The Hawera Star THURSDAY, MARCH 28, 1935. PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

Hawera Star, Volume LIV, 28 March 1935, Page 4

The Hawera Star

THURSDAY, MARCH 28, 1935. PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

Delivered every evening by 5 o’clock in Hawera, Manaia. Kaupokonui, Otakeho, Oeo, Pibama, Opunake. Eltham, Kgaere, Mangatoki, Kaponga, Awatuna. Te Kiri, Mahoe, Lowgarth, ilanutahi, Kakaramea, Alton, Hurleyville, Patea, Whenuakara, Waverley, Mokoia, Whakamara, Ohangai, Meremere, Fraser Boad and Ararat*.

The agreement signed at Washington giving ten years of “home rule” to the Philippine Islands, is an experiment in self-government about which there is a good deal of misgiving regarding the outcome. Though most Filipinos still regard independence as desirable, their more responsible leaders contemplate the economic and political future of their country with gloomy misgivings. It is significant ‘that the Act for' Philippine Independence passed by Congress in 2.933 was rejected in the Philippine legislature by a substantial majority because of its trade provisions. The political scales were tipped to the side of independence by considerations of trade and naval strategy. Particularly since 1930, the United States beet sugar industry has found it difficult to compete with duty-free sugar from the Philippines, and no duty can be imposed while the Philippines remain a part of the union. Similarly, labour unions on the Pacific coast favour independence because it will make possible restrictions on the entry of cheap Filipino labour. The naval aspect of Philippine independence is not so generally understood. Sir Frederick WFyte, who was until recently political adviser to the Chinese Government, and has an unrivalled knowledge of Far Eastern diplomacy, put the matter in a nutshell when he declared that the United States Government was sacrificing a pawn to consolidate a defensive position. It has long been recognised that Japan’s defensive position in Far Eastern waters is unassailable. “Japan,” wrote an American admiral in 1921, “stands well-nigh impregnable to direct attack. ... For any attack on Japan as matters now stand, the enemy must be in possession of a fleet about three times as powerful as that of the defence.” In the circumstances the possession by the United States of a Far Eastern naval base becomes a source of weakness rather than strength. In the event of a Avar with Japan an attempt to defend it would probably be a strategic blunder. Opinions on the Avisdom of abandoning the Philippines as an American naval base are varied, some observers being of opinion that it means surrender to Japan.