RUSSIAN TACTICS

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20858, 10 August 1942, Page 3

RUSSIAN TACTICS

ARMIES SACRIFICE TERRITORY UNEASINESS IN GERMANY • / (By Telegraph—Press Assn.—Copyright.) (British Official Wireless.) (9 am.) RUGBY, Aug 9. Developments in the Caucasus in the last week or two are considered in informed quarters in London to indicate that the Germans have not been confronted with large Russian forces. Delaying actions have been fought by rearguards with varying success, but the German advance up the railroad south-east from Rostov has been particularly rapid. Further west, temporarily successful actions have been fought, and still are being fought, southwards from Rostov, towards Krasnodar, near the western end of the Caucasus' mountains. This view of the situation is supported by the continual Soviet mention of numerically superior enemy forces in all sectors southward of the Don and by the failure of the enemy to announce large captures of men or materials. By contrast, in the sector found' Stalingrad, the Russians evidently are using large forces to contest, the German progress near Kotelnokovo. On this important part of the front, the enemy recently advanced northward of Kotelnokovo, but there is little doubt that his progress here will continue to be stoutly resisted as he approaches Stalingrad from the southwest. Meanwhile, the Russian positions covei-ing Stalingrad in the bend of the Don between Kalach and Kletskaya, are being fiercely and successfully maintained. Possible Further Losses The situation thus outlined leads to the supposition that Soviet strategy is still to preserve the strength of the armies at the cost of sacrificing territory which can be abandoned with the least serious results. Consequently, the possibility is foreseen that the Germans may be able to occupy this summer all the area lying northward of the Caucasus range and southward of the Volga between Stalingrad and Astrakhan. Such a development would involve the loss of the Black Sea ports of Anapa, Novorossisk, and Tuapse. The Caucasus range, however, is a formidable barrier, and its defence from Sukhum, on the Black Sea, to Derbent on the Caspian, would protect the more important parts of the Caucasus, including Batum and Baku. Despite the frequent Berlin pronouncements that German strategy consists not primarily in 4he occupation of territory but in the destruction of the Russian ai'mies, the influential newspaper Schwarze Korps recently declared: “Experience has taught us to reckon with the toughness of the Russians. It is impossible for us to undertake offensive operations in one fell swoop. The enemy has a vast hinterland and vast reserves of men. The war against him Can be won only by relentlessly wearing him down.” Impracticable Nazi Aims The Germans claim by this policy that they will be able in 1943 to release a large part of their tank divisions and air strength now in the east to meet the Anglo-American attack in the west. How they propose to reach this conclusion is difficult to see. They are still 400 miles from Kuibyshev and 800 miles from' the main Ural bases.

German hopes of being able to maintain only defensive forces in this situation are apparently based on the hopes of a Russian oil shortage if the Baku route is completely cut. However, it is known that the essential design of the three Soviet five-year plans was to give Russian a war base beyond the Volga. Indeed, Russian oil wells outside the Caucasus have a greater annual output than the total natural oil output of German-occupied Europe. Therefore, it is apparent that in order to be able to withdraw large forces from Russian in 1943 the Germans in the next two months must not merely conquer the Caucasus, but also undertake a gigantic offensive to the north - eastward, between Moscow and Stalingrad, and drive the Russian armies at least across the Volga on its entire course. In the present circumstances, it appears that German troop requirements are even greater than in 1942. , Offensive Restricted Confirming this appreciation of the Russian situation, it is noted that the Turks and Finns, who are nearest to the fighting, have no high opinion of the prospects of the German summer campaign. The general situation is reported to be viewed calmly in Ankara. Turkish experts are sceptical about any plans to defeat the central Russian armies. The Finns, for their part, express anxiety about the absence, with the autumn already approaching, of any offensive on the 1500-mile front between Murmansk and Orel. The most salient fact in the eastern situation this year is that whereas in 1941 the Germans had forces to undertake simultaneous great offensives along the whole 2000-mile front, this year they have remained on the defensive along the major part of it and have failed to regain the lost ground. This indicates the extent to which the Russians already have bled the German armies. The German losses continue to be great this year. For instance, the Russians stated that the Germans lost 60,000 dead and 180,000 total casualties in a week’s fighting on the Don front from July 28 to August 4. It is regarded in London as quite natural that, as reported on reliable authority, a great uneasiness is coming over the Gei’mans at the continued absence of decisive events in Russia.