The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, JULY 4, 1942. MOVES IN RUSSIA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20827, 4 July 1942, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, JULY 4, 1942. MOVES IN RUSSIA

Without waiting to complete the conquest of Sebastopol and at a time when the fate of Rommel’s North African army hangs In the balance, the Germans appear to have at last launched a full-scale offensive in Russia. This may be accepted as evidence of the urgency of the situation and also, perhaps, of the relative weakness of the German armies in the east. The offensive had been heralded for the spring, but the spring is already past and summer is well under way: yet only now have the Germans commenced to make a move It is incredible that this long delay is a matter of design, because 'Hitlei knows from his experience last year that delay was fatal to his plans. It has been contributed to by a number ol factors. The Russian offensive throughout the winter caused the Germans to use up the reserves which had been intended for the spring campaign and time was required tc replace them. Simultaneously, it was necessary for some of Germany’s best troops and equipment to be sent tc Libya, while the air force had tc be distributed in force throughom Europe, to counter the" Royal Air Force raids, to attack Malta, and tc maintain a pretence of attacking Britain. In addition, the delivery o. munitions must have been seriously delayed by the heavy British raids. Added to all these delaying factors was the heroic and stubborn defence of Sebastopol. For a * month, the Germans concentrated everything the} could'muster'for the reduction of this fortress. Even if they have finallj succeeded in Capturing it, Sebastopo has fulfilled its chief purpose. ‘ It kept engaged some eight German divisions inflicting enormous losses upon then and delaying for some weeks Iht launching of the main German attack further north. It may prove that thi: delay, like that in Greece and Crete last year, will have an important bearing on future operations in Russia, foi not only has it wasted valuable time but it has also given the Russian: increased opportunities for strengthening their positions. The German 1 : see the danger in this delay and it i: possible that it has caused them tc launch their attacks before they arc really ready. This does not meat, that their strength should be underestimated, but it does increase the hope of successful Russian resistance and it does suggest that the German operations* may be more circumscribed tlian would have been the case had they been’able to move earlier. It! seems probable, for instance, that they will be compelled to concentrate on the southern front and to be content merely to' hold their positions in the north. ' 1

The latest report suggests that a series of offensives is being undertaken between Kursk and Kharkov, where some fnindf advances have alrdady been made. ' It is possible, ol course, that' another attack against Moscow is ■ contemplated or that von Bock is planning to" drive a wedge between Zhukov's and Timoshenko’s armies, but' what 'seems more likely, in view of the lateness of the season, is that every effort will be made to contain the Russians to the north in order to pave the way for operations against the Caucasus. Each of the drives now . being - made is directed towards the railway running from Moscow to Rostov, about 100 miles tothe east of the : present front. If the Germans could push forward from Kursk tO Voronezh they could possibly separate the'central and southern Russian armies and thus considerably improve their own position in the south. It is to be expected that the Germans will" make some initial : gains in these operations, but that need not cause concern. The very depth of the Russian ' defences suggests : that' they intend, as last year, to give ground in order to maintain their ■ armies intact. If they can makef an drawal', the Germans will reap little real benefit from territorial gains; indeed, if they are much weakened in the process they may be threatened from the' north. .. '

At this stage it doevsom reasonably certain that M. Tyalinlftihad good ground for his rece-ht' petition that the Gerrhaiis’dre taieapttbtb of- delivering ah ! 'offensive along the whole front, as. they did last year. The strength of the Germans should be relatively weaker while that of Russia, despite their losses, should be considerably improved. The direct assistance which Britain and' the United States has given to Russia and the indirect help given by British diversionary' operation's must have an 'influence, and the indications are that it will be an‘increasing rather than a diminishing one. ' Germany has made desperate efforts to* cut the supply line's to Russia, without success, and at the moment is engaged in another desperate venture in Egypt which must either succeed or else be a disastrous failure which will react in no small measure on the Russian campaign. So far Germany has made remarkably little progress towards any of her real objectives: ' She has overrun a great deal of territory, and secured some economic advantage from it but she 'lias not managed to break the hostile ring which encircles her,- the forces which are opposed to her have been strengthened lathei than weakened, and she is still denied those supplies which are vital to her if she is to ; continue the war indefinitely.