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APPEAL COURT DECISIONS

WATERSIDERS’ UNION WIN RIGHT OF EXCLUSION [PUB PBESS ASSOCIATION.] WELLINGTON, August 31. In the case of the Wellington Watersiders Union v. Hargreaves, by a majority of two Judges to one, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Supreme Court and gave judgment for appellant with costs, on the lowest scale. The Court held that the provision in the rules of the Union, registered under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1925, whereby a person may be excluded from the membership of such Union at the discretion of the Union Executive was intra vires. The Chief Justice drew attention to the difference in the Australian and New Zealand law on the point as follows: “It seems to me, that in the Commonwealth of Australia, and in the States of New South .Wales and Queensland, the position such as obtains in this case has been carefully guarded against, while in New Zea-

land it has not. Whether or not the position in New Zealand should be altered is a political matter upon which I have no right to express an opinion. All I can say is that in my judgment, interpreting as best I can the law as it now exists, the relief granted by the Court below to respondent cannot he supported, and the appeal should be allowed.” Mr- Justice Johnston also supported the appellant union. Mr Justice Ostler delivered a dissenting judgment. He agreed it was not unlawful for a trade union to limit its membership by its rules, but held that the rules of the appellant union, in this case, were ultra vires, on the grounds of uncertainty. His Honor also strongly .commented on the position of the existing law: “I hold the strong opinion that whether a trade union is working under an award which gives preference to unionists or whether it has no award, but has obtained preference for its members by agreement with their employers, it should not be allowed by law to limit its members and thus create a monopoly in a right to do such work. If every trade union could thus act, the result would soon be that no person could obtain employment in any industry except by favour of the union of workers registered in respect of that industry. As the law stands, at present, however, in my opinion it is hot illegal for trade unions to limit their membership, and then by agreement to obtain preference for their members from their employers, thus creating a monopoly of the right to work for those employers. It is a. matter for the Legislature to say whether it will forbid such conditions.”

Dealing with the appellant’s argument that no legal damage had been done to respondent, his Honor stated: ■‘The appellant union by their wrongful refusal to admit respondent, caused him damage by not being able to obtain work which he would otherwise have obtained. They knew that the effect of refusing to admit him to the union would be that he could not compete for work on the wharf with members. In my opinion, it does not matter whether the preference to unionists was preference if fact or in law. By wrongful refusal to admit him, the union caused him damage, and in my opinion that damage is recoverable at law.

APPRENTICESHIP CONTRACTS. In the case of Burton v. The Precision Engineering Co., the Full Court this morning gave judgment on question of law argued before it in this action on June 29. Mr Justice Ostler and Mr Justice Johnston in separate judgments held that the Apprentices’ Act, 1923, and its Amendments applied to the contract under review, by reason of the general order of August 4, 1926, and as a result plaintiff’s remedies for enforcement of this contract were restricted to the remedies provided by the Act. The Chief .lustice, in a dissenting judgment held that as from the date of the cancellation of the award the Act and its amendments ceased to have any application to the contract, an he could see no reason why a party to such a contract should not have available to him the ordinary remedy in damages, if the other party committed a breach of contract in respect to essential features. Judgment was entered in accordance with the view’ of the majority of the Court. No order was made as to costs as the action was treated as a “test case.” The decision is considered to be of the greatest importance in view’ of its effect cn apprenticeship contracts generally throughout the Dominion.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/GEST19340831.2.47

Bibliographic details

Greymouth Evening Star, 31 August 1934, Page 7

Word Count
762

APPEAL COURT DECISIONS Greymouth Evening Star, 31 August 1934, Page 7

APPEAL COURT DECISIONS Greymouth Evening Star, 31 August 1934, Page 7

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