NO PROSPECT OF WAR.

Mataura Ensign, 29 November 1911, Page 6

NO PROSPECT OF WAR.

BRITAIN AND GERMANY. BRITISH PART EXPLAINED. Hi ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH.—COPYRIGHT. PER UNITED PRESS ASSOCIATION. LONDON, Nov. 28. As the result of the interest taken in Sir Edward Grey's promisedl statement in regard to Great Britain's foreign policy, the House of Commons presented a striking spectacle, the galleries being crowded with peers, ambassadors, and attaches and a number of Eastern visitors and foreigners. The House was restless until Sir Edward Grey (Foreign Minister) rose; then the tensity was broken only by cheers. Sir Edward's speech evoked occasionally illuminative patriotic phrases. There was the greatest applause when he justified Mr Lloyd George (Chancellor of the Exchequer) whole-heartedly. He spoke for an hour and twenty minutes with deliberation and great clearness, reading important passages. Sir Edward Grey declared that the Moroccan negotiations were still important, serious and delicate, and he intended to confine his speech to that subject. It was impossible for the Government to postpone a full statement longer,' despite the risk of disturbing a discussion which had not yet taken place between France and Germany. Herr Kiderlen-Waechter's (German Foreign Minister) recent disclosure had been published contrary to diplomatic custom and) without notifying Great Britain. He (Sir Edward Grey) knew nothing about it till he read it in the newspapers. Sir Edward Grey, continuing, said he understood that the exigencies of the situation in Germany rendered it impossible for her to be consulted. Herr Kiderlen-Waechter had already denied that France had insisted on going to Fez in defiance of Germany. On July 1, when Count Metternich (German Ambassador in London) came to the Foreign Office the despatch of the Panther on the ground that German firms required protection was explained and it was stated that the Panther would be withdrawn when the position if Morocco .resumed its quiet aspect. This communication was accompanied by an explanation making it clear that Germany regarded a return to the status quo as douftful, if not impossible, and contemplated a definite solution of the Morocco question between Germany, France and Spain. Sir Edward Grey, realising that the whole Moroccan question was being reopened, consulted Mr Asquith and l then invited Count Metternich to an interview on the 3rd and informed him that the situation was so important that it must be discussed by the Cabinet. Accordingly, after the Cabinet desired Count Metternish to inform Germany, he saw Count Metternich on the 4th and said that it was impossible for Britain not to be interested in Morocco. They must take into consideration treaty obligations with France. Many days' silence followed, Count Metternich not being instructed to make any comment on the' Cabinet's communication. Finally information had been received leading him to apprehend that Germany contemplated a settlement, including the partition of Morocco after negotiations whereto it was not intended that Britain should be a party. Though it was true that Britain was not interested herself in Morocco politically, by the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 Britain expressedly reserved the posibility of disturbance of economic and strategical conditions consequent on a new settlement. Soon after Sir W. E. Goschen's (British Ambassador at Berlin) interview of the 12th German newspapers reported that Germany had made demands on the French Congo to an extent to which, it was obvious, neither the French Government nor the Chamber would agree. Sir Edward Grey therefore saw Count Metternich on the 21st and said that Britain's silence must not be interpreted to mean that she was not interested in Morocco. The Government would be glad if a settlement could be arranged on the basis of rectification of the frontier but for cession of the Congo, which it was impossible for France to concede. If negotiations were unsuccessful a very embarrassing situation would arise. He pointed out to Count Metternich that it was rumoured that the Germans were landing at Agadir and negotiating with the natives, suggesting that they might be acquiring concessions. The German flag might even be hoisted at | the port, which was the most suitable on the coast for a naval base. | The longer the Panther remained at Agadir (continued Sir Edward) the greater the risk of developing a situation which would make it difficult to withdraw and would render it necessary for Britain to take steps to protect British interests. Count Metternich replied that he was unable to give information, but was sure that Germany did not intend to acquire commercial monopolies. The same day Mr Lloyd George's speech was delivered, he, Mr Asquith and 1 Sir Edward Grey feeling that public opinion would be misled if the subject was longer ignored, Mr Lloyd George claimed no pre-eminence or predominance for Britain in international affairs and made no menace such as saying "hands off'' to anyone anywhere. The purport of his speech was that where British interests were affected we must not be treated as of no account. "If the time ever comes when this cannot be said," Sir Edward went on, "We shall cease to exist, at any rate as a great Power."—(Great cheering.) "Unfortunately Mr Lloyd George's words were soon forgotten." Count Metternich on the 24th informed Sir Edward Grey that men had not been landed at Agadir. Germany regretted that credence had been given to an insinuation emanating from hostile quarters. Germany had never thought and never would think of j creating a naval port in Morocco. Such an idea was an hallucination.) Moreover, if the demand was rather high, Germany was ready to make France concessions in Morocco in addition to colonial matters. The Ambassador added that the Chauvinistic tone of the French and British press, which was menacing to Germany, hampered ] settlement.

Sir Edward Grey asked if he could [communicate that statement to Parliament in view of Mr . Lloyd George's speech. Count Metternich then made the communication contained in Herr Kiderlen-Wacenter's recent speech. The communication caused great surprise.

The feeling created in Germany alone seemed justification for Mr Lloyd George speaking. Sir Edward Grey added that since it was inconsistent with German dignity to give an explanation of the Agadir incident, the tone of Germany's communication made it inconsistent with British dignity to give a public explanation of Mr Lloyd George's speech.—(Cheers.) He told Count Metternich that he did not intend to say anything that would embroil negotiations between Germany or France; but it was evident that there would be a difficult situation if these failed. Count Metternich on the 27th made another communication. He trusted! that Sir Edward had gathered the conviction that Germany's pourparlers with France did not touch British interests, and he asked Sir Edward Grey to inform Parliament accordingly, without giving details of the confidential communication. He added that the territories eventually exchanged would be exclusively German and French, and that, therefore, it was advisable to leave the matter to the two parties immediately concerned. Germany seriously wished to diminish the points of friction with France in the colonial sphere. A public statement of Britain's desire for a successful conclusion of the pourparlers would lielp to calm public opinion in France. Sir Edward continued that the House would observe that the tone of this was exceedingly friendly. From that date onwards no further difficulties arose. He expressed appreciation to Count Metterich, who replied regretting that British opinion had been misled. Sir Edward 1 Grey answered, "What could be expected when ships were suddenly sent to the most suitable port for a naval base?' Even t denial of the intention to establish a naval base had not been published. However, he hoped that the present communication might be taken as a new starting-place. |

Sir Edward Grey added that Herr Kiderlen-Waechter had stated that Germany had never any intention of taking the port. If Britain had been told this at first much misunderstanding would have been avoided. The French Government consulted' Britain on every point where it seemed likely that British interests would be affected. He understood that Captain Faber's recent speech had somewhat intensified the bitterness. He could only say that Captain Faber was not an official. There had been speeches made in Germany that were equally open to objection. People seemed to take a delight in suggesting that the country was on the verge of war. The world seemed to be suffering from a fit of political alcoholism. Personally he had never believed that Germany would break off negotiations; but Germany's statement that she was not agreeable to calling a Moroccan conference suggested the possibility of a most delicate diplomatic situation. There was now no prospect of war. He hoped that his statement would act as a sedative.

Regarding general foreign policy, Sir Edward said he thought it wisest for Britain to expand further as little as possible, especially in Africa. Germany's strength was a guarantee that no one would seek to quarrel with her; but German public opinion ought to remember that the nation having the biggest army and a very big navy and building bigger, must do all possible to prevent national apprehension. Addressing the Radicals Sir Edward declared that it would be disastrous if Britain proclaimed that under no circumstances would she give a friendly Power assistance. That reversion to splendid isolation would necessitate building battleships against the united nations of Europe. He did not believe that Germany had aggressive designs. Herr Kiderlin-Waeehter had spoken of a clean slate. Sir Edward Grey endorsed that sentiment. He hoped that the part Britain had taken in removing the Moroccan trouble had contributed materially to the expectation of peace. Sir Edward concluded amid loud and prolonged cheers. Mr Bonar Law, the new Unionist leader, declared that the Prime Minister should have spoken in the House of Commons instead of delegating the duty to Mr Lloyd George. An AngloGerman war was inconceivable. They desired that every cause of friction with Germany should be removed, Britain did not want more territory. She had sufficient responsibilities already.