BIG NAVY MUST WIN.

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume IV, Issue 431, 10 August 1915, Page 2

BIG NAVY MUST WIN.

DECIDING FACTOR TN THE WAR. AN ADAITRALTA’ SECRET. MEANS TO COMBAT SUBMARINES. (By a. Naval Officer in "Weekly Dispatch.”; Tlie complete anil undisputed, command of the. oceans of the world ’by the fleets of the Allies is a fac- : tor tif such decisive importance to- ; wards the final fate of our barbarian ■enemies that naval matters should '!:e (onfiniiariy studied ahmi'side tlie I daily events occurring on land. For ‘it must, always be remembered that ; it, lucky victory against superior I forces is so much more easily ata iininwl on salt, water than on land. •If we were to lose one big naval i battle our supremacy upon the sea ’ would be lost and t'he whole war : would crumble away, dooming our i fight, for “right and freedom” to ab-

' volute failure. It will only rem.ire one big naval 'batHc with the Germans competely ■to settle the fate of this world, one i way or the other, whereas tv>on ■land it will require <a still further series of battles, spread, over a very '.wide area, before the final outcome of that phase of operations is ass These facts are. of course, common knowledge to regular students of naval and military strategy, but {everv single citizen should realise jrh;it if Germany could destroy our ’capital ships only by any means and preserve the majority of her own intact it would mean utter defeat for the Allies upon land and sea. -with all its attendant horrors of starvaItion anti unspeakable atrocities. GUNS v. TORPEDOES. Nor would the programme end ’there, but this should he enough to show those who are unacquainted (with the importance of the naval ’side of this great war the tremen- . dens issues dependent upon it. ( No matter what happens on lan-.I |the final result of this war depends absolutely and entirely upon the !navy. ’ This brings us to the much debatied subject of Lie comparative values ot capital ships—i.e., battleships and '(nowadays) battle cruisers and subI marines.’ If Germany possessed a 'thousand more submarines she ' would not he in command of the : seas until she possessed a prepon.Iderance or "superior equality” in I capital ships as well. I A good way t.o view this is to ■imagine the position reversed, and ito assume, we have a thousand subj marines and a few capital. ships to Germany’s comparatively few sui>inarines and big battle fleet. If this were the case, what would step the German cruisers from sweeping the seas, backed up, nt any time wanted, by the support of the capital ships? And although we iidglit do plenty of damage, it is obvious that our underwater craft could never keep our ports open to the world’s ci.inmew and the necessaries upon which we depend for cur national assistance. j It is thus quite clear that tlm capital ship is. relatively,.of vastly I greater importance than the- subimarine, for, again, the former can

Ipermanently exist without the latjter, but not vice versa.. I Fortunately, our chief naval ad- | vipers have not been misled, on this Ijioint, and owing to their wise foreI sight we are at present in an almost 'impregnable position on sea, always j recognising that this is due more to 'the personnel who man and build ’the ships than the material ami ! scientific marvels composing them. | ONE OF OUR. SEORETS. I I No outside person, .can quite ; realise the tension this ceaseless •vigilance entails upon our active ; sea-going naval staffs, for while ! Germany has only a few submarines 'and small vessels out—not including !t'ie Baliic Sea—the whole of our immense war and inerrant marine is I constantly keeping the sea. present-, ling a huge target to torpedoes and mines.

Many interesting and important incidents have already happened on <lm naval side which it has been thi-iight inadvisable to publish, an I in tun article detiling with naval matters a writer is confined to gem raliHes, for the secrets <d' the sea tire numerous and iet’dously guarded these- dais. It is now too late for Germany to try to make an effort to equal un in cttijital shins; tail, although the fact is carefully concealed from thepublic, her chiefs now- know positively that size for size our guns and mountings are infinitely superior; and this is a bitter pill to swallow. This fact has also been partly responsible for' their almost complete failing- back on torpedoes and mim s, ami the desperately, ’hurried concentration on the building of under-water craft, rather than on suirer-Drpadnoughts ; hut we can afford to smile, for the means to comb.*:! these cr.rlv (-rrci’s is already one of i,nr score i s.