DIVERGENT VIEWS

Evening Star, Issue 25715, 12 February 1946, Page 5

DIVERGENT VIEWS

Lesson of First Session RUSSIA'S COVERT HOSTILITY » "Dead Set" Against Britain —l<(N.Z.P.A. Special Correspondent.) (Received 11 a.m.) LONDON, February 11. Two trends of opinion about the future value and effectiveness of U.N.O. as an instrument for maintaining world peace are making themselves evident here, as the first session of the General Assembly draws to a busy and rather weary close. One trend is optimistic; the other.not so much pessimistic as realistic. The optimists, emphasising the technical efficiency with which U.N.O. has been launched, and the eventual conciliations that thus far have marked the proceedings of the Security Council, are apparently convinced that U.N.O. "will work." They see in ' the "open discussions" of the Security Council —those that are not conducted in a small ante-room in a five minutes that becomes two hours—the Great Powers settling their disputes at what they call the " bar of world opinion." U.N.0., they feel, has taken the strain, a pretty severe strain, but it is holding. . They see in the smiles and handshakes of the leaders of the Big Three in the council room a satisfying conciliatory spirit which bears comparison with political opponents who meet in the lobby after- a violent debate " on the floor of the House," and they feel that it is good, smacking (one might say) of the brotherhood of man. But there is another trend of opinion. Looking beyond the sentimentality and the handshakes, it asks what were the reasons for the "tough " attitude Russia adopted, not only in the Security Council, but also in other U.N.O. departments, which seems particularly directed against Britain. The answer, it finds, is that Russia has declared open diplomatic war on Britain and the Commonwealth, and covertly displays a certain eagerness to effect a division between Britain and the United States.

Council's Small Authority

It is felt that the " open " discussion in the Security Council served to reveal quite clearly this cleavage between the two countries, and that the decisions reached have done nothing to mend the situation. They have not altered the fact that where points of contact exist between Russia and Britain in the Balkans, the Middle East and Persia, friction can easily occur. It is also felt that these discussions liavo firmly established th© principle that the focus of.policy and decision inside the U.N.O. lies with the Security Council and not with the Asgembly, ■ and have emphasised that the U.N.O. is not a Bupernational authority but an international working committee.

For the practical purposes of international policy, the Council ' will be looked to and not the Assembly. The effect of the veto—or merely the threat of the veto—enables the Great Powers to block any resolution they like, and removes any pretence that the Council will be able to exert any authority over its permanent members. At the moment it is felt that it is too early to forecast the long-term influence this first session" will have upon the trend of world affairs. While the U.N.O. will be one factor in the foreign policy of the Great Powers, it is thought it will hardly in any foreseeable time become, as Mr Attlee hoped " the overriding factor in foreign policy."

Open Diplomatic War

It seems reasonably certain that the relationships between Russia and Britain are going to remain the dominating feature of world affairs for some time to come. The cleavage and open diplomatic war between the two countries are real and apparent. In the words of Mr J. L. Garvin there is a Communist "dead set" against Britain and the British Empire. The heart of it, he says, is that Russian policy " is bent on the centuries' old aim of suzerainty over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; that our alliance with Turkey is regarded by Moscow as the chief obstacle; and that most of the rest is the oblique policy of unavowed pressure." One effect of the U.N.O. session has been to indicate clearly . that if Russia is suspicious of. Britain then the British people are becoming steadily more suspicious of Russia, and that the

Soviet has lost in British eyes an impressive proportion of the floodwill and prestige she established throughout the war. The Russians, it is felt, in addition to their Mediterranean aspirations, pride themselves as being " realifsts," and have a greater respect for America than Britain, because they feel she is actually and potentially a greater military ' Power. Britain and the Commonwealth Russia regards, apparently, as not being in the same category. Significantly perhaps ' The Times,' in commenting upon the lessons of the Greek dispute and remarking that they will be carefully pondered by the British Government and public opinion, went on to say: "The position of Great Britain in the Near and Middle East has always rested on power. It was an essential condition of Britain's status among the nations of the world.

Britain Needs Power For Status

"It must continue in future to rest upon power. No encouragement at all should he given to the notion that strong words or strong resolutions voted by an international ' assembly are any substitute for effective power." The attitude of the United States in the Security Council discussions has been watched with interest, and it has been remarked that she has been acting as a " bridge " between Russia and Britain. That the recent Moscow conference was largely a Russo-Ameri-can affair is now taken for granted, but there is no disposition to bolieve that there are no points at issue between the two countries, and that at some future date it will not be Britain's role to be the " bridge " when those points arise for discussion. The chief " point of contact " between Russia and America is in the Far East. While it has been noted in America that Russia has formed a political and economic bloc giving it right to control trade over Eastern Europe relaxation of this control is being urged as a condition on America making the Soviet a loan.

Whatever the future of U.N.O. —and although there has been a note of scepticism discernible here frorh the very first day's session, there is genuine hope that it will " work "—the fact remains Britain to-day is being tested severely, both domestically and in the field of foreign affairs. The extent to which she will remain an " effective Power " depends upon the extent to which she overcomes her domestic difficulties. The American loan is required, both directly to ease her internal general trade position, also indirectly to allow her to maintain those forces which she deems necessary to remain " effective," but which, through Economic circumstances, she may be forced to reduce below what may be regarded as the safety level. Thus, while a section here is pleased at the handshakes and smiles in the Security others see them as a veneer to a that will require to be handled with something more than sentimentality.