WATCHFUL WAITING

Hawera Star, Volume XLV, 26 January 1926, Page 5

WATCHFUL WAITING

JAPAN’S ATTITUDE. IN HARBIN DISPUTE. BOTH PARTIES BLUFFING. BY CABLE—PRESS ASSOCIATION—COPYRIGHT Received Jan. 26, 10.28 a.m. TOKIO, Jan. 25. Despite rumours to the contrary, the Foreign Office states that the Government docs not intend to mediate in the Harbin dispute, but will continue its policy of watchful waiting. Though it regards the situation as .delicate, it is understood the Government considers that both parties are bluffing, therefore it is hopeful that hostilities will not break out.—Renter. LONDON, Jan. 24.

Mr. Perceval Lanilon, telegraphing to tlm Daily Telegraph from Peking, expresses the opinion that the control of the Chinese eastern railway is the key to the imbroglio with Russia. It lias been the property of tlm Soviet since the White Russians were defeated, blit the Chinese soldiers claimed the right to use the railway, and when M. Ivan off, the manager, demanded payment Chang Tso Lin arrested Ivano'X thus definitely challenging the Soviet’s authority in ‘China, where propaganda has been costing Russia £3,000,000 annuallv

When she failed to convert China tc Bolshevism through Chinese leaders, the Soviet began stirring up the Chinese masses to violence by the direct, stimulation policy, which, however, proved a fiasco. The Russian attack is likely to establish Chang’s position as the saviour of China.

The Riga correspondent of The Times says advices from Moscow portray the Bolshevist leaders as dismayed at, Manchurian developments. Apparently the Soviet action is intended merely to hamper mobility against the so-called national armies, and Chang’s determined retaliation came as a bombshell to Moscow, where the view seems to prevail that open and effective intervention is impossible in the present circumstances, especially a.s it is believed that it would involve a clash with Japan. It is held that Chang would not risk what he is risking without the assurance of Japanese support. It is reported that the movement of considerable Red Army forces towards China is regarded as a mere bluff, as also is the veiled threat contained in M. Tchiteherin’s three-dav ultimatum.