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DEFENCE OF PACIFIC.

AN AUSTRALIAN VIEW-POINT. JAPAN'S STRATEGIC POSITION. / LONDON, May 16. Sir Hugh Denison, K.8.E., proprietor of the Sydney Sun, was the guest of honour at the Royal Colonial institute dinner this week, and afterwards he gave an address on Australia and the Pacific. The first part of his lecture was devoted to the discovery and the development of the Australian Continent, and then he went on to speak of the position in the Pacific. At the outbreak of war in 1914, he said, it became necessary to capture the many German colonies in the Pacific which might be used as bases for raiders against our commerce. The British Admiralty entrusted the work in the South Pacific to the Australian Navy, and that, in the North Pacific to our Allies, the Japanese. Before 1914 was ended the Japanese had under their control, with the consent of the British, the Caroline, Marshall, and Ladrone groups, positions which might eventually give them the hegemony of the Pacific. Australia was momentously concerned with the Japanese occupation of these strategical positions, and it could he understood what Australia, felt when she realised her trade routes in the North would be out off in the f uture when the interests of . the Commonwealth and Japan inevitably clashed 1 hese points were undoubtedly overlooked by the representatives of the British Empire, which included the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, when Japan was given the mandate for all those islands, which would strengthen her hold in the Pacific. The more settled European mind found it difficult to follow the purposes of the Asiatics, who were careful not to make those purposes more palpable. Great Britain was anxious to offer her Ally something substantial lor her share of the war, and it was evident that the representatives of Australia and New Zealand .did” not see the importance of the question that was before them. America was resentful, for if Japan continued to grow in the same ratio as she had done in the past thirty or forty years the United States would have to fight for the retention of the Philippines, and would he in very serious disability by reason of not having any base tor her warships. And that advantage to Japan,was a colossal disadvantage to Australia. it was curious to note that Japan was lorming settlements of strategic advantage all round the Pacific-. It" was so in Mexico, and in South America. It might be said that the mandate prohibited fortifying the mandated territories. It might he so, but did anyone suppose that any docks that the Japanese built on these islands for commercial purposes would not he used in time of war. If the Japanese chose to ioitifv any of these islands, in despite of the League of Nations, who was going to prevent their doing so? Did anyone suggest for a single moment that Japan would give up her mandate at the courteous behest of the League of Nations? Japan-• was a loyal’ ally, but she was» resentful of the Australian immigration policy, and the friend of to-day might become the enemy of tomorrow.-

He looked upon this matter ns an Empire question, and not as one pertaining to any party. It concerned the safety of a great integral nart of the Empire, and it was a matter, not for nnv one section, lout for the Empire as a whole. Germany .was defeated, America. was not likely to desire to extend her territories, especially so far afield. The only possible menace came from the North, where there was an ambitious and progressive nation whose people were clamouring for new outlets for their energies and race expansion. If they could keep intruders away from that part they were doing the rioht thing. U the Imperial Conference the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand stressed the great importance of the. arrangement for some strong naval base, outside Australia, if necessary. If at the time of the Washington Coin ferenc-e, such an adverse decision in regard to Singapore a s had been taken had been dreamed of, the Australian and New Zealand delegates would not have been so ready to agree to the decisions which were come to, without having a- clear understanding a s to the sacrifice ol the only big modern warship that was possessed by Australia, lie hoped that on reconsideration of this great matter the British Government would remember what wa s due, not only to this part of the Empire. Hit also to those of their own kith and kin who in the recent hour of danger gave both their lives and their money that this great commonwealth of nations which we called the British Empire. might be maintained intact for the benefit of civilisation, and the freedom and security of • its people, not, only in the North Sea. hut also in the outlying parts of the world.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/HAWST19240705.2.6

Bibliographic details

Hawera Star, Volume XLVIII, 5 July 1924, Page 3

Word Count
820

DEFENCE OF PACIFIC. Hawera Star, Volume XLVIII, 5 July 1924, Page 3

DEFENCE OF PACIFIC. Hawera Star, Volume XLVIII, 5 July 1924, Page 3

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