INVASION OF ENGLAND.

Marlborough Express, Volume XLV, Issue 62, 14 March 1911, Page 3

INVASION OF ENGLAND.

"THE SILENT ADMIRAL" GIVES

HIS VIEWS.

■•"PRACTICALLY

IMPOSSIBLE."

LONDON, Jan. 20. '•'The Silent Admiral" has spoken .at last. Sir Arthur Wilson, who replaced Lord Fisher as the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, is by the universal consent of the sea service the most eminent naval-strategist of Ms day. But he is the most silent of sailors and among the most reticent of men. When he publishes an -opinion at all, his statement is a remarkable event. Hence the widespread attention given this week to his memorandum on invasion.

Sir Arthur Wilson has examined the possibility of the invasion of the British Isles, and has declared his conclusion and that of the Admiralty to be "that an invasion on even the moderate scale of 70,000 men is practically impossible." This memorandum is published by the sanction, of the Admiralty and through the influence of the War Minister, Mr Haldane, in the second edition of Sir lan Hamilton's book against "Compulsory Service," to which Mr Haldane contributes a preface. It is interesting to t note that Sir Arthur Wilson's opinion on the invasion problem corroborates that of his predecessor, Lord.Fisher, and the conclusions arrived at after careful investigation by the Committee of Defence.

The text of the First Sea Lord's notes is as follows: —

The really serious danger that this country has to guard against in war is not invasion but interruption to our trade and destruction of our merchant shipping. The strength of our fleet is determined by what is necessary to protect our trade., and if it is sufficient for that it will be almost necessarily sufficient to prevent invasion, since the same disposition of the ships to a great extent answers both purposes. The main object aimed at by our fleet, ' whether 'for the defence of oommerce or for any other purpose, is to prevent' any ship of the enemy from getting to sea far enough to do any mischief before she'; is brought to action. . Any disposition, that Is even moderately successful in attaininf this object will almost certainly be effetcivo in preventing a large fleet of transports, than which nothing is more vulnerable or more difficult to hide, from' reaching our shores.

These are the conclusions of the distinguished naval stratagist and fleet commander who is now the prinicpal expert member of the Board of Admiralty, and he adds: To realise- the difficulty that an enemy, would have in bringing such a fleet of transports to our coast and disembarking an army, it is necessary to remember that all the ships operating in home waters, whether they are in the North Sea, the Channel^ or elsewhere, are in wireless oomimynication with the Admiralty and with the Commander-in-Chief, so that if a fleet of transports is sighted anywhere by a single cruiser, or even by a merchant ship, if she is fitted with wireless, every ship which happens to be in a position to intercept the transports would at once get the order to concentrate as necessary for the purpose, whether she was at sea or in harbor.

It is further necessary to remember that even supposing that by some extraordinary lucky chance the transports were able to roach our coasts without being detected, their presence must be known when they arrive there J and long before half, j the troops could be landed the transports would be attacked and sunk by submarines, which are stationed along the coast for that purpose. WITHIN WIRELESS CALL. Besides the submarines there would be always a large force of destroyers, oither in the ports along the coast or within wireless call, as, in addition to those that may be definitely detailed for coast defence, the system of relief for those acting oversea will ensure a large number being actually in harbor at their respective bases, or within call while going to or returning from their stations.

Th.es© destroyers, though not Specially stationed with that object', will always form, in conjunction with submarines, a very effective second line ;of defence in the improbable event of such a second line being required. ! To understand thoroughly the small chance of an invasion from the other side of the North Sea being I successful^ it is necessary to put oneself in the place of the officer > 'who has to undertake the responsibility of conducting it. His first difficulty will be to consider how he is to get his great fleet of transports to sea without any information of it leaking out through j neutral nations or otherwise. i Next he will consider that somewhere within Avireless call we have nearly double the number of battleships and cruisers that he can muster, besides a swarm of destroyers. He has probably very vague and unreliable information as to their positions, which are constantly changing., SECRECY IMPOSSIBLE. : His unwieldly fleet will cover many square miles of waters, and as all the ships, will be obliged to carry lights, for mutual safety, they- will be visible nearly as far by rtight as by day. How can he hope to escape discovery? Many of ,his transports will have speeds of not more than ten or twelve knots, so that there will be no hope of escape by flight if he is mat by a superior force. If he is sighted by aaiy of our destroyers at night they will have l:ttle difficulty in avoiding the men-of-war, and torpedoing the torpedoing the transports. Is it possible to entice part of our fleet away by any stratagem P Possibly. But even if he suceeds in drawing off half our fleet, the other half, in conjunction with destroyers and submarines, would be quite sufficient to sink the greater part of his transports, even if supported by the strongest fleet he could collect. The fleets would engage each other while the destroyers and submarines torpedoed the transports. Finally, even if he reached the coast in safety, he would see that it was quite impossible to guard his transports against the attack of submarines while he was landing his troops; and that it was quite certain that a superior force would be brought to attack him before the landing could be completed. Taking all these facts into consideration, he would probably decide, as the Admiralty have done, that an invasion on even the moderate scale of 70,000 men is practically impossible.