The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES" GISBORNE, FRIDAY. AUGUST 14, 1942. SOLOMONS BATTLE

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20862, 14 August 1942, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES" GISBORNE, FRIDAY. AUGUST 14, 1942. SOLOMONS BATTLE

Notwithstanding .the utmost caution which'/i*; being ' observed" in /issuing official statements in connection with the Allied operations in the Solomons Islands, there seems to be good reasons to, believe that • the landing forces are meeting with a substantial measure of success. Following the first announcement that “some progress” had been made—a phrase Which was calculated' to restrain optimisnwMt is now stated that the landings were ma.de as scheduled and thi.<!''is : supplemented” by - tlie" - 'report that a landing has : been made on : a fourth island in the group. Here are sorhe'fairly concrete'Statements which seem Tto ; justify 1 ..confidence in the outcome of ,an operation which mijst necessarily ,]pe hazardous. To early tout the. landings according to plan was obviously the firsthand-most-import-ant step in the campaign. This sttp has been accomplishfed-and has belli followed by contact with the enemy. At first, some progress' \Va.s -made, and now fit is stated, that .the' Japanese g : rip on the islands is being brokeh. The Tact that /a; fourth landing has been made' • suggests that the : three 'earlier Onfes Were p/og/'e'ssing'satisfactorily, as gtherwisi? fresh commitments would hardly have been undertaken; . Reading between the lines, fhpr(efore,-; there seems to ||e every reason \for .expecting jthe first

Allied’t)|fjensiye.‘,to ,s\lccged. I If it is correct, as reported from Sydney, that *6o’'warships and •tgqnsp-o.rts-.mre taking i.payt; ,jn . tl e operation,' this .faijty alone provides Ympfessive evidence'' or the ability uf khg ALUes ~lQ„fj3ke .thermitiati.ve in fßdciflc; -.lf.at.this stage!.a force of-This size can be riiustered-for an attack at-one particular:point, it must be 1 1 di§£uiefih^' H'o : the Japanese to ponder:'’ ovfer /the possibilities when American production reaches its peak. Whether , or not the. Solomons‘venture succeeds, the ! eriemy • will have haid sortie indication of what he will have to contend with, and it can hardly lie reassuring to him. It is apparent that the attack on the Solomons has been m'ost carefully planned, but even the best of>,plans .in,-,am.-operation: of this sort are apt t_o;go: astrgy, because thejr 'Successf.ul fulfilment depends upon such' a ’ v.ariety.mf factors '.for which it is not .possible to .allow in advance. In this ' ifrgtatteeP it * ds‘ ‘obvious thai there'has'been ho isolated' minor venture, I Dn the.contrary,.'-synchronised attacks have berm made right alorig the L -Tooo‘.fniie- frbnt etrtbra'eing- an aic of islands.-,of winch the Solomons arte the rffiost 'easterly. /fTCere/has been a simultaneous attack. oh the Aleutians, atitbe uifcts%ainiicend of the Pacific, aad another on Japanese basis in Chinp. .Tp .some extent all these operations abe- reiatedHo-one another.: so w Os the attack on the nolomons is .concerned, there,/are - still many gaiis*To > 'be'lhlm9- r Mfi 'before a detailed picture if ’obtainable.- ■>' - It- is ; clear, hoViever, tKptl-the primary objectives provides fifi -.excellent naval base, and GhadalCanar; - where'"the Japanese have - established b- large aerodrome, and which iis-the .nearest point to the -Australian mainland. The latest ;liihdingi|tas :beehim.ade on:Malaita,,the most.easterly of tbeiislands,'and the -thiYd,-'which does -not seem to have been- nientibnefl,,lwas r probably Ysabel, to the norm. fU'feeSe-- Islands are all successfully.pco.upied.it will be an important st£p in the process of driving the enemy from' 'this pari of the as other of his bases will be Tendered s vulnerable -to attack. It cannot be .expected,: of bourse,/that an operation of this description will be carried out .without substantial loss. A convoy pf,the : stak of-the; one involved makes bn Yxcdlent’ target for bombing JplanpSwr^,the Japanese . have so often learned to their cost —and landings on a coast /Strongly held by an enemy are not easily-effected. All the available ' i'epoVUy/hbweVef, suggest thatitJie initial difficulties .have been overcome and if the efforts .are ultimately crowned -with ’ success there v/ill be littlef-reason' to complain at the cost of it. - Naturally,"less attention' is "focusedon the AllieddSfitM.tt.es elsewhere, but they are playing an important contributory part in file'general strategy. The attack in,,the Aleutians, thousands of miles .away; : ihas ,at least a diversionary influence, because it serves as a warning- fifi a the'''japanese of the danger of moving their naval forces from, this 4 ' ..TKiNarne applies to the air 'attars pri /Japanese bases in Chin.a- ~£he|e, .althqu^;,probably an entirely separate -operation,- serve to .contain patLof the Japanese Mr force. The aerial offensive launched by the Allies in the iNbw Guinea-arba is part and--parcel--of'tfie plan for the coriquest:ofi4be.So.lomon6. Primarily, it is directed .towards restricting the eiuMfiy- air attacks ’ on ‘ the Solomorjs convoy the despatch of, sea-b|frpinfbirdeYhents. The fact that Rabau'l i has,be,ep .raided on seven successive - days‘is- a measure of the ifrifidrtlhce : Which is attached to this feature of the operations. The lanid offensivl- agaririSt' Kokoda, which the Australiaris, ar.e.now’.reported to have repfigypifid, v .provides yet; another diverfildfil'andi’fmttiQts the .capacity of th.e enemy to send reinforcements where they are most needed. 'The ‘Whole pper.atjp,n is evidence of the A,llie,d strategy anjt there is good reason to believe that it will be as skilfully executed as it has been devised.