DISARMAMENT

Hawera Star, Volume XLVII, 26 November 1927, Page 5

DISARMAMENT

FAILURE AT GENEVA THE GOVERNMENT BLAMED. A LABOUR CRITICISM. ; AND A SPIRITED DEFENCE. BY CABLE—PRESS ASSOCIATION—COPYRIGHT. LONDON, Nov. 24. In the House of Commons to-day, Air Ramsay' .MacDonald submitted a motion deploring the Govern men l’s lack of piv.’paiiaLioii and the military character of the British delegation io Geneva. which, the motion declared, serioUvs’v contributed to the failure of the Naval Conference at Geneva and the slow progress of the League’s preparatory disarmament commission, also the Government,’s refusal to accept the principle of arbitration and the promotion of a scheme of international security guaranteed by the LeagueAll- MacDonald expressed the opinion that the Genova naval conference had loen bungled from beginning to end. Great Britain having failed to scout the field before joining battle. The only chance of an Anglo-American agreement and an American 'agreement with the rest of the world was for Great Britain and America to come 1 together. and remove the chance of war. The conference failed because war methods instead of peace methods wen followed, experts being allowed to usurp politicians’ functions. Great Britain was pledged under every' peace treaty to promote peace and disarmament, but no real disarmament conference had yet Ireen held, only discussions on how to reduce armaments in order to save money. Viscount Qacil’s statement of the manner in which he was hampered whenever he came to a proposal of practical disarmament was unanswerable. Parliament’s duty was to compel the Government to carry out the country’s na. nable intention and go ahead quicklv towards disarmament and arbitration security. If the Government faced the problem of common security there would bi? no (difficulty from the viewpoint of the Dominions, and as Russia was joining in the explorations security could proceed. Fir Austen Chamberlain’s duty was to bring the Empire as> a united powerful force into the eoune-ls of Europe and contribute to the system of peace. Sir Austen Chamberlain appeared to be setting up the Empire against the League of Nations, in which he was -uite Token. It was true that under the British Government’s - prompting tiie Government’s of Australia, and Canada, rejected the protocol of 1924. but the -o-ot'oeol was only the first draft. He believed the Empire coin'd find a form which was not merely words. Sin- Austen Chamberlain, in reply; said that Viscount Cecil’s reasons for resigning were, firstly, Air AlacDonald’s own rejection of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance; secondly, the present Government’s opposition to the protocol: thirdly, dissatisfaction with the naval conference. The Government found that any attempt to amend the protocol would necessitate' its entire recasting. The Government was charged with not making diplomatic preparations before the naval confer-* enc-e. but hitherto the Opposition had attacked him for sticking to the methods of old diplomacy instead- of open v facing the world without previous baekstair understandings. Sir Austen accepted sonic of the blame for thi3 lack of diplomatic preparation, but the conference \yr<s held at the instigation of the United States, and the British Government refrained from .reekiiin; a preliminary understanding lest it should appear to America to be seeking to evade acceptance of the invitation.

Tire debate was interrupted by the electric lights throughout the whole of Westminster Palace going, out. Later, the Rt. Hon. W. C. Bridgeman. First Lord of the Admiralty, suniniied nn the debate on behalf of the Government. He pointed out that the Labour Government was the first to lav down the 10,000 ton cruisers -authorised bv the Washington Conference. and in iris opinion it was blip best thing they ever did. It was useless to pretend there was a warlike spirit in Great Britain. The whol;?, country was iu favour of peace, hut even the League of Nations .sometimes looked to the British 'Navy bo control the pea-tv? of the world. Mi- MacDonald’s motion was’defeated by 318 votes to 105. An amendment moved by Mr. A. Duff Cooper, Conservative member for Oldham, “that this House, recognising that the Government’s efforts have been constantly directed to the maintenance of peace, the reduction of armaments, and the advancement of the authority of the League of Nations, remains opposed to Great Britain assuming the extended dangerous obligations emuodied in the protocol ot 1924, and approves the Government’s poliev,” was carried by 28S votes to J 6. SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN’S REPLY. On resuming when the lighting was partially restored, Sir Austen Cliamoerlain said he thought the lesson of the Naval Conference was that diplomatic preparation was always necessary before conferences. It would also he only after great preparations that there "could he any hope of a League disarmament conference succeeding. Those wlio wanted to hurry and press matters before the ground was prepared were likely to he confronted by the same disappointment as was experienced at the Naval Conference.

Apropos of the Leaguxe Assembly resolution outlawing wars of aggression, Sir Austen said he was not prepared to define aggression. He thought the League was mistaken in attempting such strict rules, Tor in the unknown future circumstances would probably lead to an occasion when an unhappy term of definition would enable an obvious victim of aggression to lie described as the aggressor. Replying to Mr. MacDonald’s definition of an aggressor as a party refusing arbitration. Sir Austen pointed out that the covenant already bound the signatories not to go to war until they had exhausted every method of judicial arbitration or conciliation by the League Council. “But do not let us under-rate the limitations which the covenant itself puts on the right to go to war or the obligation t-o exhaust peaceful methods before going to war,” he added. He would be the last man to suggest that the Government’s present attitude ought to he Britain’s attitude ali the time. The Government had not agreed to sign the optional clause on arbitration, because last year’s Imperial Conference agreed it would lie premature. All the British parties agreed that even if it were signed tlieie would have to he reservations. such as everything concerning the Dominions’ relations within the

Empire or internal matters within the jurisdiction of the State itself.

“What contribution to a sense of general security would such a restricted signature give if we were not prepared to make engagements in advance which, before fulfilment, might require the'legislation of seven parliaments ?’* Sir Austen asked. “This does not mean that we are not prepared to use arbitration to the fullest measure. I hope Englishmen at least will not forget what Britain has done in the matter of disarmament or arbitration. We have arbitrated on more important disputes than any other country in the world. For instance, we arbitrated or, the Alabama question, the Russian destruction of British fishing boats on the Dogger Bank, though the latter question was for the honour of our flag. We arbitrated on the Alaskan boundary, though many Canadians were or the opinion that they would therein have sacrificed vital interests. We arbitrated on the Mosul boundary. THE LOCARNO PACT. ‘ Those were iour gigantic questions in which we accepted arbitration, but we cannot undertake in advance to arbitrate in all cases when we feel we may not have power to secure obedience to an adverse award. We have practised arbitration in the past and hope to do so in the future. We had to take new and large risks in the Treaty of Locarno, which was an immense contribution to the security oi Europe.” Sir Austen Chamberlain said he did not pretend there would be no further trouble in Europe, but they could meet the difficulties in a more cheerful spirit and with greater confidence since Lo-

a.-no. The Governments of the States of the Empire who liad not signed the protocol had their own reasons. “I have no reason to believe any of them iia-i e changed their minds.” Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had suggested that everyone favoured the protocol except Britain. “If so, nothing prevents them from operating. The real reason for the agitation, is that the British„ Navy would not be of service to the'" League for the purpose of the sanctions. There is an immense difference between the covenant as it stands and the fresh obligations Mir. MacDonald recommends. In order to pool the security of the world we have pursued a more restricted and more modest role. Wherever, either at the League or otherwise, the Government could help to remove niisunderstfindings we have been glad to do so. Where we have been in a dispute, for instance in the Mosul, we accepted the arbitrament of the League, and when the award was in our favour we used it only to negotiate a settlement. “1 challenge the House to say anj Power lias done more than Britain in the cause either of security or disarmament. Home have talked more, some wanted to pass more resolutions and sign more papers, but who has done more, let him throw the first stone.” NO ENEMY ON HORIZON. Mr. Lloyd George thought Sir Austen Chamberlain had dealt most inadequately with disarmament. So long as there were huge armaments in the world, arbitration and conciliation would be impossible. The first step, therefore, was to armaments. At the present moment 15,009,000 men m Europe could be called up for slaughter with equipment such as the world had never seen for horror and destruction.

The League’s Disarmament Commission had made no progress in the last two years because conscription was outside the scope of its inquiry. Other countries complained that Britain and America, who did the most blethering about peace, were increasing their naval expenditure. Risks must be taken for peace as they were taken for war Mr. Lloyd George did not see much risk. There was no enemy on the horizon. During Disraeli’s and Salisburv’s time the defence of the Empire cost two per cent, of the national income. Now it was costing 3.1 per cent. Though the German fleet was at the bottom of the ocean and ours at present could engage and sink all the fleets of Europe, the Government at the beginning of its regime formulated a naval programme which involved the expenditure of £65,030,000 to 4;<0,000,COO on new ships. We were the pioneers of arbitration; now the feeling at Geneva is that we are holdingback and stopping the way. Mr. Lloyd George hoped:Sir Austen Chamberlain at Geneva would use his influence for disarmament and arbitration, “without which 1 think in the not distant future there will be such an upheaval as the world has nevei seen.”