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Gisborne Times, Volume LXVIII, Issue 10725, 24 October 1928, Page 5

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ANGLO -FRENCH COMPROMISE TERMS — . / LIMITATION OF NAVAL* ARMAMENTS SECRECY UPLIFTED* :1 WHITE PAPER ISSUED (British Official Wireless.) ' . - RUGBY Oct. 22. A White Paper dealing with the Anglo-French proposals for the limitation of naval armaments was issued this evening. It is a comprehensive document covering the history ot the negotiations leading up to the exchange of the Notes conaining the terms of the proposed compromise, and the subsequent correspondence with the' other chief naval Powers. As the result of unauthorised and incomplete disclosures the compromise became an object of public speculation often erroneus and misleading in character, and it is believed that the White Paper will place the matter in its true perspective. In a circular despatch to the British representatives in the capitals of countries represented on the Preparatory Commission, Lord Cusbendun emphasises that the AngloFrench compromise cannot he regarded as a detached or isolated event. It is the most recent link in a long chain of endeavour to implement the provision embodied in the articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations to the effect that members of the League recognisethe- maintenance of peace requires a reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety. - The first steps taken by the League to fulfil this obligation were turned in the direction, of comprehensive schemes of mutual assistance*, in the belief that the creation of a general sense of security was the most promising avenue, to an all-round reduction and limitation of armaments.

In the face of continued failure to reach an agreement on any such scheme this Hue of approach was abandoned in favor of more direct, me-thods.-At the end of December, 102 b, the Assembly set up a. special commission with a mandate in prepare the ground for a general conference. This commission, known as the preparatory Commission, attacked its main task at its third session, from March to April, 1027. at which British and French representatives each put forward a draft skeleton convention as the basis of discussion.

There was a wide divergence between those two drafts. On the naval side, tlie British draft provided for the limitation of vessels of war in nine separate categories. The French draft was for limitation, broadly speaking, by total tonnage. It was between these two principals of limitation by classes or by total or global tonnage, that the chief controversy has turned. The other governments represented on the commission ranged themselves, some on one side, some on the other, in the hope of bridging this divergence. MODIFIED PROPOSAL The French delegation some days later put forward a modified proposal which went so far to meet the British view as to introduce classifications by four classes. It contained a provision, however, for the unlimited transfer of tonnage from one class to another, and party for that reason, and partly owing to the small number of classes, proved, inacceptable to the British delegation. Confronted by these acute and seemingly irreconcilable divergencies and anxious ro do nothing which might prejudice the success the naval conference to which the Lmted States Government had recently issued invitations, the Preparatory Commission adjourned without lia\ - inf'- made any progress towards an agreed text for a skeleton convention. Two months later the JSaval Conference met in Geneva only to breqk down after seven weeks of effort- ~ , . , In the face of the deadlock m the Preparatory Commission followed, by tlie failure" of the Geneva Conference, all prospects of immediate progress appeared to be extinguished. Informal conversations, however, were frequent at Geneva, and ultimately culminated in conversations between M. Briand and Sir Austen Chamberlain in March, 1928, which led to tlie compromise under review. In the course of their discussion Sir Austen Chamberlain mentioned certain suggestions which had been made bv the British Admiralty and lie subsequently communicated, a written Note of them to M. Briand at the latter’s request. They provided for Initiation by six classes, alt types of vessels being included. I hoy were not acceptable. THE COMPROMISE In considering the.so successive steps towards a compromise it, should he borne in mind that the British contentions had always hten for limitation in detail. . and the French contention for limitation by total tonnage .Thus the original British plan had bee for classification hv nine classes! Under the modified British proposals, as submitted to M. Briand after the March conversation, the number of classes had been - reduced to six. but- included vessels of all types. On its side, the French Government, no less anxious than the British Government to promote an agreement had shown a disposition to meet the British thesis so far as possible. In the end a compromise was reached on a basis of limitation applicable to four classes of war vessels. While admittedly incomplete ns a final solution of the naval limitation question, they would if adopted, have added two further classes of vessel to the classes limited under tho Washington Treaty. They could only lead to useful results it the other principal naval Powers . were ready to regard them as offering a possible basis for the resumption oi negotiations in the Preparatory Commission. ' As in the matter of naval disarmament tho question of classification versus global tonnage had hitherto progress so in the matter of land disarmament the question oi the limitation of military trained reserves had proved a stumming block. The French Government, and a majority of the governments represented on the Preparatory Commission had held that reserves ' should ho excluded from limitation while the British Government had consistently supported tlio opposio thesis. For’ some time however, it had realised that further opposition on. its pn’rb to he exclusion ol these- trained reserves, in face of the attiudo maintained by a majority of the Preparatory Commission could only have tin effect of preventing progress indefinitely. So long ago as April, 19_i. Viscount, Cecil clearly foreshadowed the withdrawal, for the sake ot agreement of the British opposition. When, therefore, the two governments, were advancing towards compromise in tho matter of naval limitation it was felt that he process o agroemont could only be* facilitated by a formal intimation that the concession made to the views of the British Government on the naval classification would enable it to withdraw its opposition to the French standpoint in the matter of military trained reserves. . _ Referring to criticisms of the ai-loo-ed secrecy of the negotiations, Lord Cushendun recalls the March announcemet that conversations were proceeding, and] points out that when the compromise, proposals were boady for submission to other naval Powers the fact- wks announced by

Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons: “I myself gave to the press on Angust 30 a full account of the circumstances in which the compromise was reached, and an emphatic denial t-o speculations as to the existence of secret clauses and political understandings. The whole case is revealed in the correspondence, and any suggestions to the contrary aro totally devoid of foundation. The proposals were submitted at the end of July to the Governments of the United States, Italy and Japan. While the Japanese Government expresses concurrence in the purport of the proposals, the United States and Italy, for reasons clearly and cogently explained in their Notes, have not seen their way to accept them. The communications aro receiving attentive consideration and a reply will he made in due course,.”

CONTROVERSY OVER, LIMIT OF MILITARY STRENGTH

(Received Oct. 23, 5.5 p.m.) A despatch is included in the documents now brought together in the White Paper, which begins with the extract from the opening speech of the. President at the third session of the Preparatory Commission. lhe British and French draft conventions are set out and the discussion of them is summed nn in extracts from the speeches of delegates of naval powers, fiord Cecil’s speech to which Lord Cushendun refers was delivered at Geneva when the latter was in session. Tim modified Frerini draft submitted to the. commission referring to Lhc .< British view that some account might to be, taken of trained miiita men and reserves ot different countries, lie raid: “We have felt, and ! have slaved it all along, that it is a matter which however strongly In* rnav feel about it as a. matter of. principle,, does affect oilier countries very much more than ourselves, and that, if tho limit of military strength can lie arrived at which would not include nnv limitation of trained reserves among other countries then 1 do not think it would Ijo at all likely my government would insist on its view with respect to that.

VOLUNTARY ARMIES v. COX-

SCR I HIT ON

On March 8 of the present year ■ li l,onl Cushendun’s suggestion Sir A. Chamberlain discussed with M. Briand the disarmament position with reference to tho meeting of the Preparatory Commission called for the following week. A record of the conversation says: “.Sir A. Chamberlain began by regretting that on two critical military and naval questions the French and British were diametrically opposed. British public opinion with its traditions, believed that voluntary armies were defensive, and that conscription armies implied an offensive war whereas he was fully aware that to. the French mind compulsory military service seemed a guarantee of a pacific policy and a voluntary army appeared in the dangerous light oi Practorium guards. He went on to say that Britain had been reconsidering what we thought, c-ssential from the naval point of view and he told M. Briand of the modified proposals drawn tin hv the Admiralty. Public opinion realised that concessions were necessary from all parties for a general settlement to be reached and if he could point to a concession by the French in naval matters it would probably result in his yielding the point on the military side. On the. other hand, wo could not abandon the British standpoint on the question of army reserves unless we could justify thi sconc-ession by pointing to a similar concession made to us in the naval sphere. TERMS OF COMPROMISE M. Briand asked for a personal copy of the revised Admiralty proposals referred to by Sir A. Chamberlain. and said that he would put them before the Trench naval authorities. '“They, were not accepted, hut the conversations between the Anglo-French naval experts proceeded. Proposals, based on a suggestion made by the French naval representatives to Admiral Kelly, were on June 28 officially submitted to the French Government, which in its desire to secure a solution of tho question, accepted them in principle. LIMITATION OF FOUR CLASSES OF WARSHIPS

The agreement was confirmed, and tho terms of the compromise re-in-stated in a Note to M. Briand on July 28. stating inter alia, that the British Government “are in full agreement with the French Government that the assent of other great naval Powers is essential to success* 1 and as desired hv the French Government His Majesty's Governmentwill communicate to the Governments of the. United States, Italy, and Japan, the compromise which has already received the approval of France and Great Britain, that is to say the limitations which the Disarmament Conference will have to determine. Tt will deal with four class os of warships, firstly, capital ships of over 10.000 tons, or with guns of more than 8-inch calibre: secondly, aircraft carriers of over 10,000 tons: thirdly, surface vessels of or l>elow 10.000 tons armed with mms of more than G-inch and up to S-nieli calibre: fourthly, ocean going submarines, that is, over GOO ions. The ashington Treaty regulates the limitation in classes 1 and 2. and the Disarmament Conference will only have to consider the method oi extending these limitations to Powers non-sig-natorv to this treaty. As regards classes 3 and 4, the final disarmament conference will fix the maximum tonnage applicable to all Powers, which no power will he allowed to exceed for the total of vessels in each of these respective categories during the period covered by. the convention. Within this maximum limit, each Power will at the final conference indicate for each of those categories the tonnage they propose to reach, and which they undertake not to exceed during the .period covered by the* convention.” VOLUMINOUS DOCUMENTS United Trosß Assn by El. Tel. Copyright (Australian Press Association.) (Received 001. 23. 8.10 p.m.) LONDON Oct. 23. The long-awaited White Paper relating to the Anglo-French compromise was issued simultaneously with tho French Blue Book. The British statement contains thirty-two documents, concluding with a lengthy eonimenttvry signed hv Lord Cuslicndun dated October 9. Tlie FVench paper consists of thirty-two documents believed to include several not contained in the British White Paper. The instructions to the Ambassadors naturally differ, hut the rest is the same, supplemented by a commentary of 3000 words.

It is generally agreed that Lord Cushendun effectively disposes of the charge of secret'diplomacy front the efforts to arrive at an understanding concerning naval disarmament, and generally establishes the bona.'tides of the British Government on that point.

FRANCE’S MILITARY RESERVES

The strongest fires of criticism, however were directed at entirely different points, revolving round- the question of France’s military reserves, The/ White- Paper shows that* a telegram despatched to Washington, Tolcio and Rome from the Foreign Office on July 30, .outlining; the compromise, contained no.mention of tlie question of army reserves-and refe-r-----1 —-I :

fCantinued at Foot of Next Column.)

red exclusively to naval matters. Sir II Rumfold on August. 4 telegraphed from Berlin that the German Government was disconcerted by the news of the naval compromise, and. Feared it- might, imply a concession respecting ilie limitation qi land lorces. Sir A. Chamberlain replied vho following day: “The text of tho compromise refers exclusively to naval limitation, hut there is-an-standing with the French • Government made before the test of tho compromise was actually drawn up, that if France could meet His Majesty’s Government on the question of naval limitation, tho latter would bo lire,pared to withdraw their-opposi-tion to the views of French -and- most other Governments on the question of trained reserves/’ „

DENIAL THAT AGREEMENT REPRESENTS BARGAIN.

(Received Oct- 23. 9.40 p.m.) LONDON, Oct. 23. Lord Cushendun on October 4 explained the. position in regard tu reserves to the British representatives at Washington, Rome and Tokio tor communication to their Governments. “It has been stated in the, press tele-grams-that this naval agreement with France represents a bargain. This-is a misapprehension; it- is merely the removal of a stumbling block: .ft is not believed any American interest can be prejudiced by the withdrawal of British opposition to'the reservist question.” .