NAZI SHIPS’ ESCAPE

Greymouth Evening Star, 18 February 1942, Page 5

NAZI SHIPS’ ESCAPE

STATEMENT BY MR. CHURCHILL

SECRET INQUIRY TO BE HELD RUGBY, February 27. Making a statement in the Commons, Mr Churchill said: “In March last, the two German battleships, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, took refuge in Brest Harbour, where they were joined in May by the cruiser Prinz Eugen, after the destruction of the Bismarck. The position of these three ships became a serious preoccupation for the Admiralty. They lay on the flank of our mam convoy routes to the East. They could make a sortie at any time on the Atlantic trade, routes or into the Mediterranean. Accordingly, the Admiralty pressed for a continued attack from the air, in the hope of disabling them or preventing them being repaired. This process continued for more than 10 months, during which time the ships were undoubtedly hit several times, and repair work was made very difficult. No less than 4000 tons of bombs were droppea by bombing sorties at Brest by 3299 anciaft, for the loss of 247 Air Force personnel and 43 aircraft. As we were never in a position to know when some or all of these ships might put to sea, the situation entailed almostcontinuous naval precautions, in the hone of being ready at all times to meet the various threats these ships constituted. A further serious feature was the very-grievous subtraction from the bombing effort against Germany. The bombing of these ships was so severe that the Germans evidently came to the decision that they could not maintain them any longer at Brest, and that they must return to Germany. We do not know whether this was for the purpose of effecting final repairs or enabling them to work up full efficiency in the shelter of the waters of the Baltic. However that may be, the Germans resolved to try and bring these ships back to Germany. This was a very HAZARDOUS. OPERATION.

It could be done by sailing round the British Isles and returning via Noxway, or by a dash up the Channel. The Germans rejected the plan of returning north-about, and preferied to run the admittedly-serious risks of the Channel passage. In the Atlantic, they would have run a greater risk of being attacked by air, with extensive reconnaissances from the shore and from aircraft-carriers, and of being slowed down by torpedo attacks or brought to action against overwhelming forces, as. was tne Bismarck. The Channel route, on the other hand, was a run of under 24 hours part of which could be made in the darkness, possibly by surprise, and they had the opportunity oi choosing the weather which would be most favourable. “The whole way through the Channel and along the Dutch coast, they had the advantage of a power - ful air umbrella. The danger of running past the Dover batteries under suitable weather conditions was not great. Our slow convoys repeatedly traverse the Straits of Dover, ana are repeatedly bombarded by .the guns on the French coast, but this has not stopped our convoys. One great danger was mines. This they might hope to avoid by energetic sweeping. There remained, therefore, the action of surface craft and aircraft. Air reconnaissance would show the Germans that neither heavy cruisers nor even light cruisers were in the narrow Straits, and therefore the attacks of flotillas of destroyers and small tor-pedo-boats were all that need be expected, apart from the air. “Some people seem to think that heavy forces should be stationed so as to have been able to intercept tnem in the Channel, or the North Sea. Had we done so, our ships would have been open to the same scale of attack as the German ships at Brest. Further, such dispositions would have dangerously weakened the preventive measures we have taken to convoys, and to guard the Northern Passage and deal with other German heavy ships. The Admiralty did not consider an attempt to run through the Channel would be an impossible operation under the conditions which prevailed, but this certainly was much less apprehended, that they should break out on to the tiadv routes or into the Mediterranean. No one can doubt the vigour and courage with which the enemy squadron was attacked as soon as its movement was perceived, and, of course, everyone is very sorry that these ships were not sunk. The only questions which are open are- Firstly, why was their movement not detected shortly after daylight. Secondly, was the contact and 1 arson between the Coastal Command and also between the other R.A.F. Com ■ mauds and the Admiralty as close as it should have been? At the suggestion of the Admiralty and the Air .Ministry I have directed that an inqrmy shall be held into these points. The inquiry will be secret, and I doubt very much whether, when completed, its result will be suitable tor publication. I am not prepared to give any information about the in ouiry or anv undertaking that its result will be made public. If is found guilty of dereliction of duty, disciplinary action will follow.

PRESS FORECASTS. LONDON. February 17. The “Daily Mail” says: Mr Justice Bucknill is likely to preside at the official inquiry which Mr Churchill has ordered into the escape of me Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz The “Daily Telegraph” says: The inquiry probably will be limited to the matter the failure to spot the ships until some three and a-haii hours of daylight had passed.