WASTAGE OF NAVY

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21152, 21 July 1943, Page 4

WASTAGE OF NAVY

JAPAN’S TACTICS

U.S. EXPERTS PUZZLED

DECLINE OF AIR-POWER

(By Telegraph—Press Assn. —Copyright.) (11 a.m.) NEW YORK. July 20. The Japanese so Car have failed to manifest any major strategic reaction to the American drive in the central Solomons, says the New York Times correspondent in that area. Apart from replenishing some aircraft losses, the Japanese are fighting the campaign with substantially the forces they had available in the theatre ■when the battle began. The correspondent issues a warning that while the Japanese may be resigned to losing Munda, this does not appear to be the case with Kolombangara, Vella Levella ancl Gizoganongga. . ~ „ Commenting on the progress of the fighting in the Solomons, the New York World-Telegram points-out that Allied -forces- are still 3200 miles from Tokio. The paper contends that the Allied gains in the Pacific are still being too slowly won and that Japan is gaining the time she desires to make herself impregnable. Japanese; Strategy, particularly navai strategy, is puzzling war commentators. They agree that she cannot continue JO waste her sea power in driblets but must venture her mam battle fleet in a decisive engagement if she wishes to hold her far-flung south Pacific empire.

One-Thinl of Fleet Lost

“For ways that are strange and tricks that are dark, the Japanese High Command is certainly peculiar, writes Major Fielding Eliot, the military correspondent of the New Yoik HbVald-Tribune. analysing the Pacific sea Struggle. "Ever since our first landing on Guadalcanal’ last August, theTapanese have been sending in task forces but not one of these has been strong enough to accomplish us mission and tall have suffered seveie losses. Add the Japanese losses together and they amount to a crippling of her air-power, a loss of something 'like one third of her navy and heavy substraetions from her merchant fleet and first-line ground forces. How long can any navy keep up such .a course of action. Major Eliot says that he emphasises the hcival losses because it is beconring increasingly evident that Japanese air power is declining and the time is approaching when the Japanese must give, up many of then; Pacific island bases or risk a. major fleet action in order to re-establish their control Of vital sea communications. The writer frankly admits that he is puzzled as to the policy being followed ' by the Japanese Admiralty. The logical thing, he says, would be to group the three latest naval task forces with which the Allies, have dealt piecemeal into one major effort “It is certain,’’ concludes Major Eliot, “that the have miscalculated the strength which the ■Allies have been able to detach to the ■Pacific without injuriously affecting the -campaign against Germany. Tokio is now facing the prospect of increasing pressure against her most vulnerable spot—her sea communications. And every time Japan wastes her seapower in driblets, as recently, it makes our task easier.”