JAPAN AND BRITAIN

Greymouth Evening Star, 29 May 1937, Page 10

JAPAN AND BRITAIN

FRIENDSHIP RESTORATION

[ Wrote the “Sydney Morning | Herald’s” Special Corerspondent in | the Far- East, H. G. Woodhead, from I Shanghai, April 16: — i “Well-informed circles in Japan exi pected that the Keelung incident i would be settled as soon as the Diet | session ended. Inasmuch as the • settlement would have to be an- ! nounced in the House of Commons , and would then be cabled back to : Japan, the Japanese Government was I anxious to avoid the embarrassment ■ that would ensue if it were immedi- ' ately made the subject of an interpellation. Even as it is, the first effect of the Japanese “amende honorable” was marred by the tagging on to it by a Japanese news agency of • an unauthorised report that the JapI anese Government was convinced that I no wrongful acts had been committed I by the Keelung police. There is noth- ' ing derogatory in a Government adi mitting and apologising for unjustifiable acts on the part of its'officials; | but, in view of the critical attitude of Japanese politicians towards the new Cabinet during the recent Diet session, the amende would undoubtedly • have been used as a pretext for further I attacks, hail the Legislature still been I sitting. The settlement of the ini' cident took the form of expressions of mutual regret that the incident had occurred by the Governor-General of Formosa and the British Consul at Tamsui. The former stated that the police officer concerned had been reprimanded for laying hands on a bluejacket under examination and for the use of improper language to a British officer, and cautioned to be I more careful in future. The British reply agreed that the incident should: now be regarded as closed, and as- [ sured' the Governor-General of co-' operation in preventing similar incidents in future. The setlement may be expected to be followed by the resumption of courtesy visits to .Japanese ports by the China Squadron. And it may be hoped that in the case of fortified areas and remote ports restrictions will be imposed upon shore leave which will avoid the i;isk of midnight brawls, whichever party may be responsible therefor. There'have been many signs of a widespread desire among the Japanese for an improvement of Anglo-

Japanese relations. The selection of the Emperor’s brother as Coronation envoy was striking evidence of this desire, which has been reflected in several of the more influential Japanese newspapers. Feelers in this direction have not been devoid of criticism of British policy, but it is evident that it is realised that the restoration of cordial Anglo-Japanese relations is dependent upon a reorientation of Japan’s China policy. It is fully understood that the British Government, in the Far East as in the Occident, is not prepared to make friendship with one Power conditional upon a policy that is bound to give offence to another. The British Press and British politicians have been outspoken in their criticisms of certain features of Japanese policy in China, notably the so-called “special trade” and the perpetuation of the pseudoEast Hopei Autonomous regime, neither of which can be considered

consistent with obligations to maintain the integrity and independence of China. What appears to have been an inspired expose of the Tokio Foreign Office's viewpoint on these issues indicates that Japan would be willing to discuss them with China, or with Great Britain, but. will not participate in collective discussions with other Governments. A more moderate attitude on the subject of naval disarmament or limitation of naval armaments was also fore-

shadowed in the same article, which, however; was critical of British insistence upon the settlement of such a minor issue as the Keelung incident. “SPECIAL TRADE.”

The importance attached, by the Japanese Cabinet to Anglo-Japanese relations was emphasised several times by the Foreign Minister, during the session of the Diet. More promising, perhaps, than these naturally somewhat vague assurances is the statement that appeared in both the . “Nichi Nichi” and the “Asahi,” that the new Foreign Minister is devoting ; special attention to the problem of i Anglo-Japanese relations, and that it is his intention to pursue in China a I policy that will definitely remove ■ foreign suspicions of Japanese inten- ■ tions in that country. It is stated : that in return for certain tariff con- ■ cessions, the Japanese Government : will take steps to merge the East 1 Hopei Autonomous Council with the I Hopei Chahar Political Council, and I to “readjust” the so-called “special trade.” It is considered that this can Ibe done without sacrificing any ! material Japanese interest in North ' China, and that the result will con- - vince Britain and other Powers that Japan has no territorial designs on that portion of Chinese territory. Mr Kawagoe, Japan’s Ambassador to China, is expected to return to Tokio to confer with the Foreign Minister shortly, and it is reported that Mr Ishii, who was only recently promoted Minister to Siam from the post of Consul-General in Shanghai, will be recalled to take charge of the East Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Oilice. The way has been prepared for more cordial Anglo-Japanese relations when British suspicions of Japan’s intentions in North China have been rempved by the settlement of trade disputes with Canada, Australia. and India. An important Japanese Economic Mission is shortly to visit the United' Kingdom. The interest aroused by the magnificent feat of the “Kamikaze” seems likely to react favourably upon any sincere effort, to improve Anglo-Japanese friendship. British politicians are not likely to forget the services rendered to the Empire by the AngloJapanese Alliance, or to overlook what might have happened had Japan keen in the opposite camp during the Great War. Querulous criticism of t

ho establishment of Manchukuo has abated, and though Britain’s undertaking to the League precludes formal recognition unless China, herself takes the initiative, Manchukuo has ceased to bo a. live issue in British foreign policy. The main danger to a settlement of Sino-Japanese problems in North China on a. mutually satisfactory basis now appears to lie in the possibility of Nanking's mistaking a conciliatory gesture for a sign of weakness, and reviving Japanese military opposition to the substitution of a policy of concessions for one of coercion.