The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, TUESDAY, FEB. 4, 1941. GERMAN AIR STRENGTH

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20471, 4 February 1941, Page 6

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, TUESDAY, FEB. 4, 1941. GERMAN AIR STRENGTH

■ Speculation has been rife recently as to the possible strength of the German air force and its prospects of successfully invading Great Britain. Since it is probable that Hitler, in desperation, will be compelled to launch another determined air assault in the near future a discussion of this question is of more than academic interest. Hitler claims, of course, that his air. armada is invincible, but this is not the first claim that has been made to invincibility in regard to similar forces. Whether this armada will be as completely discredited as its famous predecessor remains to be seen. In the meantime, estimates of Germany’s air strength have steadily mounted to the fantastic figure of 70,000 military machines and it is said that this force, or a large part of it, will be used for the subjugation of Britain. This estimate need not be taken seriously and even if it were cut in half it would still be greatly exaggerated. After all, the output of aeroplanes in any country is largely a matter of calculation and recent discussion in the United States, the most highly industrialised country in the world, has served to show the limitations in regard to aircraft manufacture. There is, of course, some degree of secrecy in regard to German air strength and production but sufficient is known to discredit some of the recently-published figures.

An official estimate of the number of aeroplanes possessed by Germany at the outbreak of war was 4200 machines. To allow for a substantial margin of error this figure can be doubled, giving Germany an assumed strength of 8400 machines when the war started. Expert opinion which, in this connection, should not be far astray places her maximum building capacity at 1500 planes a month. If this rate has been maintained consistently for the 17 months of the war—and it is not unreasonable to assume that there has been at least some dislocation as a result of the raids by the Royal Air Force—she will have built 25,500 new machines; that figure allows for peak production having been obtained even in the first month of the war. This, with the force with which she started, would mean that she had had a total of just under 34,000 machines available to her, against which has to be set her losses. It is known that at least 6000 machines have been definitely lost in combat. To that number must be added the unrecorded losses, seriously damaged machines, losses by accident and in training, and obsolescence. At the very least, the total deductions would be three times, and probably four, the number of machines known to have been destroyed, in which case the maximum present strength would be 16,000 aircraft of ail types, trainers, fighters, bombers, and transport. Possession of this number of machines does not mean that a force of that size could be used for an attempted invasion of Great Britain. The proportion of bombers to other types is not known, but it is known that the losses of bombers in the first onslaught against Britain was so heavy that Germany had to convert fighters to replace them. Then it had to be remembered that the Luftwaffe must, of necessity, be widely dispersed. Hqr fighters, for Instance, must be distri-

buted from Norway to Czechoslovakia to the Atlantic. More recently she has been compelled to send forces of bombers to the Mediterranean in a belated endeavour to check the British advances in that area. It may be that Germany to-day possesses a total of 10,000 combat planes of various types in various localities, but how many of these could be used for the purpose of an attack on Britain? 11 her full force were concentrated on the one objective she would leave herself extremely vulnerable to attack and might, indeed, sutler heavier losses than she could inflict. It is probable, nevertheless, that Germany has been using the enforced inactivity of the winter months to build up a concentration of machines with which tc launch a full-scale attack on Britain, but in the same period Britain has not been idle and if the attack does come it will meet with the most determined resistance.

Finally, it has to be remembered that Germany delivered what was intended to be a knock-out blow last September. What reason is there tc believe that Germany can succeed now when she failed then? No one L going to suggest, surely, that the previous attack was half-hearted or that Germany did not then use every ounce of force which she could muster. Not only had Hitler promised io defeat Britain in the autumn, but he must also have realised how important the time factor was to him. Then, he had unquestioned superiority in the air, to-day his superiority is doubtful ant, the odds against him are increasing al. the time. If he has a larger force now than he had in September, which is unlikely, so has Britain. More than that, in September Britain, if noi taken by surprise, at least had not had the opportunity to perfect her defences in the light of experience. Now she knows exactly what to expect, she knows better how to countei it, and she is infinitely better prepared to meet it. Not only is her own air force growing all the time, bu' assistance from the United States is or, an ever-increasing scale. AH these factors suggest that while Britain maj suffer heavily in further attempts at invasion, those attempts can nevei succeed. On the other hand, they suggest, also, that Germany might do well to ponder ihe possible consequences of a counter-invasion.