BRITAIN AND DISARMAMENT

Evening Star, Issue 19724, 26 November 1927, Page 5

BRITAIN AND DISARMAMENT

DEBATE IN COMMONS LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT ATTITUDE OX OPTIONAL CLAUSE. (British Official News.) Press Association —By Wireless—Copyright. IiUCBY, November 21. Continuing the debate on disarmament in the House of Commons, Sir Austen Chamberlain gave a number of reasons why the present Government could not recommend the signature of the optional clause in the League of Nations’ Covenant, but said ho would lie the last man to state that the attitude which they had to take at this moment must necessarily be the attitude of the British Government for nil time. It was a very few years since the Covenant was signed, since tho League of Nations was erected, and since the permanent court of international justice was established. The decision which the British Government did, in tact,' come to was tho decision reached by the Imperial Conference when they agreed that it would be premature to adhere to the optional clause to-day. Further, they were not going to take action in the matter without prior consultation among themselves. He need hot say how important it was that the whole Empire should act together. Embarrassment to all would be created if one member of the Empire were concerned in a dispute on which another member of the Empire had undertaken to arbitrate, while he himself had not clone so. It was, he believed, common ground to all parties in this country that oven if tho_ Government ■ did not sign tiro optional clause they could only do so with reservations'. ■ At present there was a great body of law on the subject of naval belligerent rights. Wo should have a reserve on everything, which concerned, the relations of : the Empire, and we should have a reserve on anything which, concerned the dominions, and make it perfectly clear that wo would not arbitrate on internal matters, which were in the sovereign jurisdiction of the State itself. What really could bo contributed to the sense of general security or the cause of arbitration by giving a signature to the optional clause with reservations, if we were not prepared to make in advance any engagement which at the time might require for its fulfilment concurrent legislation in certain Parliaments of ' the Empire ? That did not moan we were not ready to use the fullest measure of arbitration for the settlement of disputes. Sir Austen pointed out what the country had done in tho matter of disarmament arbitration. Ho supposed it was true to declare that wc had arbitrated more, and on more important issues, than any other country in the world. Wc had shown our belief in arbitration in the past, and as wc practised it in the past we would practise it in the future. Wc could not, however, undertake to arbitrate in all cases when wc felt wo would not have the power to secure obedience to an adverse award where we ourselves had been in a dispute, as, for instance, over Mosul. We had accepted the arbitration of the League, and even when the award was in our favor we had used it only to negotiate an agreed settlement. In that particular part "of Europe, which has so often been the scat and cause of war, and where our interests are most directly and immediately concerned, wc have undertaken to bring to the support of the League’s judgment the whole force which the Government of this country could command.

Sir Austen concluded: “Has any Power done more than we have in the cause cither of security or disarmament? Some have talked more, some have wanted to pass more resolutions and have been ready to sign more papers, but who has'done more cither in the cause of disarmament or the cause of security? Let him bo the first to throw a -stone at us.” GENEVA NAVAL CONFERENCE LABOR’S CENSURE MOTION. CRITICISM AND REPLIES. LONDON, November ‘2l. _Mr Ramsay MacDonald, submitting, jus disarmament motion, expressed the CJinion that the Geneva Naval Confer(Slce was bungled from beginning to end. Britain failed to scout the field before joining the battle. The only chance of Anglo-American agreement and American agreement with the rest of the world was for Britain and America to come together and remove the chance of war. The conference failed because war methods instead of peace methods were followed, experts being allowed to usurp politicians’ functions. Britain was pledged under every peace treaty to promote peace and disarmament, but no real disarmament conference had yet been held, only discussions bow to reduce armaments in order to save money. Ho was not interested in disarmament as an economic move, but as a means of removing the world’s trust in arms. The world must be got into a frame of mind for taking security fpr granted, and pursuing arbitration and ordinary civilised methods for settling disputes. Viscount' Cecil’s statement of the manner in which he was hampered whenever it came to the proposal of practical disarmament was unanswerable. Parliament’s duty was to compel the Government to carry out the country’s palpable intention, and go ahead quickly towards disarmament, arbitration, and security. If the Government faced the problem of common security there would be no difficulty from the yiewpoint of tbs dominions, as Russia

was joining in, nncl the explorations of security could proceed, fcjir Austen Chamberlain's duty was to bring the Empire as a united powerful force into the councils of Europe and contribute to the system of peace. Sir Austen Chamberlain appeared to be setting up the Empire against the League. He was quite mistaken. It was true that under the British Government’s prompting the Governments of Australia and Canada rejected the protocol of 192-i, but the protocol was only the first draft. He believed the Empire could find a form which was not merely words.

Sir Austen Chamberlain, in replying, said that Viscount Cecil’s reason for resigning wero; First, Dir Kamsay MacDonald’ own rejection, of the treaty of mutual assistance; secondly, the present Government’s opposition to the protocol; and, thirdly, dissatisfaction with the naval conference. Tho Government found that any attempt to amend tho protocol would necessitate an entire recasting. The Government was charged with not making diplomatic preparations before the Naval Conference, but hitherto the Opposition had attacked him for sticking to methods of old diplomacy instead of openly facing the world without previous backstair understandings. Ho accepted some of the blanie for tho lack of diplomatic preparation, but the conference was held at the invitation of the United States, and the British Government refrained from seeking a preliminary understanding lost it should appear to America to be seeking to evade-the acceptance of the invitation.

The debate was interrupted by the electric lights in the whole of Westminster Palace suddenly going out. On resuming when the lighting had been partially restored, Sir Austen Chamberlain said he thought that the lesson of the Naval Conference was that diplomatic preparation was always necessary before conferences. It would also be only after great preparations that there could be any hope of the League Disarmament Conference succeeding. Those who wanted to hurry and press matters before the ground was prepared were likely to bo confronted by the same disappointment as was experienced at tho Naval Conference. ' Apropos of the League Assembly resolution outlawing wars of aggression, Sir Austen said he was nob prepared to define aggression. He thought the League was mistaken in attempting it. Such strict rules for unknown future circumstances would probably lead to an occasion when an unhappy term in the definition would . enable an obviouis victim of aggression to be described as an aggressor. “I do not think it will bo impossible for the League in Individual cases to apportion the blame, but I believe a rigid definition will bo a trap for the inno-' cent and a signpost for the guilty.” Replying to Mr Ramsay MacDonald’s definition of an aggressor as a party refusing arbitration, Sir Austen pointed out that the covenant already bound the signatories not to go to war until they had exhausted every method of judicial arbitration or conciliation by the League Council. “But do not let ns nndcr-rate tho limitations which the covenant itself puts on the right to go to war, or the obligation to exhaust peaceful'methods before going to war.” He did nob pretend that there would be no further trouble in Europe,_ but they could meet the difficulties in a more cheerful spirit and with greater confidence since Locarno. The Governments of the States of the Empire who had not signed the protocol had their own reasons therefor. “ I have no reason to believe that any of them have changed their minds.” Would Mr MacDonald be prepared to place Britain and all her resources at the mercy of the League’s machinery without our people having any control? If not, Mr MacDonald would bo more usefully employed defining how much of the protocol he would adopt, what new obligations he would undertake, and how he would fulfill them, than in talking vaguely and raising hopes he could not fulfill, and spreading uncertainty instead of confidence. The common argument against signing was that unless all went in the proposals could not bo carried out. OTHER SPEAKERS. Air Lloyd George thought that Sir Austen Chamberlain had dealt most inadequately with disarmament. So long as there were huge armaments in the world arbitration and conciliation would be impossible. The first step, therefore, was to reduce armaments- At the present moment 15,00(3,000 men in Europe could bo called up for slaughter with equipment such as Urn world had never seen for horror and destruction. The League’s Disarmamen Ca n mission made no progress during tho last two years because conscription was outside the scope of the inquiry. Other countries complained that Britain and America, who did the most blathering about peace, were increasing their naval expenditure. Risks must be taken for peace as they are taken for war, and ho did not see much risk. There was no enemy on the horizon. During Disraeli’s and Salisbury’s time the defence of _ the Empire cost 2 per cent, of the national income, now it is costing 3.1 per cent. Though tho German fleet is at the bottom of the ocean, and ours at present could engage and sink all the fleets of Europe, the _ Government at the beginning of its regime formulated a naval programme which involved the expenditure of £65,000,000 to £70,000,000 on new ships Wo wero pioneers of arbitration, bur now the feeling at Geneva is that we are holding back and stopping the way. Ha hoped Sir Austen Chamberlain, at Geneva, would use his influence for disarmament and arbitration, “ without which, I think, in tho not distant future there will be such an upheaval as the world has never seen.” Mr Buxton said that the pillars of Labor’s policy were disarmament, arbitration, and security. Sir _ Austen Chamberlain professed great friendship for tho League, but he was always attempting to chock its_ activities. He was like a hen continually warning ducklings not to take to the water.,

MR BRIDGEMAN SUMS UP. Later, Mr Bridgeinan summed up tlic debate on behalf of tlie Government. He pointed out that the Labor Government was the first to lay down the 10,000-ton cruisers authorised by the Washington Conference, and, in his opinion, it was the best thing they ever did. It was useless to pretend that there was a warlike spirit in Britain. The whole country was in favor of peace. Even the League of Nations sometimes looked to the British Navy to control the peace of the world. MOTION DEFEATED. The Labor motion was defeated by 318 votes to 105. Mr A. Duff Cooper's amendment, " That the House, recognising that tho Government's efforts have been constantly directed to the maintenance of peace, the reduction of armaments, and the advancement of the authority of the League, remains opposed to Britain assuming the extended and dangorous obligations embodied in the protocol of 1924, and approves of tho Government's policy/' was carried by 288 votes to 66. THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE RUSSIA'S DELEGATE. BERLIN, November 24. (Received November 26, at 1.30 a.m.) M. Litvinoff has arrived en route to Geneva. He will confer with Dr Stresemann to-morrow. ' AMERICA'S "BIG NAVY." AN INOPPORTUNE SPEECH. NEW YORK, November 24. (Received November 26, at 1.30 a.m.) The Washington correspondent of the New York 'Times' states that the "Big Navy" speech, attributed to Captain "White in- Paris, is considered inopportune, at least in official circles, coming as it did at a- time when there is hopo for reasonable adjustments, of naval construction programmes. Official comment was declined. Mr 0. 1). Wilbur (Secretary of Navy) has corrected tho impressions in Paris that tho speech was delivered after approval in Washington, where nothing was known of it until the newspaper accounts appeared. That the United States want to be in the best position to defend herself is not disputed, but the administration would regret any implication that it is developing a navy aimed to outstrip Britain or any other Power in a competitive armament race.