NAZI MANPOWER

Greymouth Evening Star, 20 June 1942, Page 3

NAZI MANPOWER

INFLUENCE ON OFFENSIVE

BERNE, April 16. Hitler's efforts to build up a new Spring-offensive army of 8,000,000 men—reliably reported here to be iiiutv under way—will aggravate what |is already an acute shortage, of industrial manpower within the Reich. From the closest possible estimate of Germany’s manpower situation, formation of an army of this size now would result in a shortage of between 4,500.000 and 6,000,000 socalled “indispensable workers” in I vital industries.

I Although there are many intanjgibles, such as Germany’s exact supI ply of foreign labour arid the number lof troops which can be counted on I from those countries allied with the Axis, it is possible to assess in round ligures the man-power situation in Get many to-day. I Al present, Germany’s population us aoout 80,000,000 persons, of which 49 per cent., or 39,200,000 are males. Of the males some 64 per cent., or 23.000,000, belong to the age grouu of between 15 and 60.

Of this latter group, some 19,300,000 are engaged in industries essential to the war effort in the following categories: Coal mining, 1.400.000; J son. ore and other metals mining, 900,000; foundries, smelting, mechanics. transport equipment, trucks and auto manufacture, 2,900,000; electrotechnical, 500,000; textile, 900,000; food industry, 1,700,000; construction, 2,800,000; male agricultural workers, 8,200,000.

Naturally, as the war progresses, shifts will appear in these ligures. as for example the reduction in the construction for civilian use at the outbreak of the war saved between 1,500,000 and 1,800,000 workers. However, it is possible to balance this saving against the increased military construction needs such as the building of roads in the eastern conquered areas, and erection of quarters for troops on the front. Certain saving in agriculture by the introduction of foreign and female labour is balanced, similarly, by rhe increased needs of heavy industry and transportation material. Therefore, the estimate of 19,300,000 workers now engaged in industry is one which can be relied upon to remain nearly constant. This figure can be taken to represent Germany’s average industrial manpower needs.

CAUSES OF SHORTAGES.

I In reckoning the various factors ‘ which result in the shortages, war casualties may be taken first. By the end of January, it was estimated conservatively that the German armies had sustained 1,200,000 fatalities and between 2,000,000 and 2,200,000 wounded. Experience has shown that of the wounded, some .30 per cent., or 600,000, will not be fit for full-value industrial work. The remaining 1,400.000 either returned to the front or were exchanged for i workers at home. • Assuming that 40 per cent, of the 11.800.000 fatalities and those unfit

; for work were originally taken from vital industries, it would appeal' that the total number of Germany's workers had been reduced from 19,300,000 to 18,500,000. And assuming that 40 , per cent, of the remaining estimated j 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 troops at the ■ front have been recruited from vital : industries to fill such specialist jobs as truck, tank, and airplane maintenance, the total number of workers available to German industries would have been further reduced to between 17,000,000 and 17,200,000. Thus with an army of between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000 men as at present, there would be a manpower shortage of about 2,100.000. From this it is possible to arrive

at some estimate of the shortage which would result from mobilisation for fighting service of an army of 8,000,000. Undoubtedly, a large 'number—perhaps as many as 2,000,- | 000-—might conceivably be obtained from. ? Hitler’s satellite allies, leaving Gernfhny with only 6.000,000 troops to supply. However, whereas to recruit its first army Germany dipped 'into its industrial manpower only to I a limited extent, to build a new armv i of 6,000,000, Hitler would be forceci 1 to draw a far greater proportion from ■ this class, in asmuch as there are few I German males available now who .were neither engaged in the army nor I essential industry. i Therefore, reckoning on the basis I of its present estimated shortage of ■ industrial manpower, it would oe : safe to say that building an army of 1 8,000,000 would cause a domestic I labour shortage of at least 4,500,000 i to 6,000,000 men. I There is little likelihood that Germany could import sufficient foreign labour to make up for this shortage. At present there are conservatively estimated to be 2,250,000 foreign

workers in Germany, and although the Reich is trying desperately to increase this number, by drafting labour in the occupied countries, it would be virtually impossible to make up for the entire shortage. Moreover, there is already evidenced a see-saw between the army and industry—the army demanding I the industrial workers be recruited for the armed forces, while industry seeks demobilisation of skilled workers already in the services, but needed in industry. The authoritative labour publication “Reichsarbeitblatt” stated in February that those “indispensable” workers who had been drafted into the army from war industries would possibly have to be demobilised. And at the end of March the Berlin correspondent of the Swiss “Neuer Zurcher Zeitung” stated that the “indispensables.” were at that time being demobilised. Attempts to double up and have one worker do the work of three and the simultaneous closing of firms for civilian use has not produced the expected results.