THE ARMISTICE.

Hawera Star, Volume XLVIII, 29 November 1924, Page 15

THE ARMISTICE.

HOW IT WAS MADE,

MARSHAL FOCH’S STORY

(By Edouard J. H. Dulieu in the Sydney Morning Herald.)

For the 6th anniversary of the armistice I thought it would be of interest to translate an interview of Marshal Foch on the armistice, published in the French newspaper Le Matin. The occasion of ’ the interview was the. visit of the great soldier to Amiens to commemorate the day the Australians stopped the big German punch, and the place, the historical railway carriage (now at the French War Museum), in which the paper which ended the greatest war was signed. There was no ta'lk then of granting an international loan to Germany, nor any protest about her responsibility for the war. “W'hat is an armistice,” says the Marechal; “a truce a cessation of hostilities, whose object is the discussion of peace when the Governments who agree to it are in such a position as to impose peace as they 7 want it.

“Has the armistibe that I signed on the 11th November, 1918, fulfilled this condition? Yes, since on the 28th. June, after seven months’ negotiations, Germany has accepted all the conditions of thej Allies. I had told the Premier, M. \ Clemeneeau : ‘This is my armistice ; you can now make any peace yqu wish; I am in a position to impose it.’ Is it my fault if the peace has not be e n good? I have done my work. It was for the politicians and the heads of Governments to do theirs.

“I had been thinking of the peace fof a long while. From September, 1918, I wrote to M. Clemeneeau and said to him: ‘The end of the war is in .sight. Send me an agent from the Foreign Office to let me know exactly the conditions of peace you are preparing, in order that our armies may occupy all the territories which will have to be the guarantee of the carrying out •of the peace treaty that you make.’

“M. ClemenCeau answered me: ‘This is no business of yours.’ ” There the reporter notes that- when Marshal Foch said that M. Clemeneeau or any other treated him with disrespect, or even coarsely repulsed him in such and such circumstances, he had a pleasant smile, and generally chose -that very moment to light his pipe, while saying; “Yes, yes, this is so.” Then the Marshal told us of the .meeting \V'ith the German delegates. “When I saw r them coming in the railway-carriage, Erzberger ad the two others, accompanied by a naval officer, whose name I- have ’forgotten, I was, for a moment, much affected. I said to myself: ‘So this is the German Empire. Well, since it is coming to me, I will treat it as it deserves to be treated. It is beaten; I will be firm, cool; but will bear no malice nor spite.’ For, after all, they were jolly well beaten,” said th e Marshal in a deep tone, apparently sneaking to his pipe.

“I had arrived at Rothondes on the evening of the 6th. My train was shunted to a siding. The following day another train. arrived very- slowly behindhand. It was the German train. A gangway was put between the two trains on account of the mud. Shortly after Weygand (then Chief of the Staff of the Marshal) came in and told me that the German delegates were there. Erzberger came first, and introduced the other to me in a rather indistinct voice. I said: ‘Gentlemen, have you any papers We will examine their validity.’ They- 1 showed me papers signed Max de Bade. We considered them satisfactory. I turned to Erzberger and said to him: ‘What do you want from me?’ ‘We have come,’ he answered, ‘to receive communication regarding the conditions on which you want to mjike the armistice.’ I answered: ‘I have no communication to make,to,you. If you have any demand to present to me, let me have it,’ and he gave new explanations. I said : ‘Do you ask for the armistice?’ He replied: ;‘We ask for it.’ I then answered : ‘I will therefore let you know, through my intermediary, on what con-ditions-the Allied Governments consent to grant you the armistice.’ “ AYe then sat down in the next carriage, where my offices were, Admiral Wevmss on my right, Weygand on my left, Erzberger between Obendorf and ■ Winterfield, in front of me. Weygand read them the conditions, which were translated as soon as read. I could see them becoming dejected. Winterfield was very pale. I think he was crying. As soon as the reading was over, I s aid: ‘Gentlemen, I leave these terms with you. You’have J2 hours in which to answer them. During that .time you may make me any observations on the details.’

“Then Erzberger became pathetic. ‘I beg, Monsieur le Marechal, do not wait these 72 hours. Stop hostilities from to-day. Our armies are the prey of anarchy, bolshevism threatens them, this bolshevism nnghtTeach Germany, all Central Europe, and threaten France herself.’

“I did not give way, and replied: ‘I do not know in what state your armies are, I only know the condition of mine. Not only can I not stop the offensive, but I am giving the order to continue it with redoubled energy.’ “Then Winterfeld spoke. He had notes before him, and had carefully prepared his argument. ‘We must consult our staff at headquarters,’ he said, ‘and discuss together the technical points. How can we do it ? How can we communicate if hostilities continue? I ask you for thpse technical reasons to stop hostilities.’

“I answered him: These technical discussions well be quite opportune in 72 hours’ time. Until then the offensive goes on.’

“They retired. _ As for me, I sent to all the Allied armies a last appeal to the courage and energy of all. All the Com-manders-in-Chief sent me the enthusiastic answer: ‘Depend on us. We will not stop.’ “I pass over the three following days. The Germans tried to overwhelm us with papers. Weygan received them, and transmitted them to me. ‘On the evening of the 10th, I reminded the Germans that they must sign the next day. They received a long telegram from Hindenburgh, telling them to sign. But revolution broke out in Berlin, and I said to them: ‘Who do you represent now?’ They showed me a telegram from President Ebert, a telegram in cipher, which was signed, I do not know why, ‘606, This telegram confirmed their power. “In the night- from the 10th to the 11th I did not sleep much. I rested from midnight to one o'clock, then the Germans came. I conceded them 5000 machine-guns and motor lorries. That was all. At 5.15 they signed, with big, angry handwriting. At 7 I was leaving for Paris.” “At 9 a.m. I was at M. Clemenceau’s. He was not particularly genial. He was grumbling. He asked me what I I had conceded to the Germans. . . . All that is of no importance. ... I told

him that the cannon must be fired at 11 o'clock to announce the end of hostilities. He wanted that to take place at 4 p.m.. when he would be going up the tribune, of Chamber,-’of- Deputies. I told him that the Allied armes were warned to be on guard since the night by my order, that the last shot would be fired at 11 o’clock, and that everyone would know it. On these words, M. Barthou aiid other personalities came into his office, and backed me up. He agreed to fire the guns at 11 a.m. “I said to him: ‘My task i§ over; yours begins.’”