BETWEEN BIG TWO

Grey River Argus, 4 January 1946, Page 5

BETWEEN BIG TWO

BRITAIN’S POSITION In International Sphere LONDON, January 2. The “Glasgow Herald” asks whether the Moscow agreements are a defeat for British foreign policy. It said: “Mr Churchill based the foreign policy of this country, for war reasons, on an alliance with the United States. According to some critics he went too far in. his devotion to it, but all critics—except the truculents of the Left—agree that there was at the time no other policy. Such a policy could not be followed in peace time. To have followed it would have been to place Britain in regard to the United States very much as Austria was placed in regard to Germany before the last war. The policy was therefore gradually transformed into the policy of the Big Three. There was no third course for them between co-operation and war, that is, mutual destruction. When this is the alternative, power inevitably declines to the big battalions. Britain found herself an impoverished' country in a Commonwealth and Empire that was disunited, politically and geographically, between two very great continental Powers strategically placed to make any war certain to fall most heavily on Empire territory. We were not in a position to carry on power politics in isolation. And we could only have done it as second fiddle to either the United States or Russia. To escape from that dilemma there were only two courses. The first was to organise the Empire as a Great Power based on Western Europe. Backed by the Empire’s resources,’ a Western Bloc could become a first-class military and economic Power, more than able to hold its own against its rivals. Against this there was the argument that it would take over long—an argument that was sound, but really based not on the time factor, but on the dislike to Eiiropean commitments of the Dominions, on the lack of cordiality between Britain and France (an inheritance from the Churchill regime), on the openly expressed hostility of Russia, and on our financial dependence on America. That course was shelved by the Attlee Government and the second course was taken. That course was to regard the existence of the ‘Big Five’ policy, on which for realist reasons Mr Stalin is asserted to insist, as a temporary necessity and as a half-way house to basing British foreign policy on the United Nations’ Organisation—in other words, to transfer policy ultimately to the truly international sphere. This is Mr Bavin’s attitude, and it is that Which gives reality to the Foreign Ministers’ dream of a representative international government. “Mr Bevin’s attempt to proceed along these lines suffered two reverses at the outset —the establishment at San Francisco of the veto, which lames truly international action at its sources and virtually stabilises Big Power’ policy; and the necessity of accepting the American loan. The former makes a permanent possibility of old-fashioned Big Power war. The second does restrict—how far is not yet apparent-—the freedom of action in foreign policy of Britain. This freedom is already perilously restricted in that there is no Imperial foreign policy and that under the Bevin policy the difficulties of obtaining one are increased. But the policy remains, and despite all misgivings, the Government regards the Moscow discussions as a victory for it. What constitutes that victory? Just this—that at the price of concessions, the machinery by which the Big Five works functions once again, and it will be more difficult to stop it functioning a second time. Mr Bevin is in fact betting on time as a factor. The Assembly and Security Council of U.N.O. will not indeed replace, but they will transform in the manner desired, the Big Five system and will begin that work at a time when the Eig Three, having come to an agreement, can hardly make breaking it the immediate sequel.”