THE SALZBURG MEETING.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XXVIII, Issue 2135, 24 October 1867, Page 3

THE SALZBURG MEETING.

{From the Spectator, Aug. 24.) The " language of the two. Emperors Napoleon and Francis Joseph towards «ach other," says the Moniteur, " has been most affectionate, and their interviews have been of a peculiarly intimate and cordial nature." The " views of the two sovereigns as to the Eastern question are said entirely to coincide." One " of the chief objects of the understanding arrived at between the i;wo Emperors is to prevent South Germany from governing the North German Confederation." The Emperors intend to invite the other Powers of Europe to join in an agreement, "the basis of which will be the maintenance of the Treaty of Prague." Such are the telegrams which have been whizzing like diplomatic bullets across' Western Europe all the week, and which are either official digests of actual ' contracts between the two Sovereigns, intended ta enlighten tho

world, or official digests of the ideas Napoleon wishes to have belieyed, and intended to take the world in. The Havas Agency—Continental for lieutor's Company—being entirely under the control of the French Government, the latter supposition is by much the more probable, but either is sufficient to prove this. The Emperor of the French intends to make the temporary division of Germauy established by the Treaty of Prague a permanent basis of his policy. Germany cannot be divided into three, as he ordered M, Soulier to say it had been, but at least it shall be two, and not one. He either thinks or he desires the world to think, that he has won over Austria to his view, and it is, on the whole, possible, in defiance of antecedent probabilities, that he has won her. It is hardly probable that he would have ventured on such a series of inventions as these telegrams without basis sufficient to prevent a blank official denial. The Hapsburgs, moreover, are Spaniards of a good class—that is the key to them—and when they publicly and ceremoniously thank a subject for restoring the good relationsbetween Austria and France, as they have thanked Prince Metternich, they intend that public acknowledgment to be not only a supreme honour —and they think it an honour beyond compare—but to be a political manifesto. The allusion to the East, the quarter in which French, Austrian, and English interests are so nearly identical, is, if an invention, an admirable one, and the Treaty of Prague is no doubt a natural basis for French, if not for Austrian policy. The Emperor has made a mistake, but an endurable one, if Prussia is only to be extended to the Main, to be only as great as France, and not quite so well situated. If, however, Prussia is to be Germany, if the greatest nation of Central Europe, perhaps the greatest nation in the world, is to be organised like a regiment, under the Hohenzollern, then it would cease to be endurable. France would be stifled, and France dislikes thick neckcloths. On the other hand, so long as South Germany remains independent, so long as a great Catholic German population outBide Austria remains isolate, the Hapsburgs have a chance of retaining their position as a civilized ruling House. Aided by events, they may draw Wurtemburg, Hesse, Baden, and Bavaria into a confederation of which Austria would be the head, and if not so aided, may at least keep their own dominions intact, at least retain the solid base which enables them to deal with the Hungarian kingdom as equals. The Catholic Germans of Austria will hardly consent to merge themselves in'the Protestant Germans of Prussia, unless secure of their due influence, unless they are a mass sufficient to be worth conciliation. But if the Southern States join Prussia, and find the junction not only endurable but pleasant, as Catholic Cologne, for example, has found, then indeed it will be hard_ to keep the Austrian States from their natural position as members of the united, prosperous, and externally powerful German Empire. Austria, tOo, really needs help to preserve the independence of the States of the Danube, which is becoming problematical, and she can hope to obtain it only from the West. On the whole, we incline to the belief that the telegrams are in the main true; and if true, they bode no good to the permanent peace of the world. Two very considerable empires, one admittedly strong, one perhaps stronger than it is for the moment believed to be, are united in the resolve to arrest a movement which has almost the force of a convulsion of nature, the movement of the Germanic people towards unity. Already enough of that unity _ has been accomplished to render resistance dangerous, and it may at any moment become almost hopeless. Hesse, it is perfectly understood, must obey any summons from Berlin. The people of Wurtemburg have announced, within the last fortnight, in an informal Parliament of notables, that they intend to join the North, to concede to her in their own words, an undivided military control. The Bavarian Ministry have prevented their King from visiting Salzburg by an expression of opinion which amounts to an exercise of moral coercion. In a few months the South, which is fretting under its isolation, will be enthusiastic for union, and then Count von Bismarck must either risk a great war, or give up the dream of his and his master's life. Is he likely to fear the risk ? He stated in Parliament, immediately after Sadowa, that he expected it, that Prussia was prepared for it, and that he hoped to keep the annexations Prussia had acquired with the sword. He either has secured St, Petersburg, as Continental statesmen believe, or he can secure St. Petersburg by offering aid to the south-east, and with that alliance an attack even from France and Austria need not look too formidable to be risked, At any rate, unless he risks it, lie may give up all hope of uniting Germany, and there is no reason to suppose that with a stake so enormous be will hesitate to take up good cards. His real opponent will be Frauce, and to France under an Empire, with a Sovereign who cannot select the best General lest he thereby promote a rival, with an army doubtful if it be well led, and a people demoralised by eighteen years of servitude, he opposes an army equally great, fully confident in its leaders, commanded by men whose victories help to cement the monarchy) and supported by a people young in spirit, drilled to perfection, and tilled with the hope of reaching a visibly attainable goal. We see no clear reason why Count von Bismarck should falter, and yet if he does not falter he comes straight athwart the Napoleonic bases of peace, a Germany cleft in two by a contemptible river. He may of course delay, may occupy these months in conciliating Hanover, and those in reorganizing the South, may even think it better to wait a possible revolution in Paris which might spare him all anxiety, but sooner or later, if Napoleon remains

upon the throne, and the papacy does not regain its hold on Munich, the conflicting ideas must clash with a clang that will reverberate throughout the world. And, looking to the disturbance the armed peace would create, the necessities of Napoleon, and the difficulty of restraining national enthusiasm both in Germany and in France, we can by no means believe that the interval, the moment of hushed breath, will be protracted. •It is not the interest of Napoleon to protract it beyond the spring, and he can at any moment inquire why Prussia, bound by the Treaty of Prague, is fortifying Mayence with iron plates. But England ? We do not like the part asiigned to England in this drama at all. There is not indeed, the slightest probability that Queen Victoria will visit Paris as a sort of Empress of Britain, with Mr Disraeli for Vizier, prepared to sign alliances, and take part in arrangements for remodelling Europe. That is not Her Majesty's role in life, and the telegram which assumes that position for her throws some discredit over the remainder. But it must not be forgotten that the existing Ministry is by long prepossession Austrian, that Mr Disraeli believes it the duty of Great Britain to be servile to Napoleon that both the aristocratic parties have expressed their resolution time and again not to consent to an united Germany, and that the interest of Great Britain in the East is, ou the whole, identical with that of Austria. She wants to keep Russia out, and so do the Hapsburgs. It is more than possible that England, if not asked for too much, might join such an alliance, might accept the Treaty of Prague as a new basis for the public life of Europe, might consider the independence and greatness of Austria indispensable to the independence and security of the East. That such a view would be fatal to our true interests, which command us to welcome Germany as a counterpoise to France, to hold our Eastern position by our own strength and not by alliances, and to see in the possession of Egypt full compensation for the expulsion of the Turks, is as little to the purpose as that it is our moral duty to support the nationalities. The Ministry are just as capable of miscalculating the chances of German consolidation as of American unity, it is as likely to believe Austria as indispensable to Europe as to hold with Mr Disraeli that the safety of England demands the independence of the Pope. It is hard to believe that the nation will, for the second time in six years, make the blunder of striving to prevent the growth of a nationality, but the Ministry may, and in foreign aftairs a resolute and unscrupulous Ministry—and Lord Stanley and Mr Disraeli together combine a maximum of courage with a minimum of scruples —in England. The telegram may be a pure invention, in form it is certainly an absurdity, but it is a strange one to circulate just after the Empress Eugenie's visit, and with Napoleon's imprimatur. The mere rumour of such an alliance tends to make him strong; and Napoleon's strengthjustnowis not a guarantee of peace.