FORBIDDEN MARRIAGES

Evening Star, Issue 19654, 6 September 1927, Page 8

FORBIDDEN MARRIAGES

' JUDGE AND WILL VETOES. Reserved judgment was delivered by Mi Justice Russell in tho Chancery Division (London) in a summons seeking direction upon tho construction of the will of the lato Mr James Lanyon and in tho matter ot tho freehold estate, the Mount, at Braugbing, Hertfordshire. Mr Justice Russell said that Mr Lanyon left his residuary estate to his son for hte and for division among the son’s children after his life, and then came this provision: “Provided he does not marry a relation by blood, as I wish to mark my great objection to marriage by blood relations. Tho son was now a bachelor of thirtyseven, and lie desired to know whether if ho knowingly or unknowingly married _ a blood relation be would lose his life interest, and whether tho provision oi the wi.l was void or his future choice of a bride was to bo fettered by the risk of_ a subsequent discovery that ho and his_ wife had a common-ancestor who lauded in Pcvenscy Bav with William the Conqueror. Mr Justice Russell decided the provision did not operate to defeat tho life interest of tho son, but only to defeat the interest of his children. Mr Justice Russell said that a testator might make any disposition, however whimsical, but it must bo clear, not _ uncertain, and not contrary to public policy. The courts had held good a provision m a will against marriage with any person born in Scotland or any Scottish person, and also a provision against marriage with a Jew, and a provision against marriage with a domestic servant or a person who had been a domestic servant^ A condition in restraint of marriage, including all men of a particular profession, had been held to be void. In the present case the uncertainty # of tho clause operated against its validity. It was impossible to ascertain whether any particular woman was a blood relation, or was not, when a Pevensoy Bay or even a more remote common ancestor might he found. , . Tho provision was one leading to a probable prohibition of marriage, and so was contrary to public policy and was void.'