The Hastings Standard Published Daily TUESDAY, SEPT. 28, 1897. SPAIN AND AMERICA.

Hastings Standard, Issue 437, 28 September 1897, Page 2

The Hastings Standard Published Daily TUESDAY, SEPT. 28, 1897. SPAIN AND AMERICA.

For the cause that lacks assistance, For the wrongs that need resistance, For the future in the distance. And the good that we can do.

The cables of the past few days have made us realise that the rebellion in Cuba still goes on merrily, and that Spain has accomplished very little in the matter of subjugating the islanders. The interference of the United States has been anticipated for some time, and repeated efforts have been made in Congress to obtain for the insurgents belligerent rights. Resolutions embodying such a proposal have been passed twice by Congress, but neither President Cleveland nor President M'Kinley deemed it prudent to accept the responsibility. Major M'Kinley is, however, pledged to interfere, but the anxiety to get the Dingley Tariff Bill off his hands has prevented him from taking action. It is needless to say that the Americans are anxious to interfere. The Yankees are apparently spoiling for a fight, and just the moment the foreign policy of Mr Sherman, the Secretary of State, is likely to bring the Great Republic into conflict with Spain and Japan. The Government of Madrid has foreseen the probability of American interference and has been quietly preparing against the contingency. The American Ambassador at Madrid has apparently sent in an ultimatum, and although bis note is friendly its purport is unmistakably hostile. " Unless satisfactory assurances were given that the war would be completed before the meeting of Congress" is the tenor of the note, and we may be sure that Spain will give no assurance, satisfactory or otherwise. When the Yankees approached Spain as mediators the Spanish Government politely but firmly replied that Spain would take her own time and choose her own methods of pacifying the island. In Madrid it is considered that war with the United States is inevitable, and we are far from believing that the Yankees will have it all their own way in the tussle. Spain has been strengthening her navy by purchases of war vessels, while the Americans have done a little in that direction, but nothing in comparison to Spain, The relative naval strength of the two countries early in the year was given as follows :—Spain—l battleship, 90 cruisers, and 16 torpedo boats'; United States —5 battleships, 47 cruisers, and 17 torpedo boats. Spain thus possesses 107 vessels to the 69, or, if we include 19 port-defence vessels, 88 owaed by

America. The Spanish Government, as we have stated, has increased its naval strength, and 12 torpedo craft besides cruisers have since been added to the navy list. In addition to the numerical superiority in war vessels, Spain, it is generally believed, may count upon the active support of Japan. An offensive and defensive alliance is reported to have been concluded by these two countries as against the United States, and with the Japanese navy added to the Spanish material, our Yankee cousins will have a contract in hand that will be anything but profitable? at the finish. The Americans are largely interested in Cuba, the trade between the island and the mainland being very considerable. Indeed one magazine writer attributes the civil war in Cuba to the machinations of the detestable Yankee rings. This writer declares that the Cuban insurrection is the work of the great Sugar Trust of New York, an organisation of a truly gigantic nature, controlling unlimited capital. Its first proceeding was to buy up the entire sugar crop of the Southern States, and then to operate for such a rise in the market as would give the speculators a profit of ceut per cent upon the transaction. This was accomplished by destroying the only important source of supply which could enter into competition with the home-grown crop. Cuba raises about 1,200,000 tons of sugar per annum, and exports largely to the States. To destroy this source of supply a revolutionary band of Cuban mullatos and kuadroons sitting in New York were furnished, it is said, with an enormous subsidy, and within a month the island was ablaze with the flames of insurrection. The crops in the ground were destroyed, and the stocks in hand were burned. This is a sensational statement to make, and were it not supported by an Englishman it would scarcely be credited. Mr J. Fitzmaurice Kelly, in an article in a recent number of the New Review, says, with respect to the insurrection, that " it is. confessedly the work of speculators in New York and Key West, using Hayti as their base ; and were the result successful it is certain that the American mortgagees would endeavor to foreclose." MiKelly states that the political grievances of the Cubans have 110 real existence. The rebellion, 110 matter what was the primary cause of it, seems beyond the power of Spain to suppress, notwithstanding that she has made enormous sacrifices of men and money to accomplish the task. If Spain and the United States come to blows there can be no doubt of the ultimate victory of the Yankees. The Spanish Treasury is well-nigh empty; and the country is in no condition to stand the strain of a prolonged war with a nation so rich in resources as America. Even supposing the aid of Japan may be counted upon, still we are ready to believe that the Yankees_ will triumph. The road to victory will not be easy, and the cost must be reckoned even with a wealthy nation. General Weyler promises to crush the insurgents in four months. While that may be his desire there is every reason to doubt his ability to perform the feat. He has been some time at work with an army numbering from 200,000 to 250,000, and his successes have been few and far between. At any rate he cannot possibly subjugate the Cubans before the end of next month, by which date, according to tha Yankee ultimatum, some satisfactory assurance must be given. The Spaniard may not wait for America to strike the blow but may choose to hit out at once, a pretext for which can be found easily enough.