KUT SURRENDER

Greymouth Evening Star, 21 June 1937, Page 9

KUT SURRENDER

HORRORS OF DEFEAT. i ' i

When the Great War finished I determined to draw a veil across its memories: - to look only forward and never back. I wishted to forget much; but Lady Neave’s book has revived all the old memories, like pain returning after a drug has worn off—memories of the tragedies of the Mesopotamian campaign, of the siege and surrender of Kut-al-Amarah, of our march into captivity, and of the prison camps (writes H. C. Armstrong, in the don “Sunday Times.” reviewing “Remembering Kut (Lest we Forget).” by Dorina L. Neave.

Lady Neave has tried to tone down the horrors of those tragedies, and even to find excuses for some of those responsible, but her use of the narratives of tlie survivors and her simple direct style have made the facts stand out even more vivid, clear, and pronounced than before. At the cud of 1914, the Indian Government sent an expeditionary force to Mesopotamia. Without any clear policy or military objective, the trobps were pushed forward. The administrators and the departments under them left the base at the port of Basra on the Persian Gulf in muddle and chaos. They starved the troops of supplies, arms, stores, and, above all, of transport and medical equipment. The troops advanced, winning battle after battle, but they advanced through a barren and hostile country, and their only line of communication was the treacherous and twisting Tigris river, until at last they met the main Turkish force before Baghdad. Here they were held up. Behind them were 300 miles of" river communications conconstantly threatened by Arab tribes and guarded by only 300 men, a man to a mile. Forced to retire, they were caught in mid-air. They turned and stood fast in a bend of the river in the village of Kut-al-Amarah, and here, they were surrounded, and, after a long siege, 13,000 officers and men were taken prisoners and marched away in to captivity. TOWNSHEND.AND THE SIEGE.

General Townshend was in command in Kut, and his handling brought him no credit. He made no correct summary of the available food supplies. He allowed 7,000 Arab civilians to remain in the town, and they acted as spies for the Turks and stole the food. A new force was sent from India to relieve him He repeatedly telegraphed that his supplies were ending. The relieving troops were thrown into action piecemeal as they arrived in desperate attempts to save him, instead of being concentrated into one force and breaking through with one massed attack. When they failed, Townshend found more food. His communiques became jokes, and he did not inspire confidence among his men. As soon as the siege started he sat down and he lost hi§ momentum. ' It was a long siege—one of- the longest in hisstory, 147 days in all; yet throughout it he never made one sortie or attempt to cut out, though on three occasions, and especially on March 8, 1916, he could haVe got away with little effort 1 or risk. He preferred to sit and wait to be relieved, and so he failed. Then came the final tragedy. Thirteen thousand officers and men surrendered and were driven by Arabs and Kurds under Turkish officers and men out across the Syrian deserts in the full blast of the burning sun up 2,000 miles into the Inner Plateau of Turkey. I came behind them. I was casehardened to pain and horrors, but even now the memory of what I saw is a nightmare: my own men in columns that staggered slowly along, holding together to stand up because they were so weak: in rags: verminous: covered with sores: broken down with disease, malaria, enteritis, dysentery. Others crawling on all fours, and hundreds lying by the roadside waiting to die, so weak that often the jackals were gnawing at their feet before they died. And the inhuman Turks and Arabs beating, clubbing, and looting them. Of the 13,000 who marched out of Kut only 4,000 remained at the end of the war. The whole road cried out for vengeance, and, instead, when the survivors reached England, they were ignored, and to-day many of them broken in body are in deep need.

SIR CHARLES MELLISS, V.C. But against this black background show up great deeds of gallantry, of reckless courage, of incredible endurance, and almost equally incredible self-denial, and, here and there, though not so often, quaint conceits and humour; such things as make me proud of having been a member of that force; and Lady Neave has described some of these as graphically as she has described the horrors. She tells the story of a handful of sailors who volunteered to try and break the blockade round .Kut by steaming a ship, the Julnar, up the river through the Turkish lines: those sailors knew that their chances of life were small. Of the parson the Reverend Spooner, who gave up the comfort of a good concentration centre to help the men in a foul labour camp: of men giving their last ration to a. pal. or selling their only boots to get milk for a sick friend: of men standing up to their brutal captors and refusing to allow their spirit to be broken: blowing up a German power slat ion: running a railway truck into a tunnel which they were cutting and crushing the Germans who were inspecting inside; and she tells how the second in command, Major-General Sir Charles Melliss, V.C., fought furiously .tooth .and nail with the Turks to help the men. If this book does nothing else, it does justice to General Meilis, a great soul, a heroic figure, who was afraid of no man, whether his superior or his Turkish captors, and who worked in Kut, on the march, and in the camps with an intense fury to save his men. He is worth a book to himself. There are several minor errors in the book, but I am not with those reviewers who ignore the 90.000 words in a book which are correct aand concentrate in cavilling at the ten or 20 words which are incorrect: but I must disagree with Lady Neave in one thing. She says that General Meilis persuaded Townshend not to cut his way out of Kut. I do not believe it. for I stood close beside them while Melliss urged Townshend to act.