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BRITAIN’S ARMY

A MOTORISED FORCE RAPIDLY MOVING COLUMNS REGENT EXERCISES Anyone who saw something of the Army exercises this year can hardly fail to have beeu impressed, writes a military correspondent of the ‘'Manchester Guardian.’ There is nothing new in the adaptation of the internal combustion engine to ‘ military purposes; it was-put to a dozen uses in the last war. What is new is that at last, after years of experiment and anxious searching of heart, the whole organisation of our Array has been recast on the basis of the internal combustion engine. Many foreign armies have their mobile armoured formations; but their infantry divisions still contain a high proportion of horsed transport, hampering their rate of movement. The British Regular Army alone constitutes the homogeneous fighting force of which military reformers have dreamed. The details of the new war establishments are necessarily not for publication. Perhaps the most useful thing at this stage is to give some general impressions of the new model at work. THEIR MANY VEHICLES. One has a vivid recollection of a brigade group on the march—an infantry brigade of three battalions, a machine-gun company, a regiment of field artillery, an anti-tank battery, and a field company of sappers—made up to war establishment by drafting in men from other units to take the places that would be filled by reservists on mobilisation. The first impression was. the great number of vehicles required to carry the troops and their actual fighting necessities. The next was the length of the column on the roads and the speed at which it moved. The columns of horse, foot, and guns that we knew in 1914-18 did .their steady two and a-half miles an hour well closed up, nose tight jammed to tail, as their predecessors had done in a hundred campaigns down the centuries. By contrast the modern column counts on moving at a steady 15 miles an hour, including halts, which means a speed of anything up to 30 miles an hour whilst moving on the road. The ever-present air menace decrees that there must be no bunching, which in any case would block the roads and impede movement. To ensure an even flow of traffic vehicles must be spaced out at intervals of a hundred yards, or even more.

A DIFFICULT PROBLEM

The control of such a column on the march presents a very difficult problem a regiment of field artillery alone with vehicles spaced out at the normal intervals occupies 10 miles of road space. The number of men available for traffic control duties is limited, and a great weight of responsibility ■rests on the shoulders of the young n.c.o. or soldier in charge of a vehicle. It is not too much to say that in the modern Army every man must be able to read a map, and read it quickly and accurately, as well as drive a vehicle.

One could feel nothing but admiration for the way in which these young soldiers, many of them only just out of the depots, rose to the occasion. The standard of driving was high, there

were ' very few mechanical breakdowns, and when the column was halted every vehicle was at pains to obtain what cover it could from the air.

At such times it was possible to be in the middle of the area in which the troops were moving and. to be almost unaware of their presence. Another noticeable thing was the almost ,complete absence; of noise made by an army moving on rubber tyres. The tramp of feet and rattle of gun wheels that used to advertise the movement of troops for miles, particularly by night, were gone. The training of the drivers included moving by night without lights, and they had attained a very high standard of proficiency in this art. CLOTHING AND KITCHENS. One was struck by the care and forethought that had been lavished on many minor details of equipment. Various patterns of new clothing were on trial; apart from the gas-resisting properties of a waterproofed - cotton material, one wondered whether any of them was preferable to the old service dress as far as the infantry were concerned, though cotton overalls worn over service dress seemed a sensible kit for an artilleryman or a motor driver. A company of sappers was equipped with power tools and a new pattern of steel-girder bridging material, and completed the various jobs that fell to its lot with extraordinary despatch. Many existing bridges will require strengthening to bear the weight of a modern army.

Last, but by no means least, the old held kitchen has gone, and its place is taken in every unit by a most ingenious device. Food is cooked on a petrol range and taken up to the troops in insulated containers capable of keeping it hot for as long as three days. The constant cold food that added so much to the discomfort of the soldier on active service, and which in the long run was the cause of a not inconsiderable number of hospital cases, is_ a thing of the past. An interesting point is that it has been found impracticable to ■ distribute from tanker lorries the petrol which supplies the motive power of the army to-day, and the can in normal commercial use is too costly. Use is made of a sealed white-metal container like the Indian kerosene oil tin.

MECHANISED FORCES

The mobile division —tanks and cavalry—is a mechanised force —that is to say, it fights as well as marches on wheels, or rather on tracks. Moving at the pace it does, the problem ot controlling it and issuing orders is one of great difficulty. It is even doubtful whether in all circumstances it would prove possible to draw up ano distribute written orders. Can or radio-telephony always be relied on, particularly at night ? Very much depends on the, instinctive co-operation and team work of the various units. Besides the immensely-increased demands on the initiative and intelligence of the private soldier, the task of the regimental officer, and< in particular that of the lieutenant-colonel commanding a regiment or battalion, is out of all proportion greater than ever before. Obviously the human factor is all-important. _ . The infantry division is motorised and not mechanised. That ia to say, it marches on wheels and except for the mfantry carriers nnd such tanks as may be albtted to it for the attack, it fights on its feet. The infantry reach their position of assembly by road, disembark, leaving their veliclL under cover, and go into action much as their fathers did before them. But not quite. Ihe accepted doctrine to-day for a daylight attack when anything more,,,.than the very slightest resistance is expected is that

the infantry are “ put on to ’ the position by tanks specially allotted lo?. the purpose. These, together with infantry r ‘carriers,” . with their Bien guns and the supporting artillery, combine the two essential elements or fire and movement without which no attack can hope to succeed. Once on the position, the fighting vehicles , rally , hack to the’ rear under cover, leaving the infantry, with their fifty-two Bren guns for each battalion' and the machine-guns and anil-tank guns allotted to them, to organise tbe defence and deal with - the impending, counter-attack. , Owing to the greatlyincreased range of the.new 25-pouudea gun-howitzer, the supporting artillery, will have moved forward their observation parties, but not necessarily, changed their gun positions. In the actual attack the infantry appeared very thin on the ground, a welcome change from the masses of men that used to offer such targets to the enemy machine-guns. .It is noteworthy, that in the new model the infantry section, the brick from which .every military organisation must be built up, consists of seven men. Its counterpart in the German Army comprise* 13, and in the French Army 12 men. In each case the section has one light! automatic, so that; there is little' difference as regards-fire-power. The difference is made up bv the .greater! number of riflemen in the foreign sections. ..

Thus, as Mr Hore-Belisha promised in his speech last March, we have made use of machine-power and fire-power Aa' order to economise man-power. For the small and highly-trained long-service army of an industrial nation this seems an eminently sensible decision. Tbit judgment is confirmed by the obvious keenness with which all ranks have adopted and are adapting themselves to the new organisation. What the Army needs at the moment is to be left to get on with the job of training for war, without any more far-reaching changes. But our adoption of the new model raises a number of questions of wider importance.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ESD19381201.2.175

Bibliographic details

Evening Star, Issue 23129, 1 December 1938, Page 22

Word Count
1,443

BRITAIN’S ARMY Evening Star, Issue 23129, 1 December 1938, Page 22

BRITAIN’S ARMY Evening Star, Issue 23129, 1 December 1938, Page 22

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