The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, MONDAY, JUNE 24, 1940. PEACE FOR FRANCE?

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVII, Issue 20281, 24 June 1940, Page 6

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, MONDAY, JUNE 24, 1940. PEACE FOR FRANCE?

The new French Government which was sot up last week under Marshal Petain sought to negotiate terms for an armistice. Now it appears, as was only to be expected, that it has had no opportunity to negotiate but has been compelled to accept dictated terms which must mean the virtual surrender of France to German domination. i .om the moment that it was announced that it was proposed to sue for peace it was clear that there could be no alternative to complete surrender and, in the circumstances, the final peace conditions, whatever they may be, can occasion no real surprise, ft would be absurd for Germany not to take full advantage of the weakness of the French Govermpent and the Nazis cannot even be blamed for the spectacular manner in which the meeting with the French delegation was arranged. After all, Germany still has every need to capitalise her successes and she should not be begrudged this obvious effort to build up the morale of her people. What is necessary now is to take stock of the situation, so far as it has been clarified, and determine how best it can be met and what greater effort can be brought into the war effort in an endeavour to counter this latest, reverse. At the outset, however, it must be remembered' that whatever the announced pence terms might be it does not necessarily follow either theft France will be willing or able to abide by them or Germany able to enforce them.

It must be assumed from Mr. Churchill’s announcement that the French Government has placed the whole of the French Empire and its resources at the mercy and in the power of the German and Italian dictators and that, as a result, France will be used to assist the dictators in the war against Britain. On the face of it, such a prospect is black, but it cannot be accepted at its face value. It is no good arguing as to whether or not the peace terms are harsh and unjust because nothing better could be expected and even if some concessions had been obtained the experience of Czechoslovakia is sufficient guarantee that Germany would riot have abided by thorn. What does

matter is whether the French Government will be able to carry out its undertakings. The first point, that presents itself is that the Government which has carried out these negotiations, if such they can be called, is not a Government of the French people possessing the confidence of the French Parliament, but, in effect, is nothing better than a puppet administration created to further the aims of Germany. It is inconceivable that it could rally the French people to its support or secure their acquiescence in the bartering away of their empire and their freedom. Rather is it to be expected that this abject and shameful surrender will arouse all the intense loyalties of which the French people are capable. Already there is evidence that Frenchmen in all parts of the world are responding readily and freely to the appeal to stand firm at the side of Britain in order that their freedom and their independence might bo preserved and their liberties restored. The French colonial empire has, in effect, already accepted the offer of union with the British Empire and it is not unreasonable to assume that the French fighting services, so far as they are able, will follow suit. A good deal of anxiety has naturally been expressed as to the fate of the French navy, but at this stage, anyhow, there is not the slightest occasion for alarm. Whatever the Bordeaux Government may have agreed to, it is unbelievable that the French Navy would be willing to hand itself over to the enemy and permit its ships to be used against Britain, and even if it were the British Navy would have some say in the matter. It is far more likely that the French forces, wherever they are free to make their own choice, will recognise that the only hope for the ultimate salvation of their country lies in linking themselves with Britain and continuing the fight to the bitter end. They have nothing whatever to gain and everything to lose by acquiescing in the surrender of the Government which never truly represented them and, in these circumstances, it can be said with a good deal of confidence that the forces of France are still destined to play an important part in the liberation of Europe. Again it can be said that inquests are of little value in the conduct of military operations but it is important that there should be an understanding of the situation as it has developed in France. As far as the French army is concerned, it has been said before and should be repeated now that there is neither room nor ground for recrimination. This army played a magnificent part in the campaign but, betrayed by the Belgians and inadequately supported by Britain, it was outfought by a vastly superior opponent. It was clear that the French army could maintain its resistance only at the cost of untold suffering to its civilian population and the destruction of its towns and cities. Under such conditions it could not be blamed for failing to continue the fight but what is totally inexcusable is that defeat in one theatre of war should be seized upon by a puppet Government as a reason for complete capitulation ■'in all theatres. In striking contrast is the attitude of Czechoslovakia. Poland, Norway, Belgium, Holland, and even Luxemburg which, although far more sorely beset and more seriously over-run by the invader, have refused to sacrifice their national honour but have continued to fight on confident in the belief that victory will ultimately be won. France has sued for peace, but neither for her nor for the world can there be peace until the threat of German domination is removed and because the people of France must l'ealise this truth it is to be assumed that they, too, to the limit of their capacity, will continue the struggle.