COATS MURDER TRIAL

Manawatu Standard, Volume LII, Issue 5, 5 December 1931, Page 4

COATS MURDER TRIAL

CONVICTION CONFIRMED. DECISION OF APPEAL COURT. WELLINGTON, Dec. 5. By a unanimous decision the Court of Appeal yesterday found that the statement made to the police on July 6 by George Errol Coats, now under sentence of death for the murder of Phillis Avis Symons, was properly admitted at the trial, and further that the trial Judge, Mr Justice Blair, did not wrongly direct the jury in warning it that the life of the prisoner was not necessarily forfeit if it convicted him of murder. On the bench were the Chief Justice (Sir Michael Myers), Mr Justice Adams, Mr Justice Ostler, and Mr Justice Smith. Leading counsel for the prisoner submitted that the statement made by Coats to the police on July 6 was improperly admitted at the trial within the meaning of section 20 of the Evidence Act, 1908. This read: “A confession tendered in evidence in any criminal proceedings shall not be rejected. on the ground that a promise or threat has been held out to the person confessing unless the judge is of the opinion that the inducement was, in fact, likely to cause an untrue admission of guilt to be made.” The propriety of the admission of the statement'was to be gathered from a review of the circumstances operating at the time.it was taken.

Counsel proceeded to read at some length from the evidence taken in cross-examination of Detective Murray covering the period when Coats was at the police station and during which period the statement was made. Coats was ''taken to the police station by Constable Smith at 9 a.m. on July 6 and was kent there until 1.15 a.m. on July 7, except for a short visit which was paid to prisoner’s room. He was charged at a quarter past one. Coats was not cautioned until he was charged with doing a noxious thing. Detective Murray had said that he was not cautioned as it was not by any means certain that a charge would bo made. It was after particulars had been placed by Detective Murray before his superior officer that Coats was charged and warned that anything further he said would be used m evidence against him. The question then was altogether different from murder. Detective Murray had said that Coats gave his statement freely and voluntarily for the purpose of clearing up the matter, and the officer told Coats

he had “better tell the truth,” or words to that effect. The detective recognised the possibility that the girl was quite well, but it seemed important to inquire as to her whereabouts. One statement made by Coats was rejected by Mr Justice Blair, who, with the two possible exceptions now before the Court, gave the greatest possible consideration in the triaj. ■ The Chief Justice,: Sou certainly had the fairest possible summing up. Replying to the Chief Justice, counsel submitted that 'a confession was a statement made by a prisoner tending to incriminate himself or tending to prove his guilt. The Chief Justice' asked if it was suggested that, it' was not the duty of the police to get the man and inquire what he knew about the whereabouts of the girl. Counsel said he would not say that, but the way in which' it was done was not commendable nor calculated to obtain a free and voluntary confession. There were three main sources from which inducement might be gathered, (1) Tffie circumstances surrounding the nature of the statement; (2) whether the questions were put by a person in authority; (3) by the form of the interrogation. -V. ./■ v EFFECT OF DETENTION;. * ,

Referring to an English authority which held that a confession made through hope or fear excited by W person in authority was not admissible as evidence, counsel said that in this case Detective Murray was a person in authority, and although it had been said that Coats was not detained, be was left at the police station and provided with meals. A more sensible arrangement would have beeU to tell the man to go out and get lunch, and return in a quarter of an hour. That would have averted the bias which was induced by being kept at the police station, and in such circumstances the statement was one which miglrt have been made by Coats- in order that he might be free. The Chief Justice said he would like some authority to show that a statement which amounted to a denial was a confession. The Solicitor-General replied that in the statement Coats expressed appreciation of the way in which the statement was taken. The Chief Justice remarked that there was no evidence of what was called the “third degree.” Counsel: The “third degree” is a term which has a sinister American meaning. With us a statement can be extracted by kindness in suclr a way that it is like the “third degree.” The Chief Justice pointed out that in the case of a man taken to the police station, the police were acting fust as much in his interests as against him. The man might be able to show that certain suggestions were untrue, and as long as the “third degree” was not used, surely there was nothing wrong in keeping him at the station. Counsel urged that any statement extracted in such circumstances as in this case was likely to be false, also that the word “confession” should not be given a limited meaning. He submitted that the statement came within the meaning of Section 20, already quoted. The Chief Justice: A confession means an admission of something, not a denial of everything. Counsel went on to state that Coats was with the girl at a later time than i he admitted in the statement, and | that went to show that the statement was false. Finally counsel submitted that the onus upon him was discharged if the evidence showed that the prisoner had been interrogated in such circumstances as had been revealed here, inasmuch as the prisoner >vas likely to be under a bias. Bias might be reasonably assumed from having been kept within the four walls of the police building for nearly 24 hours, and it was a reasonable assumption that the statement he made, particularly the last one at eleven o’clock at night, was one which might have been induced by his desire to be free, to get away. Replying to the Chief Justice, counsel said that if the statement was inadmissible as evidence it was not available for cross-examination. The Chief Justice said the thing that struck him was that at the time the statement was made there was no suggestion of murder. Addressing the Court, second counsel for afccused also made several submissions concerning the statement of Coats to tire police. He contended that all the admissions made by Coats constituted a confession within the meaning of the Act; the statement Undoubtedly was one of an incriminating nature. He proceeded to the question of whether the trial Judge wrongly directed the jury, and submitted that the statement as made by the judge was contrary- to long-established practice. Counsel pointed out that it was the duty of the sheriff of the district to carry out the sentence, but not until he had had an intimation of

the Gdvernor-General’s pleasure in respect thereto. Mr Justice Ostler .remarked that every citizen knew, what the practice was in such cases. Counsel suggested that the jurymen would feel very relieved at such a statement being made, as they would feel that after all that was not final. A jury might be divided, and such a statement might do a great deal toward bringing in a verdict of guilty. Mr Justice Ostler asked how it could be a misdirection when it was an accurate statement of the law of the land? At the conclusion of the case for the prisoner, the Solicitor-General was asked to devote his argument to the construction of section 20 of the Evidence Act. The Solicitor-General contended that a confession meant an admission of guilt in respect of the offence charged at the trial. The Chief Justice : You don’t mean a straight' out admission ? The Solicitor-General replied “No,” saying it must be intended to establish a fact that would prove guilt. An inquiry by a detective was intended, not to prove guilt, but to establish facts upon which conclusions might be made, Mr Justice Adams: You say it must be for the purpose of establishing facts in relation to a particular offence which may result in a charge, or may result in proving the innocence of the person suspected. Mr Justice Smith remarked that the essential element in the construc--1 tion of the section was that the one making the confession must intend to admit guilt. The Solicitor-General replied that the meaning of the word “confession” in the section was put beyond all doubt by the concluding words, “likely to cause an untrue admission of guilt.” A confession must be more than a statement subsequently used to prove the guilt of the •• prisoner. Taken altogether, Coats’s statement was a denial of guilt with some explanations wholly exculpatory. If the detective did say “it will be better for you to tell the truth” it was a recommendation without threat or promise. The detective had known Coats for some years, and said the interview was a friendly one all through, and in the nature of a discussion. A good deal had been said about the time that Coats was in the police station, .but that course was a conqmonsense one with the object of clearing up the matter under investigation. Coats never made the slightest objection, and was quite content to remain there. I Counsel for Coats briefly replied, ' and said that any statement so obtained and used or relied upon by the Crown as inculpating the prisoner out of -his own mouth came under the section. FINDINGS OF THE COURT. In giving judgment, the Chief Justice said that in his opinion the word “confession” in the section meant just what was there and no more. _ The word “admission” meant an admission of guilt of the affence which was actually before the Court. In his opinion it was clear that the statements tendered in the evidence of the detective and accepted by the trial Judge were not confessions within the meaning of section 20. Whether that was so or not, he was satisfied that it did not show that there was any promise or threat held out in the case, and certainly if there was a promise or threat it was not a promise or threat likely to cause an untrue admission of guilt to be made. . The statement that was admitted seemed to be a denial, and at the time there appeared to be no suspicion of foul play. It was intended to make an investigation, and in the investigation other inquiries were made from the prisoner which resulted in the statements being made and which had now been brought before the Court. For the reasons given he (the Chief Justice) considered that there was no ground shown for rejecting these statements, and in his opinion the first question must be answered by saying that the statements were properly admitted by the trial Judge. Dealing with the second question, the Chief Justice said whether or not it was desirab’e for a judge to tell the jury in a case of that kind that the sentence always had to be considered by the Governor-in-Council, was a question which could not be answered in the same way in all cases. One judge miglrt, another might not, think it necessary or desirable to make such a statement to the jury. Speaking generally, it might depend upon what had been said to the jury by counsel for the prisoner upon the question of penalty following a conviction on a charge of murder. His Honour was satisfied that there was no misdirection on the part of the trial Judge which involved an error in law, and the second question must be answered accordingly. . . Mr Justice Adams said that Section 20 of the Act was unambiguous and clear in construction. Counsel had pre-

sented the case very ably, but had failed to convince His Honour, who said he was entirely in agreement with the Chief Justice on both questions, the construction of Section 20, and in relation to misdirection. Mr Justice Ostler considered the statements were made by prisoner to exculpate himself from the suspicion he knew he was under. Although prisoner was a long time at the police station there was no unfair practice. Every consideration was given prisoner at the trial. Regarding the second question, an accurate statement could not be a misdirection. The whole statement did not tend to reveal his guilt at all, said Mr Justice Smith, and he failed to see in the circumstances that any promise or threat wus held out likely to cause an untrue admission of guilt to be made. In regard to the second point, he considered that there had been do misdirection at all. The conviction was confirmed.