Mr. GOBLETS LECTURE on the NEW ZEALAND CONSTITUTION BILL,

Lyttelton Times, Volume II, Issue 102, 18 December 1852, Page 8

Mr. GOBLETS LECTURE on the NEW ZEALAND CONSTITUTION BILL,

Delivered to the Lyttelton Colonists' Society, Dec. Ist.

The most convenient introduction to a lecture on the Constitutional law lately enacted for New Zealand will be, I think, a very brief and general summary of the constitution it is intended to displace ; that is, under which we now live.

That constitution is founded on an act of Parliament passed in 1840, by which her Majesty was authorized to erect New Zealand into an independent colony, and to constitute a form of Government for it by letters patent. In pursuance of this act, letters patent were issued, commonly called the New Zealand charter of 1840, by which New .Zealand was made a separate colony, the executive power was entrusted to a Governor and executive council, and the Legislative power to a Governor and Legislative Council. The Executive Council was to consist of the Colonial Secretary, Colonial Treasurer, and Attorney-General; the Legislative to consist of the same officers, with the addition of the three Justices of the Peace, whose names should be standing first in order in the commission of the Peace, such commission being liable to be revoked and renewed at the pleasure of the Governor.

Elaborate instructions accompanied the charter, limiting in a great many particulars the Governor's discretion in the exercise of the legislative powers vested in him by the charter, and limiting still further the powers of the legislative couucil, as contradistinguished by the Governor. The instructions provided that no ordinance should be enacted unless previously proposed by the Governor, and they enumerated a long catalogue of forbidden subjects on which the Governor was prohibited from proposing or assenting to legislation. The instructions further provided that all ordinances should be sent home for allowance or disallowance, and unless in some specially excepted cases, that they should not take effect until her Majesty's pleasure should be known upon them. It seems at first sight difficult to imagine why so elaborate and complicated a method for giving effect to the wishes of the Colonial Minister for the lime being was devised, and what use to any body there could be in a council selected entirely by the Governor, discussing only measures proposed by the Governor, and incapable of bringing any laws into operation until sent home to be approved or disapproved there. The only shadow or pretence of power which it had was negative; the power, that is, of refusing to pass the Governor's laws; and I leave you to imagine how much chance there was of that ever happening, when three out of the seven members were the Governor's own paid servants, and the other three nominated by him, and holding their seats at his pleasure "while he himself was to possess a casting vote in addition to his original one. I can understand, nay, I can appreciate the advantages of a pure monarchy. * For dependencies inhabited (as our penal colonies were at first,) only by convicts and soldiers, or (as our Indian empire still is,) by people incapableof working representative institutions, a local despotism is probably the best form of Government. Indeed, I have always considered the particular form of a Colonial Government as (although of course very important.) still secondary in importance when compared with its localization. lam tempted to go the length of saying, that the best possible men, governing a distant colony from England, would do more unwise and mischievous things than the worst possible men, living in the colony, and supported by no influence external to the colony. It is not then at present the power of the Governor which I am animadverting upon as pernicious. It is the absurd and anomalous mechanism by which, on the one hand, his complete subordination to the English Secretary of State is- provided for, and, on the other hand, his sense of responsibility is blunted, by permitting him to use the screen of a sham legislature, nominally colonial and independent, but in fact, incapable of offering the slightest barrier to his will.

The act and charter above referred to were repealed and abrogated in 1846, but revived in 1848, with an additional provision for increasing the number-of nominee councillors, and for enabling the Governor and Council to constitute Provincial Councils. That act and charter, therefore are the instrument of Government under which you now live, for it is

not worth while to describe in detail the provisions of an Ordinance establishing Provincial Councils which Sir George Grey passed in 1848 ; the Constitution framed by it possessed no vitality, and practically expired after one feeble Session. Still less need I discuss the second and still more futile measure carried by the Governor last year with a similar object. This latter measure, as you all know, never came into operation at all, and has just been comfortably buried out of our sight. What! have said may suffice to introduce a consideration of the Constitutional Law which has just been enacted for New Zealand. It is not my intention to take up your time with an enumeration and a detailed criticism of every clause and every provision in the Constitutional Act. I will assume that you have made yourselves acquainted with the substance of it already, and that what you wish to hear is rather a comment upon its general spirit, illustrated by occasional reference to particular clauses—an exposition, if I may use the phrase, of the philosophy of the measure, than any at? tempt at a complete and .exhaustive analysis. With this view of my subject, I propose to divide my observations on it, into three heads, viz. Those which apply to 1,. the relations which will subsist, under this constitution, between the Colony and the Mother Colony. 2. The relations between the Central and the Provincial Governments •, and 3, the form and functions of the various departments of Government in the Colony, together with such remarks as I may think nacessary to make on the minor features of the act.

Notwithstanding the concessions made in this act to the improved state of public opinion in reference to Colonial affairs, notwithstanding the practical advance in a right direction, which it exhibits, there is still much in it of what may be called the old leaven. The concessions seem to have been rather extorted one by one, from necessity and by importunity, than dictated by ah enlarged comprehension* of true doctrine. I see ho consistency in the construction of the scheme, no leading principle upon which some things are given and some withheld. If the modern theory of Colonial Government, that, namely, which has been acted upon for the last eighty years, be right, we have got too much power; on the other hand, if the old theory upon which the colonies of Rhode Island and Maryland were founded, be right, we ought to have a great deal more. I will explain what I mean ; the essence of the former or modern theory, is an idea that the Crown (which is the formula for expressing the Imperial authority whatever that may be) has in each colony an interest not;only distinct from, but opposed to, the interest of the inhabitants of the Colony. This notion pervades, colours, and shapes, the whole modern policy of Great Britain towards her Colonies. Those who hold it consider, of course, that their first duty, as loyal servants of the Crown, is to take care that whatever may he done for, or granted to, colonists shall be consistent with life retention, in its plenitude, of the ■" authority-of the Crown." This is the phrase that occurs everywhere, in dispatches, instructions, debates, charters, and laws. If we attempt to show that such and such a provision, say the power of disallowance of Colonial Laws within two years, is a practical grievance, we are met, not by an argument to show that there are practical advantages in the provision, hut. by the same axiomatic phrase ; " the power of the Crown must not be diminished." Sometimes no doubt, it may be incidently maintained by some reasoner more than usually bold, that it is for the advantage of the Colonists alone or chiefly that the power of over-ruling their wishes is reserved to the Crown ; a few will also contend vaguely, and without.going into detailed proof, that England reaps material advantages from interference with the. local affairs of colonies; but these are only the exceptions; the larger number of the advocates of Down-ing-street seem to rest their case upon the a-priori notion of the prerogative. "They will not surrender the prerogatives of the Crown." Even in the very latest discussion of colonial affairs of which we have intelligence, Lord Grey according to the newspaper report refuses to consent to the demands of the Legislature of New South Wales for local self-go-vernment, because they are in his opinion " lrreconcileable with monarchial institutions," and Lord Derby expresses his adhesion to that sentiment by an emphatic cheer. But I need not multiply examines; they will easily occur to every one of you,

The practical operation of this doctrine is the establishment iti all modern colonies of a system which is the converse of what we call local Self-Government. A system of which the main principle is, that an unlimited power of interference with and control over every matter and every person, connected with the making of colonial laws, and administering colonial Government, should be reserved to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Of course, this unlimited power will be exercised, move or less frequently and offensively by different ministers, but the Downing-streefc theory requires that they should all possess it, and be restricted in its exercise solely by their own prudence and . sense of right. The system, as hitherto worked, ■'; is consistent and complete. A Governor is appointed by the Colonial Minister in the name of the Crown, and holds his office at that Minister's pleasure. It is expressly provided that he shall be subject to instructions from the Minister. His tenure of office is, speaking generally, not long enough for him to acquire any permanent or deep-rooted interest in the country which he governs. It is to him what a military station is to the Colonel of a marching regiment—when the Governor of New Zealand gets the route for the Mauritius or the Cape, New. Zealand is to him what Gibraltar or Malta were to the battalion that was quartered there last year. His hopes and fears hang not upon you at all, not upon your likings or dislikings, your weal or Woe, but upon those whom the system assumes to be " the opposite party,"— namely the Minister of the Crown. Through the medium of this officer, hound as he is by duty and interest to implicit obedience, the Colonial Minister has his foot as I may say, upon the colonies ; he can do exactly as he likes with them. The Governor, subject to instruct ti.ons, appoints to'all Executive Offices, is in fact the sole Executive authority. He generally nominates either the whole, or part of the Legislature, and exercises, more or less, direct control over their initiative legislation. He always exercises an unlimited veto on all their bills. But the indirect control thus reserved to the Colonial Minister over local legislation is not enough. Lest the Governor should inadvertently assent to a Bill which the Minister might consider objectionable, an unlimited power of disallowance by the Minister himself always in the name of the Crown, is invariably provided ; moreover, as the Colonial Legislatures have nominally the power of voting and appropriating supplies, it is thought necessary, in order that the Imperial officers should he completely independent of them, to provide what are called Civil Lists or Schedules, that is, to reserve from the control of the Legislatures, a certain, generally a very large proportion, of the colonial revenues, and to pay out of it the salaries of the Governor himself, and as many of the public servants as he may think fit. Thus England no longer taxes the colonies ; she only allows them to tax.themselves, and then " appropriates" the proceeds. But besides all these legal powers, the Governor has another power which I will not call illegal, but which is indefinitely capable of being illegally used. I mean the power of ordering the Treasurer to issue public money, not necessarily according to the law by which they are appropriated, hut as he pleases. This power was admittedly used in a manner directly contrary to law in 1850-1, and I presume it will be again used illegally after the expiration of the present year, as the Legislature has,. I believe, only appropriated the revenue up to that time. Noav I can. see no practical way of controlling this power; the Treasurer is responsible to the Governor, but the Governor is practically not responsible at all. If he can make sure of being " backed" at home, I see nothing to prevent him, upon any case of asserted necessity, from appropriating •■ as he pleases, by means of this power, the whole revenue of the colony.

On. the whole, it is ; evident that theoretically as well as practically, the authority of the Secretary of State (acting in the name of the Crown) over modern British colonies is uncontrolled and complete. Against his will if he chooses to enforce it. the colonists can do absolutely nothing; cannot make a railroad, pass a vagrant act, nor dismiss a constable. It is vain to say that he does not, and will not, interfere vexatiously and oppressively ; the most abject servitude is always mitigated, more or less, by the prudence or humanity, or indolence of the masters. If he please, he'can do it universally ; as a matter, of fact, he does it often enough to constitute an intolerable grievance. But it is

not, after all, his personal interference that constitutes the worst part of the system ; the worst part is that his authority, supreme and paramount, gives to his local delegate powers of practical despotism, such as no merely local despot could safely exercise for any length of time. Upon a colonial Governor, speaking generally; the colonists have no hold at all. Their public opinion is nothing to him ; their physical force he laughs at; his eyes are always turned to England ; if he can make things and pleasant there, he can afford to 'ireat with supreme contempt, the remonstrances of the community which he rules. Colonial Governors constitute perhaps the only class of rulers in the world who have none of the more ordinary, or if you please, vulgar motives for consulting the welfare of their subjects, such motives, T mean, as hope, fear, patriotism, or personal sympathy. Of course you will now and then find men who are independent of, and superior to, ordinary motives, and who will do their duty solely because it is their duty. But most Governors are ordinary men, and require the stimulus of ordinary motives. The chances are therefore, that the system which I have described will produce, if only on this account, as bad Government as it is possible to conceive.

This exposition of the principle which runs through and supports the central system of Colonial Government is not irrelevant. I want to shew you how this principle works in an inconsistent, that is, a partial and diluted, manner throughout the while of our new Constitution. The framers of it did not recognise, perhaps, did not comprehend the radical viciousness of the constitution which they found existing; they have dealt, therefore, only with what appeared to them its practical grievances.

It is impossible not to see that the same paramount and controlling power which was reserved to the Crown by the former constitution is also reserved by this. The Governor, subject as usual to instructions from home, appoints to executive offices, possesses the power of unlimited veto, authorizes the issue of monies, has his civil list reserved, in short, is both theoritically and practically independent of the ■colonists, while both theoretically and practically he exercises an immense power in the management of their affairs. Besides this the power of disallowance by the Crown at its pleasure, that is at the pleasure of the Minister, is preserved.

It is true that there are two checks upon this power of the Minister and of his officer; one isthe power granted within certain limits to the representatives of the people over the public purse ; the other is perhaps hardly less important, it is the power granted to the people of authoritatively expressing their opinions and wishes through their chosen, representatives. These are important and valuable checks; still it must not be forgotton that almost all their efficacy depends either on the character of the Colonial -Minister, or- (more frequently) on the state of public opinion at home. In fact you all feel that your best safeguard against future oppression will still be the watchful' energy of those .friends to whom you owe the present measure. The letter of your law will not protect you. Your physical force is nugatory. The most' you can say is, that you have in your hands the means of impeding the action of a hostile government, and of unequivocally speaking: your sentiments with respect to it. But thisasnpt nearly-enough. If you impede the action of Government, you will yourselves, in the first instance at least, suffer a great deal more than your rulers. By speaking your sentiments you will exercise only an influence of which the extent must depend on circumstances over which you have no control. This state of things must not continue. Your liberties must not be left dependent on the varying chances of personal character or popular opinion. You must claim a charter for your rights ; a regular, legal, permanent security, such as no one can infringe upon without convicting himself in the face of the world, of illegality as well as oppression, violence as well as tyranny. For this purpose your representatives ought, in my opinion, to demand that a line may be drawn between matters of Imperial and matters of Local concernment, and that the uncontrolled and exclusive management of the latter may be left to yourselves. It; will be their business to maintain and to prove that the fundamental principle of the modern theory of' Colonial Government is erroneous, inasmuch as the Crown liaj and can

have no interest distinct from, still less opposed t0 tuat of the people of the colony, with but one exception ; that is except in connexion with their relations towards foreign powers. Interested, of course, the Queen and Parliament of England must be in everything that effects the general prosperity, and therefore the good local government of the colonies, but the point to insist upon is that they are less directly, less deeply interested than the colonists themselves, and that they are from physical circumstances, generally speaking, incapable of undertaking colonial caffairs and dealing with them to advantage. Therefore the interest, such as it is, of England in the local government of her colonies is best consulted by leaving it altogether to those who are more interested in and better acquainted with the subject. It is really childish to go on repeating the formular phrase " monarchical institutions," and making the Queen, as it were, the scape goat of her Ministers sins and follies. That colonists should make laws for regulating their own affairs, and choose officers for administering them, without the assent or interference of the Crown, involves no more an undue encroachment on the prerogative than that the Corporation of London, or the University of Oxford, or the East India Company should do so. If we look to precedents of Constitutional law we find that in the reigns of Charles L, and Charles 11., when doctrines of prerogative were at the highest, rights such as we now claim were freely granted to the North American colonies. Maryland, Connecticut, and Rhode Island possessed complete legislative and executive power, by charter, subject only to the vague and inoperative condition, that they should make no law "repugnant to the laws of England;" audit is certainly strange to hear Lord Grey and Lord Derby in 1852 denouncing as antimonarchical doctrines which Wentworth and Hyde did not hesitate to apply in 1634 and 1662. The charter granted by Charles to Connecticut ordained that the Assembly should consist of a-Governor, Deputy Governor, 12 assistants, and two deputies from every town, to be chosen by the freemen. The Assembly had authority to appoint judicatories, elect officers, make freemen, establish laws, '-not repugnant," &c, "according to the course of other corporations within this our kingdom," to assemble the inhabitants in martial'array and to exercise martial law;. In short, the powers of local self-go-vernment thus granted were complete and unlimited. The charter granted by the same sovereign to Rhode Island was almost identical in its terms. It still forms the constitutional law of the State. The charter of Maryland gave equally full powers to the people, subject to the rights of the proprietary and his heirs, the proprietary standing in the position of an hereditary Governbr. Such was the view taken by the Stuart Kings of the respective rights of colonies and: of the Crown.

If, on the other hand, discarding empty names, we look to the reality of things, what becomes of the flimsy talk about the supremacy of the Crown ? We all know—those know best in whose mouth the phrase is most frequently found—that the Crown means the Colonial Minister of the day, uncontrolled and unchecked, except in some extreme and rare cases, by the influence of public opinion, acting through the House of Commons. The question is not between the Crown and the people—not at all. It is between the Imperial Government and the Local Government; between the mother country and the colony. Until the Crown's power of vetoing Colonial Acts ' and appointing to colonial offices be given lip, the colonies cannot be said to possess rights of local self government. Politically speaking they are either practically enslaved, or at best, only free by sufferance.

The next point connected with the relations between the Mother Country and the Colony, to which I will draw your attention, is the reserved schedule or civil list. By the acti) 16,000 a year is reserved from the the power of the Assembly, and appropriated in a. manner partly fixed by the Act itself, and partly to be fixed by the Governor, under instructions from home. This civil list is not a large one, it is true; it is a much smaller one than colonies are generally saddled with, but it is nevertheless an important grievance, both theoretically as a badge of political servitudef and practically as weakening almost the only instrument of control over the Government which we are to possess. It is occasionally maintaii^d, that because in England a civil list, that) is, a number of salaries

attached .to certain public offices, is voted by Parliament at the commencement of every reign, and remains unchanged till the end of it, therefore there ought to be an analogous fixed appropriation in colonies. Those who talk thus forget, firstly, that the English civil list is voted by the representatives of the people of England, not by those of another people; and secondly, that the holders of offices comprised in it are appointed and dismissed practically, by the advice of ministers responsible to the people of England. No comparison, therefore, can possibly be drawn between that case and the one which we are considering. I am, as much as any man, in favour of making public offices as far as possible independent of an annual vote of a colonial assembly. But I entirely repudiate the doctrine that the British Parliament should fix their salaries, and until the people of New Zealand have some other more direct and legitimate mode of making their public servants responsible, I shall object to any tampering with the means of control which is afforded by a command of the public purse. I cannot see the slightest real difference between the grievance of an imposed civil list, and the grievance for the removal of which the Americans rebelled. It is just the same under another name—taxation without representation. The last point connected with this part of rriy subject which I shall mention, refers to the position and functions of the Governor. There are three distinct views which may be taken of the Governor's office. It is necessary that we should make up our minds which to prefer.

One view is, that which has been of late years universally applied throughout the British Empire ; according to it, the Governor appointed by and responsible to the Imperial Government, is altogether independent of the Colonists, yet always takes an important part in administering their affairs and generally governs them as absolute ruler. Another view is that which was r'ecog-. nized in the charters of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and several other of the old Colonies. It contemplated the Governor primarily, if not exclusively, in the light of a local officer. He was not, so far as I can make out, the organ or the representative of the Crown at all, held no commission from it, and was not subject to its instructions. In some cases he was chosen by the Colonists; in others (as in the proprietary Governments), his office was hereditary. In all the cases to which lam alluding, his functions were essentially municipal, and his position completely independent of tiie mother-country. The third view is" one which has never yet been brought into complete or consistent operation, but to which there has been for some years a tendency, more or less marked, towards approximating in the more powerful colonies of Great Britain. According to this view, the Governor would be primarily an Imperial Officer, holding his Commission from the Crown, subject to its instructions, and representing its interests. With respect to the colonists, he would stand somewhat in the position now held by the Sovereign of Great Britain towards his subjects ; that is, he would administer their affairs entirely through the instrumentality of advisers responsible to the representatives of the people, and possessing their confidence. Among these different theories of the Colonial Governor's office it will be necessary for you to choose, when you demand, as of course you will demand, a reform of your Constitution.

Of the first, which contemplates the Governor as an Imperial officer practically governing the colonists, it is not necessary that I should speak further, most of the observations which I have already addressed to you, being directed to show that it is irremediably pernicious and bad. The second, which contemplates the Governor as a colonial officer only, has the advantage of having been carried into eminently successful operation, both in the old colonies to which I have referred in describing it, and iv the United States of America, where the State Governors are chosen by the people of the States, and have no special relation,still less are subordinate or responsible to the President of the Central Government of the Union. It has, moreover, the advantages of simplicity, intelligibility, and if I may so speak, reality ; names correspond to things under it; the Governor actually governs; he has no divided duties, no doubtful responsibility : he is chosen by the people, paid by the people, responsible to the people. Where it prevails the form of the local Government is republican, like that of all our chartered corporations. In the eyes of fo-

reign nations, the Colony or State has no independent existence; it is merged.in the Imperial unity, by allegiance, by citizenship, by offensive and defensive alliance; but with its internal affairs there is neither theoretical nor practical interference. In each colony so constituted and organized, there might, perhaps, reside a representative of the Imperial power, who might he called Royal Commissioner, Lieutenant, or whatever else you please, but his functions would be absolutely restricted to those matters which the Constitutional law would, on the hypothesis, have excluded from the jurisdiction of the Local Government as matters of Imperial concernment —with merely local affairs he would have no more to do than if he lived in a foreign country. To a plan embodying something, like such a complete division of powers as this, I am myself inclined, as a theorist. I think on the whole, it would consist best with the circumstances and the feelings of British Colonists. But I doubt whether now or for some time to come, we can hope to see public opinion in England sufficiently advanced to assent to such a plan. It is strange, but true, that though it would have seemed natural and proper in the 17th century under the Stuarts, it would startle people very much now under what is, in fact, a Parliamentary Government. I hardly know whether even in the Colonies the balance of the best and most intelligent opinion would be in its favour. I am disposed to think, therefore, that as practical men, striving for what we can get, it will be more desirable that we should endeavour to obtain the realization of the last of the views enumerated above ; that, namely, of Government by means of responsible ministers. .It is superfluous to remind you that the Government of England is administered upon the principle of the responsibility of the Ministers of the Crown to the representatives of the people. The Sovereign, or Chief Governor, reigns by hereditary riglis, and is, therefore, independent and irresponsible; but the ministers, through whom he is obliged to act, are not only responsible de jure, but are also de facto dependent on Parliament for the means of carrying on the Government. Indirectly, therefore, the people of England exercise a complete control over the executive ; or at least, a control sufficient for all practical purposes, and excluding the possibility of direct collision. This system, which is not the result of deliberate contrivance, but which has grown, as it were, imperceptibly, out of the conflicts and struggles of British political parties, has been to a certain extent adopted in the North American colonies which still own allegiance to Great Britain ;in Canada, in Nova Scotia, and I believe, (thoiurh I am not sure), in New Brunswick and Newfoundland. In these colonies the Executive officers are chosen by the Governor, but they are chosen from among men who possess the confidence of the Legislative Assembly, and from those only. A decisive defeat in the House on what is considered a question of confidence, is fatal to the existence of the defeated Ministry, and results in the elevation of their victorious opponents. Now this system, which works very well in England, presents, undoubtedly, many difficulties, when we attempt to apply it to her dependencies. In the first place'it'is a question whether Colonial Governors, who are, be it remembered, not only Governor?, but also responsible and subordinate officers of the Imperial Government can be trusted to carry on the administration of the Colony permanently upon a system which is not fixed, as in England, by unalterable necessity. If they, or the Colonial Minister whose delegates and servants they are, choose to exercise their legal powers in an "un- . constitutional" manner, it might be very difficult for us to prevent them. In the case of a powerful country like Canada within ten days' sail of England, and bordering upon the United States, there may he a virtual security that responsible government being once established, will not be interfered with, but I confess I should not feel the same confidence with respect to the position of a feeble and distant colony like New Zealand nominally administered upon the same law. Observe that the Governor, as I said before, is upon this view something else besides Governor. As an officer and representative of the Crown, it would be absurd to be dependent upon you, either with respect to his functions or his sa'ary. He must therefore either draw his pay from Engiand, or have it imposed by England as a charge on the colonial revenue: so that in the exercise of the

plenary executive power bestowed on him by his commission, he will not be at all fettered by personal considerations. And of course it must be so, unless the whole system were altered, and he ceased to be the representative of the imperial authority. If the- reserved, schedule were withdrawn and you acquired thereby the right of stopping the supplies, it would be necessary for the Crown to secure the position of its officer in some other way. But being thus sesurc, with such an amount of theoretical authority, he could hardly fail, I think, to exercise a formidable influence over your local administration. I do not think you could expect him to act permanently and habitually the part to which use, tradition, and necessity have reconciled the sovereigns of England ; in a word to reign, and. not to govern. Besides, there is this practical difficulty in carrying the doctrine of Government by responsible ministers after the English fashion, into effect here, that it is very doubtful whether you will find in a small and poor community like this a sufficient number of men qualified to fill the higher offices of Government who could afford to hold them on such a precarious tenure as that of depending on the will of a majority in the General Assembly; or, on the other hand, men at the head of every political party which might obtain a majority in the Assembly, qualified to administer the various departments of the Executive Government. For all these reasons, as I said before, I cannot help thinking it would be found more convenient, that is, more conducive to good administration that the Governor himself should be chosen himself by the people for a fixed term and responsible to them, and that his ministers should be appointed by him and responsible to him only. There would thus he a certain continuity and permanence in the administration of public affairs, while the responsibility of the executive head would insure due harmony between the Government and the people. But having fully stated my opinion, I repeat that I think we are more likely to get responsible ministers, than a responsible Governor, and I will only add that either plan would in my opinion, sufficiently conduce to good practical Government.

I will next state what are, in my view, the questions which it would be right and proper to reserve from colonial jurisdiction, and place under the exclusive cognizance of the Imperial Government,..'and in doing so, I will use the words of one of a series of Resolutions moved by Mr. Adderley, in the British House of Commons, as an amendment on the Australian Constitutional Bill. " The only subjects which concern the interests and honour of the Empire with relation to these distant dependencies of Her Majesty are, Ist, the allegiance of the Colonies to Her Majesty's Crown; 2nd, the naturalization of aliens; 3rd, whatever relates to treaties between the Crown and.any foreign power; 4th, all political intercourse and communications between any of the colonies, and any officer/of a foreign power; sth, whatever relates to the employment, command, and discipline of Her Majesty's troopsandships within the eolohies,and whatever relates to the defence of the colonies against foreign aggression, including the command of the colonial militia and marine in time of war; and, 6th, whatever relates to the crime of high treason." Speaking more generally, it may be said that matters which concern allegiance to the British Crown, and relations with foreign powers, are,those which must be reserved, from colonial jurisdiction, for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the British Empire. For these restrictions the honours and advantages of British citizenship, and the protection of Great Britain against foreign enemies, will be an ample compensation ; nor do I think they would be felt by a single colonist as practical grievances. Before the time arrives when these colonies, conscious of power, shall demand the privilege of standing on equal terms with the mother country, in the family of nations, I trust, that increased facility of intercourse may render it practicable to establish an Imperial Congress , for the British Empire, in which all its members may be fairly represented, and which may administer the afftiirs which are common to all. It is necessary for me to remark, that I see no reason why intercourse with uncivilized native powers should be forbidden to Colonial Governments. It never was so in North America, and 1 do not see that the relations of our early colonies with natives were at all less satisfactory than those of our modern dependencies, where everything has been managed by Great Britain. Certainly the duties

and responsibilities which the old system mv posed on the colonists in this respects, seem to have formed a national character replete with self-reliance, energy, and political ability. The American Revolution was made by soldiers and statesmen ; if the Australasians are ever summoned to a similar struggle, it will find them if they don't take care, mere wool-growers and gold-diggers.

The only point connected with the relation between the Colony and the mother' country, which it remains for me to discuss, is that which regards the judiciary. It is a ques-^i tion whether there ought to be an appeal froin> * the Colonial Courts to the Queen in Council and it is a question how those provisions of the Constitutional law, which concern both the colony and the mother country, are to be interpreted and enforced, as regards the first question. I hold that, except in Admiralty cases,, there ought to be no such appeal,—with every possible respect for the great lawyers, who form the judicial committee of the Privy Council, I cannot but think that the advantage of the. superior ability and learning which they would bring to bear on the cases of Colonial"appeal, is counterbalanced by their want of conversance with local laws and customs, and for the extreme difficulty of getting the facts of those . cases clearly brought before them ;-while the right of appeal, if brought practically into ope- • ration, it would entail an amount of inconvenience, delay, and expense which can hardly be over-estimated. If the colonists Will determine to avoid the fatal economy which would tend to cripple the efficiency of the bench ; if they will make it worth the. while of high-.s principled and able men to fill their judicial offices, I. have no fear but that the public peace and the rights of individuals may be'amply secured and maintained without there being any necessity to keep an appeal to a tribunal 16,000 miles off, hanging over the heads of the unfortuate suitors. As regards questions which might arise between the colony and the mother country upon the subject mat-? ter and the boundaries of their respective jurisdiction, these I should be content to refer tothe Judicial Committee as at present constituted, or to the Judges in Exchequer Chamber^. There is, however, as yet no necessity for discussing this point as a practical question ; for there is now no distinct and independent Jurisdiction in the Colonial Government, and the Imperial authority being paramount in all questions, local or otherwise, the extent and manner of its interference depends altogether on the pleasure of the Colonial Minister. But if that most important ■ desideratum, the separation of juri^lictions, could be obtained, a tribunal analogous to the Supreme Court of the United States, which is the final interpreter of . the Constitution, would immediately become necessary for the purpose of enforcing and enacting that separation. Now as our only object would be to secure that a tribunal for this purpose should be independent and impartial, and as there is every reasonable guarantee for the independence and impartiality of the English Judges, I do not see that any better mode of reference could be arrived at, or required, than either of those which I have suggested. The cases in which their authority would be invoked, cases namely of disputed jurisdiction between the Imperial and Local Governments would in all probability; be rare. But it is most likely that if really free institutions were given to all the colonies, and the arbitrary power of the colonial office were removed, the same or some similar tribunal must be constituted, for the purpose of deciding disputed questions between different Colonies.

(To be continued-)

To the Editor of the Lyttelton Times. Christchurch, Dec. 13, 1852. Sir, —Will you oblige me by inserting the following in your next week's paper ? I am, Sir, you most obedient servant, C. W. Bishop.