is new is not ‘necessarily’ true, and that which is true is not ‘necessarily’ new.” He doesn’t think that I should inflict my “tenacious opinions” (as he calls them) on other members of the community. I see the point. His dogmatism will be losing its popularity (if is has any to lose) eh ? _ I am accused of raising a materialistic issue, yet I can, with complete confidence, defy him to prove liis accusation. I insist at the moment on nothing more materialistic than the recognition of the claims of human reason.—l am. etc.. AY. E. H. CREAMER. Atkinson St., Woodville, 19-4-34.