REICH EMPHASIS

Evening Star, Issue 22891, 24 February 1938, Page 2

REICH EMPHASIS

BATTLESHIP'S ROLE So far as Germany is concerned, .the much-dispute'd question as to whether the next war on the seas will be won by battleships or aeroplanes has been definitely decided in favour of the battleship, says a Berlin message to the ‘ New York Times.’ Experts who determine Germany’s naval policy are convinced, according to the new ‘ Naval Year Book,’ that the “ battleship ,is still the nucleus of every fleet which is unwilling to stay glued to the coast, but is willing to fight for - supremacy,and openly scoffed at “ younger schools ” which pronounce the battleship dead every ' time a new weapon appears* 7 777 The' doom bf the battleship, .the * Year Book ’ points out, was first proclaimed’ as early- as .50 years ago, when, the first torpedo - boat appeared 1 -fmtil .the Russo-Japanese 1 battles taught the “youngsters ” otherwise. ... The same predictions, were repeated when the submarine appeared, until the World War showed after the early months that a submarine -was unable to sink even one major battleship, and naval battles. were still being decided by superior shooting and heavier armour. Now it is the aeroplane which is supposed to have . rendered the battleship fit for the scrap Heap. But, the * Year Book ’ says, “ events in Spain clearly have shown hoyf small the hitting results of planes in attack against battleships really are.” At the same time, the -Gormans do not propose to exaggerate one feature of naval construction at the expense of another, but to strike a golden mean between the three factors determining the ships’ fighting value—namely, speed, gun calibre, and armour protection. ABSTAINS PROM GUN LIMIT. Therefore they are abstaining from going the limit ,on the gun calibre permitted under the qualitative. armament limitations agreement, which other naval Powers either, have reached or are closely approaching. That limit is 40.6 centimetres, or approximately Win. But German battleship armament as revealed in the ‘ Year Book ’ is as follows: Two new 35,000-ton battleships at present under construction to be armed with eight 38-centimetre, or approximately Isin guns, and 12 15-centimetre, or approximately 6in guns. The two new 26,000-ton battleships, the Scharnborst and Gneisenau, launched towards the end of last year, are armed with nine 28-centimetre or approximately llin guns and 12 15centimetre ior approximately 6in guns. This staying below the permitted calibre limit is quite deliberate in order to permit greater armour and underwater protection and greater speed. This moderation, the ‘ Year Book ’ suggests, again results from the lessons of the Battle of Jutland, in which the Germans sank far more British ships than the British sank German ships despite the higher calibre of the British guns, because the British sacrificed armour protection to firing power. Out of the same , considerations the ‘ Year Book 1 also pronounces the 10,-000-ton, the so-called Washington cruisers, as good only for commerce * raiding because they are too vulnerable for actual battle. While the technical considerations on which Germany is reconstructing her fleet are thus beginning to reveal themselves, there is so far no indication whatever of the strategic considerations guiding her. The strategic purpose of the German pre-war fleet was plain—fight the British Fleet in the North Sea—and it was built accordingly. Its cruising range was limited to distances of the North Sea and,the Baltic. EMPLOYMENT ABROAD. There is no such single purpose visible so far behind the German Fleet. Neither the speed nor the. cruising radius of the new battleships has been revealed, but both are • presumably great, in keeping with the high speed

and largo cruising radius of the vestpocket battleships built under the terms of the Versailles Treaty. This would suggest that a. new fleet was being built for possible employment further, away from the German coast than the old fleet.

The same idea is suggested by the two 19,250-ton aeroplane carriers, the construction of which caused some surprise when first announced, because Germany first disclaimed any intention of building them. On the other hand, while •-she is expandingfher submarine fleet,it is’ noteworthy ;that the majority of these submarines are ’.small and fit only, for defence jn, home waters. ‘ ' The ‘ Year Book ’ reveals that, in addition to-the -36 submarines - already, constructed,. Germany has laid, the keels’ for submarines Nos. 37 'to *51 7 and the Construction of submarines Nos._ 52 to 611 already! is. planned. ' Of them- eight will’ be 740 tons, 11 517 tons, and the last six 250 tons, as are the bulk of the 36 already in service.. . . The same is true of the rest of the “mosquito fleet”—torpedo boats and speed - boats, all of which are of small tonnage and thus might be assumed for home defence. One guess of the naval experts is that Germany is proposing to build up her fleet to the contractual limit of 35 per cent, of the British, which _ would permit her to control the Baltic and bottle up any Soviet fleet. But others studying the possible implications of the new triangle of Germany,. Italy, and Japan, count up the naval forces of these, three Powers, built and building, and compare them with the forces of the other possible triangle—Britain,, France, and Russia, Doing so they find that taking into consideration the strategic requirements of the British Empire the anti-Communist triangle would soon be able to meet the democratic triangle on almost equal basis. This in turn leaves the balance of power between them to the United States Navy.