HUNTER ESTATE CONTROL

Greymouth Evening Star, 8 July 1932, Page 7

HUNTER ESTATE CONTROL

THE WIDOW’S CASE. [PER PRESS ASSOCIATION.] WELLINGTON, July 7. In the Appeal Court, in the case Hunter v. Hunter and another, counsel for the respondent (Lady Hunter) continuing his argument, submitted that the administration of the appellant prior to and during the hearing of the original action was vbry material in determining whether the appellant should be passed over or not. Since the date of Sir George’s death, his widow and her child had not received one penny in income from the estate, and they had. been reduced to such a state of poverty that Lady Hunter had been compelled to sell articles of personal furniture in order to support herself and her child. Counsel continued, “In spite of this, however, the appellant has spent four guineas a week of the estate money on the training of a young racehorse, and expended considerable sums on permanent improvements, which, in view of the circumstances of the widow and child, was quite unnecessary. Lady Hunter suggested, at a very early stage, that a block of land should be offered to the Government to cover the amount payable for death duties, and she had even gone so far as to enquire, as. to the willingness of the Government to accept such a block. Cyril Hunter, however, unwisely refused to ratify her offer, although the whole of the complications caused by the non-payment of the death duties would thereby have been avoided.” Counsel contended, further, that the appointment of Cyril Hunter as the executor would virtually amount to the appointment of Mr Dunn, who already acted for Cyril Hunter in his private capacity. Apart from any personal factor, it was undesirable that the same man should act as solicitor, banker, manager, and stock and station agent to the estate. There was no doubt, also, that acute hostility existed between Mr Dunn and Lady Hunter, and that ill-feeling and friction was inevitable between them. Taking the whole of the circumstances into consideration, he submitted that the Trial Judge, in passing over the appellant and appointing the Public Trustee, had exercised his discretion upon proper grounds.

The Court reserved its decision