HOW LONG?

Evening Star, Issue 16194, 16 August 1916, Page 6

HOW LONG?

CONFLICTING VIEWS. THE HAPPY MEAN. OLE SOMME STRQKE. STEADY PROGRESS. [By Cbiticos.] Advices received by American business men in London indicate that among neutrals there is a growing belief that the end of the war is in sight. “Most forecasts speak of early in 1917, and'some believe the termination will be in November.’' On the other hand, according to the Prime Minister of Australia,. Mr W. M. Hughes, the end is not yet in sight. He believes that a decisive victory for the enemy is impossible, but that does not necessarily mean that victory is with us. A few days ago, it may be remembered, M. Marcel Hutin was telling us in ‘La Victoire ’ that we might expect an AuatroGerman debacle in a few weeks. Such a medley of conflicting and often quite worthless opinions leaves the average man in hopeless state of mental bewilderment. When he listens to the optimist a roseate vision of an early peace floats before his delighted imagination. But when the pessimist comes along and begins to utter his characteristic forebodings, our friend’s mind becomes overshadowed by the gloomiest pictures of long years of war looming ahead. It is a fairly safe rule that one can get an approximation to the truth by striking a mean between the exaggerations of the optimist and those of the pessimist—between the views of the man who expects an Anstro-German collapse in three weeks and those of the man who sees another three years of war before us. The opinions of these people are merely the products of their varying temperaments. Macaulay once declared of the poet Southey that he did not know what the word reasoning meant, and that what he called his reasons were, in fact, nothing but his tastes. There is a profound psychological truth underlying this somewhat exaggerated way of putting the matter. The inefficient thinker sees everything thrown into false perspective, and expects an almost immediate or a very remote termination of the war according to the peculiarities of his temperament. Even if the end were coming in a fortnight it would not be in sight to a man with no grasp of the situation and unable to foresee the sequence of events which would bring it about. On the other hand, even if it were not to come for 20 years, it would yet be in sight to a man who could foresee this and grasp all the principal factors leading up to it. THE ACCELERATING RATIO. There is nothing really obscure in the general situation to the man who can rid himself of the temperamental peculiarities of the pessimist and the optimist and see things in their proper perspective, and sound deduction confirms the common-sense view that the truth is to be found about midway between the two extremes. The writer has already committed himself to the conclusion that the back of the business is likely to be broken about Christmas, but that it may take several months more to conclude the war. This is based on the obvious fact that we have at last gained a great superiority in striking power on all fronts, and that our strength must rapidly increase, whereas that of the enemy must diminish. No number of reserves could withstand the present rate of attrition for long. “ Yes,” replies the pessimist, “ but we have only recaptured a small fraction of the ground lost.” That has very little to do with the matter. Victories are not won by acres of ground, but by guns and men—by “ force massed and wielded in skilful combination.” We are already beating the enemy, and our successes will increase as our strength increases and as our strategical situation improves. Our progress will not only continue, but it will proceed at what the mathematician calls “an accelerating ratio,” or quicker and quicker, as our strength increases and that of the enemy diminishes. Therefore the fact that our present rate of progress seems slow in proportion to the amount of ground to he recovered, signifies very little. It is trap that the enemy can increase their resisting power by shortening their lines, but that would be to admit defeat. To admit defeat would bo to invite the in-, tervention of Rumania, and that would lengthen their lines again by hundreds of miles, would bring half a million into the field against them, and lead to a swift debacle. Therefore the man with common sense and a level head will not be far from the truth if he gauges the future duration of the war by striking the happy mean between the views of the optimist and. those of the pessimist. VERDUN AND THE SOMME.

The London correspondent of the Sydney ‘ Sun ’ has sent some interesting conclusions as to the genesis of the Russian offensive in Galicia and the Anglo-French offensive on the Somme. He asserts that the Russians desired another couple of months for preparation, but that Brussiloff struck in answer to an appeal from the Italians when the Austrians were approaching the Venetian Plains. This is rendered somewhat doubtful by the smashing strength of the Russian" attack. It was clearly Russia’s time to strike when Austria had rashly transferred a considerable fraction of her men and guns to the Trent ino, whether or not Italy appealed for help; and her success shows that she was well prepared. The correspondent goes on to assert that the' offensive on the Somme was forced upon us by the danger to Verdun. That has been urged here from the commencement, together with the view that it does not represent our main stroke, and that the Pomme was chosen because the fact that the French and British lines join up there, and that it was an extremely good place to which to draw the enemV’s reserves, made it a very suitable point for a diversion. . Incidentally the correspondent repeats the story that tho French during the. opening stages of the struggle decided to evacuate tho place. Tile semiofficial story was that General De Castclnau took the decision, but was overruled by General Joffre. On the other hand, American accounts declare that the decision was General Joffre's, and that he was overruled by tho politicians on account of the moral effect that evacuation would have had. If the latter story be correct, the politicians were right for once. While the decision of the military men was justly based on the conclusion that the value of the town itself was not great either from the tactical or strategical point of view, because the west bank of the Meuse made a better line of defence; vet, since it could he defended, the probable effect of its evacuation upon the imagination of the man in the street made the effort worth while. It would have been different, however, had the defences of Verdun not been of great natural strength. When the same correspondent declares that Germany is still far better supplied with big gnna than we, he is less convincing. It is difficult to imagine that the Allies can continuously boat down the enemy’s defences on the Somme, in Galica, and on the Isonzo without a substantial superiority in artillery. What he probably means is that our advantage is still not what we hope for and mean to get. OX THE CARSO. _ From the Isonzo the Italians report little that is fresh. Steady progress continues, and the number of prisoners taken mounts up. It is too early yet to forecast tho influence, of Italy’s successes upon the war as a whole, though the next week or so should bring some" light. If her successes continue she may revolutionise the strategical position. But much depends upon what troops Austria can draw from th* Trentino, where the ynx probably expecting tlw main Italian blow. If 'sufficient forces are not available from that quarter to check the Julians in their advance over tii© Carso RlaUuui the enemy will be faced with the necessity of shortening their lines. The ‘ Xieue Fieie Press ’ of Vienna, points out that the collapse of Austria would mean the imminent

downfall of Germany. That is true, and it is one of the facts which are overlooked by those who point to the great strength of Germany as proof that the war will last a couple of years or more 3 : et. The fall of Austria would leave Germany exposed to attack on every side, and oven it Germany is still strong it is apparent that Austria is weakening rapidly. There could he no more conclusive proof of this than the demand of the Austrian paper quoted above that they should send to Berlin for political as well as military direction. When, a nation is reduced to asking its ally to take over the direction of its military and political affairs its condition must be parlous indeed. Hero lies Italy’s opportunity. If she can force her way over the .Carso and deploy in Carniola Austria’s collapse will bo rapid. ANOTHER SEDAN? •3* A Petrograd. cable, commenting on Von Bothmor’s retreat in Galicia, states that in some quarters another Sedan is considered possible. Anything is possible, of course, but such a result is not in the slightest degree probable. Von Bothmcr’s retrograde movement has been begun in time to save him, and though General Letchitsky’a troops are nearer to Stryj than is his own army, tins will not be a serious danger, so long as his troops are steady. The Austrian centre can easily fall back at a much greater speed than that at which General Letohitsky’s forces can advance in face of the resistance of the Austrian right wing. But rearguard actions are always costly, and the enemy’s losses shonld be immense. Meanwhile the Russians have crossed tho Lukh, a tributary of the Upper Sereth, and the occupation of Mammpol brings them within a lew miles of the important railway junction of Halicz, on the Dniester.