DIVORCE PRACTICE

Greymouth Evening Star, 11 March 1932, Page 5

DIVORCE PRACTICE

DECISION RESERVED. [per press association.] WELLINGTON, March 10. In the case of Rose v. Rose, before' the Full Court, this afternoon, counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the deed was not pleaded, it should be disregarded by the Court, for that was the law in England, and should apply here. If it. had been pleaded, it would have been open to the Court to enquire into the circumstances surrounding its asking, and then possibly to ignore it. As, however, it was not pleaded, the Court was denied the opportunity of investigating those circumstances. Counsel for respondent, on the other hand, contended that English cases were unsatisfactory. They did not proceed on any settled rule of'law, but had been decided on a considerable number of different grounds. The weight of authority in Australia and New Zealand was to recognise, and give effect; to a deed, where it had not been pleaded, this course being based on reasons of public policy. The Court reserved its decision.

(A question of law, arising out of divorce practice, is occupying the attention of the Full Court. On December 4, 1930, Alfred Shepherd Dawson Rose, of Wellington, entered into a deed of separation with his wife, which contained a covenant that he would not endeavour to compel her to cohabit with him, or seek to enforce any restitution of conjugal rights. On June 24, 1931, Rose filed in the Supreme Court a petition for the restitution of conjugal rights, a copy of which was served on Mrs Rose, who instead of filing an answer, and pleading therein the deed of separation as a bar to the making of an order, ignored the proceedings and failed to take legal advice. When the matter came before the Chief Justice for hearing, he raised and. reserved for the opinion of the Full’ Court, the question of whether the deed of separation, existing as it did, but not having been pleaded by the wife, was a bar to the making of an order for the restitution of conjugal rights.)