Thank you for correcting the text in this article. Your corrections improve Papers Past searches for everyone. See the latest corrections.

This article contains searchable text which was automatically generated and may contain errors. Join the community and correct any errors you spot to help us improve Papers Past.

Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image

NORTH WEST FRONTIER

THE RULE OF LAW. The British public at intervals uneasily awakes to the consciousness that it has a vulnerable continental frontier. The great Canadian frontier has been settled wisely and, as it may well be hoped, for ever. But there is another which has not been so settled. It is a line extending for upwards of 1,200 miles from Cape Monze towards the western abutments of the Himalayas. At some point in this line, every important invasion of India that has been recorded, and many that are beyond record, was effected. It is the North-Western Frontier of India (writes. Sir James Crerar in the London “Sunday Times”). We did not invade India. We entered it peacefully by sea for peaceful purposes, which destiny transformed. But the routes which were followed by the IntTo-Aryans themselves, by Alexander the Great, by obscure hordes from Central Asia, by tho first Arab conquerors and by all the great Muslim dynasts who came after, have still the interest of pregnant lessons from the past and warnings. for the future to ourselves.

It would not be to the present purpose to deal with the intricate and somewhat obscure position in Waziristan, which is merely one of the recurrent manifestations of a larger problem; but some examination of the major issues involved in this problem may be opportune. We are by law and treaty as well as in fact, directly responsible for the defence of India. India can only be safe so long as the British and Indian navies defend her oceanic trade routes and possibly hostile approaches by sea and so long as our arms and administration secure her NorthWestern Frontier. This frontier has to be made good against two dangers, different in kind but both of great gravity. Tho first is chronic intestine trouble in the independent or semiindependent tribal areas which fringe tho settled districts of the Punjab and North-West Frontier provinces. This ferment results, at the best, in lawless and insolent incursions into British territory, looting, murder, kidnapping —affronts and injuries which no Government. can tolerate and of which, incidentally, the Governments of the neighbouring provinces, now endowed with a. parliamentary constitution but not. directly responsible tor defence, are likely to be markedly intolerant.

The second and the connected danger is that of invasion on a much more formidable scale from the direction of Afghanistan and Central Asia. This, in present circunistal ces. may seem remote, but it has been very near in the past, and serious deterioration in the tribal fringe might bring it very near again. A HARD QUESTION. As things stand, the problem may reasonably bo limited to the first of these, with a wary eye upon potential developments. which have-, indeed, elfin in the past been the first preoccupations of oiii' diplomacy and strategy. The higb-votagle section runs from Southern Waziristan round the Kurram salient and up to the Mchmand country. Eajuur and Swat. Theie, as elsewhere in these marches, you have a. country of a sullen and shrewidsh beauty, sterile in crops bul fertile in men, and a population, armed mid trained Io arms, whose social institutions are raiding and' blood-feud. 1 -, fanatic in religion, and with all Hie avarice of an energetic penury. What, accommodation except that of the wolf and the.lamb is to be made between them and the settled, peaceful, prosperous communities

within the border? A hard question, but not incapable of an answer. In the long history of frontier policy three projected solutions appear and reappear. The first is the conquest and direct administration of the country up to a close frontier with Afghanistan. The second is withdrawal to a hypothetical “scientific frontier” behind our present positions. Few will now advocate either of these courses, which leave intact tho root of the trouble, and would merely take different ground, probably at terrific military disadvantage, for the future of pereninal warfare. Neither as the warden of India’s marches nor as the custodian of the! peace and content of ninety million! Moslems could we accept either al- i ternative_, Whatever of this kind might once have been practicable is now no longer possible. The third course aims at the reclamation of the country to the rule of law and peace—what Wade and Wolfe did beyond the Highland 1 Line and what Sandeman did in Baluchistan. It is the policy which holds the field, and which few in these days are likely to question. The problem is economic, in the widest sense. In the initial stages (perhaps at all stages) there must be roads and accessible military bases, but the essential objective is not a garrison. An ancient and inveterate predatory economy, in which private or public war is the main occupation of the adult male, must be gradually replaced by an economy of peace.

LOOKING FORWARD. Rilles must be made dearer and ploughs cheaper, land a better investment than loot. Whatever in this way may be done —roads, irrigation, markets industries —it is possible that the natural resources of the country may be inadequate for a settled population based mainly on agriculture. In that case tho tribesman must be given not only a stake in his own country but wider opportunities beyond it. If we are to impose, as we must, the way of peace we must provide the means of peace. This aspect of the problem is fundamentally economic, but it must not be forgotten that there are other factors questions of foreign relations and an integral scheme of strategical defence —which are of vital importance and I which arc inextricably connected. I These must all bo reconciled in a co-] herent unity. It. would, moreover, be] folly to ignore that any pacific settlement of the frontier must itself have a sound and stable military basis. J This is the immediate question of the moment, but all military measures must be co-ordinated to a comprehend sive, long-term policy. The ultimate! objectives must be clearly conceived] and pursued by methods that are firm,, friendly (when this is possible), and' consistent. And, looking forward, if 1 tho voluntary accession to an Indian! Federation of a civilised frontier state 1 or states seems now a. Utopian vision,] let us avoid, by either extreme of: temerity or irresolution, the certainty of making it impossible. !

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/GEST19370621.2.69

Bibliographic details

Greymouth Evening Star, 21 June 1937, Page 9

Word Count
1,048

NORTH WEST FRONTIER Greymouth Evening Star, 21 June 1937, Page 9

NORTH WEST FRONTIER Greymouth Evening Star, 21 June 1937, Page 9

Help

Log in or create a Papers Past website account

Use your Papers Past website account to correct newspaper text.

By creating and using this account you agree to our terms of use.

Log in with RealMe®

If you’ve used a RealMe login somewhere else, you can use it here too. If you don’t already have a username and password, just click Log in and you can choose to create one.


Log in again to continue your work

Your session has expired.

Log in again with RealMe®


Alert