SOMALILAND EVACUATED

Greymouth Evening Star, 20 August 1940, Page 7

SOMALILAND EVACUATED

WAR OFFICE EXPLANATION

t ENEMY PAYS HIGH PRICE j ■ ; [BRITISH OFFICIAL WIRELESS.] « l RUGBY, August 19. A War Office communique states: . “The original - Allied dispositions in Somaliland, were based on a scheme ’ of close "Franco-British co-operation. Under this scheme, the French forces at Jibuti were to hold the right flank —the pivot of the whole position. With the sudden secession of the French Government from participation in further hostilities, a new and grave situation was created. More than half the available Allied force had been neutralised, and it became immediately necessary to decide upon the most effective measures for dealing with the emergency. Various alternatives were open to us. We could reinforce British Somaliland in sufficient strength to ensure its safety, but to do so would have involved employing important reserves, and thereby weakening reserves in other theatres of war more important to our immediate war effort than Somaliland. The time factor was also a serious consideration. This plan was therefore reluctantly abandoned. Another alternative was immediate unresisting evacuation. This meant giving up British territory without fighting, and thereby losing an opportunity of inflicting losses on the enemy in men and material, which will be difficult for him to replace. The third course was to remain with our small force, using it to inflict the maximum losses on the enemy, until withdrawal became inevitable. This-third, course was chosen, and l.hu e vacua tian of Somaliland has now oeen success:, any comp-i—wd. Oui force has been withdrawn. ' All guns, except two lost m the earlier stages of the action, have been embarked. A great part of the material stores and equipment have also been evacuated, and the remainder destroyed.’ Our wounded have been safely brought away. British, Rhodesian, Indian, African. and Somali troops, working in the closest co-operation with the Navy and R.A.F., have carried out the role assigned .to them, with conspicuous skill and bravery against greatly superior strength. Enemy losses, particularly among the Blackshirts units, have been heavy, and out of all proportion to our own.”

BRILLIANT DEFENCE.

RUGBY, August 19.

A communique issued in Cairo on Monday states: “After fighting a brilliant rearguard action against picked Italian formations, supported by tanks, artillery, and aircraft in overwhelming strength, all the British force in Somaliland was successfully evacuated from Berbera, last night.”

AERIAL RAIDS.

(Recd. August 20. 12.30 p.m.). CAIRO, August 19.

An R.A.F. communique states: We made numerous bombing raids _ and reconnaissances over Somaliland, with a view to breaking up convoys and motorised units, and harassing the troops advancing on Berbera. Considerable damage was done. We lost one plane, from which the "crew baled out.

FLEET’S “WITHDRAWAL”

RUGBY, August 19.

The Italian wireless, boasting yesterday of the damage it alleged that recent Italian raids on Alexandria had inflicted, added it was reported that the British fleet was “withdrawn from this base.”

This has drawn comment from London observers, that the British Mediterranean Fleet, unlike the Italian navy, frequently leaves its base in order to cruise in the Mediterranean and take the offensive against the Italian forces. It would appear that the Italian wireless is endeavouring to distract attention from these operations and their true significance, by depicting them as a flight of the British Navy from danger. ITALIAN NUMBERS. (Recd. August 20, 12.45 p.m.) LONDON, August 19. An Air Ministry spokesman said: The R.A.F. in the Middle East made over 50 per cent, more attacks than Italians, with far fewer casualties. The R.A.F. destroyed over 200 Italian planes. These results were obtained more by superior training and better courage than superior aircraft, British pilots returning from battle possessing supreme contempt for the Italians.

The Italians in Libya have about 530 planes, including 190 modern bombers, and 120 fighters. The land force is about 250,000 whites, and 25,000 to 30,00 coloured. In the Dodecanese Islands, the Italians have 30 fighters, 30 bombers, and some sea-planes. In East Africa, they have 170 aeroplanes, of which 25 per cent, are fighters. The land force is 200,000, including mechanised units.

ITALIAN CASUALTIES

(Recd. August 20, 11.10 a.m.) LONDON, Aug. 19.

The Berlin radio stated that a new Italian casualty list named 115 officers and rankers, killed in action in North Africa from July 16 to 3'l. The list named 41 officers and rankers, killed or died on active service on the Western Front.

LIBYAN DESERT.

DUiVft’S ON FIRE.

RUGBY, August 19

A Cairo communique states: In the Western Desert, following the naval shelling of dumps in the area north of Capuzzo on August 17, our patrols report seeing for some hours a dense column of smoke 100 feet high. In Kenya, yesterday, a few miles from Buna, a party of 30 Banda fled, after exchanging shots with a small party in oars. EGYPT’S WAR ENTRY (Recd. Aug. 20, 10.55 a.m.) CAIRO, August 19... Ahmed Maher Pasha, President of the Deputies and leader of the Saadist Party, urged Egypt to enter the war, in order to safeguard her independence against the 'threatened Italian invasion. “Egyptians must unite and co-operate with the British, in an effort ’to repulse the common foe. Italian troops concentrations on the i.

Egyptian border obviously threaten this country. Therefore, it is the duty of Egyptians to defend their soil, and assist Britain, with the alliance. Despite Mussolini’s promise to respect Egypt’s territorial integrity, the Italian have indiscriminately bombed Egyptian towns. The public no longer asks whether we ter the war, but when!” The Egyptian Minister of Finance has ordered new sequestrations of Italian property at Suez, Cairo, and Heliopolis. A total of 11,500 Italians have registered with the Cairo police.

ABYSSINIAN UNREST.

LONDON, August 19.

A British United Press message from Cairo states that Abyssinia is seething with revolt. The Italians feel so insecure that they have warned native chiefs. Even in the capital, Addis Ababa, Italians do not dare go outside their own quarter of the town at night. Two sons of an important Abyssinian chief, invited to the Government Palace, are reported to have been later shot.

An R.A.F. communique issued at Cairo states: Our bombers yesterday (Sunday) raided the Addis Ababa military aerodrome.

CAIRO, August 19

A direct hit was registered on four hangars, and a petrol fire was started at Addis Ababa, All Our planes returned. ITALIAN VERSION ROME, August 19. One was killed and five were wounded, as a result of a raid on Addis Ababa, where a bomb hit two sheds containing old equipment. VALUE OF BERBERA. ONLY SUITABLE PORT. While Berbera, objective of the Italian attacks in British Somaliland, had small material value it was of importance as the only suitable port on the coast from which Britain could attack Abyssinia, and its loss would also affect Britain’s prestige on the other side of the Red Sea, said Mr F. S. Parker, a New Zealander, who has. an intimate knowledge of this coast, in an interview (states the “New Zealand Herald”). Mr Parkei- was for several years chief engineer of the motor-ship El Hak carrying petroleum products from Suez to ports oh both sides of the Red Sea and further south along the coast of Italian Somaliland. During that time he called at practically every port large and small in this area. 9

From the strongly fortified port of Massawa, in Eritrea, along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden the whole coast was utterly arid, Mr Parker said. Supplies for the coast had to come either from the more fertile highlands inland or from across the Red Sea.

Berbera was the only real port on the British Somaliland coast. Zeila, which has been taken by the Italians, was not a port at all. It was only an anchorage with a cluster of native huts. Berbera, however, was a natural harbour- with a sandbank protecting it from the south-west monsoon. It had only a residency, a few, European houses and some hundred j Somali huts. There was no wharf for ! large vessels, all unloading being dorie s by lighter. He could not agree, how-, ever, with the claim that it was of nostrategic value. It was at the head of a 600-mile road to Addis Ababa and was the only port suitable for landing troops from Aden for operations against the Italians. The coast, from Jibuti to Zeila was perfectly flat and would offer no hindrance to the Italian advance, but between Zeila and Berbera the mountains came right down to the coast. There was a wedge of . flat land inland for 30 or 40 miles from Berbera, with mountains behind. If the Italians reached Berbera progress along the rest of the British Somaliland coast would be easier as there was fairly flat land in most places, but there were no ports or settlements of any value. Inland in British Somaliland the highlands were quite fertile and a certain amount of sheep raising was carried on. Sheep were even exported to Aden so that the capture of these areas might be of some value to the Italians in securing supplies.