The War In the Far East.

Evening Star, Issue 12307, 23 September 1904, Page 6

The War In the Far East.

THE GARRISON AT PORT. ARTHUR JAPAN’S LATEST CAPTURE ABLE TO COMMAND THE TOWN KUROPATKIN’S ONEROUS TASK ’ THE ARMY DEMORALISED CARPING HOME .CRITICS A GREAT BATTLE HOURLY EXPECTED

Tress Association—By Telegraph—Copyright. IN PORT ARTHUR. HOPING AGAINST HOPE. A BRAVE DOCTOR. LONDON, September 22. An Englishwoman, the wife of M. Kravtchenko, a Russian officer, who accompanied Lieutenant Radziwili and others in a junk from Pori Alt bur, says that there were when she left thirty nurses per 1,000 men. The ladies make the soldiers’ clothes. The soldiers' wives and poor women attend to the laundry work. There wore no contagious diseases, but a large red-headed fly wan feeding on the corpses, and its bite was causing many deaths. A doctor, fatally bitten, amputated bis thumb and then his arm, but the poison reached hi? heart. The garrison were buoyant, and there could bo no braver or finer set of men. All have unlimited confidence, in the possibility of holding Port Arthur. AN IMPORTANT POSITION. LONDON, September 22. (Received September 23, at 7.32 a.m.)

which he was far, very far behind, tho present British Commander-m-Chief. Todleben was an engineer pure and simple, and i. ivuropatkm and Dragomiroff be added to these two names we have almost the full list of the military genius of Russia for a hundred years. Dragomiroff is probably tho best strategist of the lot, and, as far as we know, he and Kuropatkin aro in complete accord. Strategy being a stranger m a strange land as tar'ns Russia is concerned, it is not wonderful to find that t here is a. complete disagreement as to how the campaign in the Far East should le conducted—a, disagreement which is no doubt intensified to some extent bv personal feeling. The principal point of difference just now is the question of tbo means to be adopted with regard to Port Arthur. It can easily be seen that Kuropatkms idea is that if the relief of Port Arthur is to occur at all that relief must come from ’lira ska. He has no liking for an advance into a re-entrant such as the Liao-tung Peninsula is. As long as Japan holds the upper hand at sea that plan would be so dangerous that it is- difficult to believe that anyone understanding even the rudiments of the soldier’s art could have ever recommended it at all. Kuropatkin, yielding no doubt to extreme pressure from St Petersburg, allowed Stackclburg to try it once, and Stackelburg, as have scan, was very luckv to get out of it as well as he did. What' General SaUharoff apparently wants is another plunge into tho same funnel. Admiral Roshdesventsky, who has been nominated for the command of the Baltic fleet, seems to l>c having a battle royal over the despatch of the squadron, and it is probable that his mea of the modus operand! with respect to 1 °rt Arthur is the same as General Kuropat,kin's. General Dragomiroff will probaolv throw Ids weight and influence into the scale in support of the same strategic plan, but—as the playbills say—“there are others.” It alt reads verv, much like the wrangles of Phnll, Barclay' Kutusoff, Wittgenstein, Bagration, and Miladorovitch over the conduct of the great campaign against Napoleon in 1812. These wrangles ended in doing nothing, and losing lots of men in the doing of it. As it turned out, the policy of doing nothing paid in the end, but that is not in anywise to be laid to the credit of the Russian generals of that dav.

The ‘ Morning Post ’ states that the capture of the two forts near Shu-ish-ying facilitates the insertion of a powerful wedge, ns it makes a gap between the eastern and western fortifications, through which the railway enters Port Arthur. LS IT A KEY AT LAST? LONDON, September 22. (Received September 23, at 9.20 a.m.) Reports from Tokio say that the forts just captured by a desperate assault arc Fort Kuropatkin and another to the westward of Itz-shan. They offer excellent gun positions overlooking Port -Arthur. All the Russian attempts to dislodge them were repelled. The garrison are now dependent for water on condensers. THE NEXT SORTIE. LONDON, September 22. Aji authoritative statement has reached Shanghai that the squadron at Port. Arthur have determined to make a sortie this week owing to the incessant bombardment, and they will tiy to reach Kiao-chau. THE JAPS POUR IN. LONDON, September 22. Advices from St, Petersburg state that, considerable forces have been landed at Dalny and Ying-kow. AN ANTICIPATED BATTLE. LONDON, September 22. (Received September 23, at 9.20 a.m.) A Renter's ti.us.vagc states that a battle is expected hourly at Fu-drun, thirty miles cast of Mukden. A RUSSIAN ATTACK. AND HEAVY REPULSE. LONDON, September 22. ißeceived September 23, at 7.52 a.m.) I'iold-marsha-l Oyama has telegraphed that seven battalions of infantry and two batteries attacked tho Japanese at Chung-tai-tf-e on the 17lh. A sharp engagement ensued. A portion of the Mukden force approached nearest, and then began to retire to tho north-west,, the Japanese, artillery firing on them for half an hour, inflicting heavy loss. KUROPATKIN CRITICISED. HOME ADVICE TAKEN.

—Some Heresy.— So much for the Russian position from tiie point of view of pure startegy. A word or two on offensive as compared with defensive fighting may not bo omt of place, and a common notion as to the advantages of the defence may on passant be knocked on the head. So plentiful is the crop of error sown by naif-informed writers that the question tins the attack or the defence benefited most by improvements in firearms? would probably be met with an ansu cr in favor of the defence in nearly every rase. This is as wrong nr- wrong ism be. A lien, after the Danish, Austrian, and Franco-Prussian ware, the leading military thinkers of Europe came to formulate the lessons of those wars, they found that the introduction of the breedi-loader, so Gi from increasing the advantages which the defence hae always enjoyed, Lai actually decreased them, and had to a Large extent favored the attack. If tills were true in 1073, when Scheldt and other writers first advanced the view, it ought to be even more so to-day. The substitution of tlm breech-loader for the muzzle-loader was the introduction of an instrument wherebv a longer range and greater accuracy of strike were obtained. If such an innovation lessened (he gap of advantage which the defence had enjoyed over the attack up till, say, 1848. it is reasonable to conclude that tho introduction of the “ modern ’’ magazine rifle and the '‘modem'’ field gun has still further lessened the gap, because “ modern ” weaponsarennly instruments whereby the advantages which came with the introduction of the needle-gun are verv much accentuated. Nevert Irel ere, nearlv everyone seems to hold to the idea that each improvcmerrt in v eupons makes a new factor in favor of the defence. It does nothing of the sort. The time was when tbo defence could receive the attack in the open field. It cannot do eo now. Unless the defenders dig themselves into cover they cannot live at all. Once they are driven from that cover no fnrtltcr stand is possible until new works have been constructed. What does this mean? It moans that every improvement in weapons is robbing the’ defence of a certain mobility which it once possessed and if, as some think, mobility is the first essentia], this is a great advantage to lorn. It may bo true that “ modern *’ weapons make the task of storming trenches harder than it was. but it is doubtful if even this advantage will last long The losses sustained in storming trenches are determined mainly by the effectiveness of the artillery preparation ’ which has preceded the assault, and further changes in guns, such as the introduction of shrapnel which shall at bnee be man-killing and have a wide anelo of opening, to sav nothing of improvements in lures, will etill further favor the attack. Shelter trenches will then cease to give shelter, and head cover will be wanted everywhere. When that happens the defence will bo more immobile than over. As things stand at present—well, Pieter's Hill was a, formidable position while it stood, hut. what resistance- could the defenders make after it, fell? None at all. And not only that, hut there is the additional fact that now when a defensive lino has been erce pierced tho consequences extend to a flank with far greater rapidity than thev vsed to do.

CORRESPONDENTS LEAVE THE ARMY. LONDON, September 22. (Received September 23, at 9.20 a.m.) French Press correspondents in St. Petersburg state that mbit-ary circles severely ’ criticise General Kuropatkin’s tactics, and that the Czar is- disposed to accept the i Minister of War's advice and order an ! offensive movement, owing to the increasing demoralisation of the army. i Owing to differences with the authorities, most of the Russian war correspondents have been ordered home, j JAPAN TAKES NO CHANCES. | I ONDON, September 22. i At Japan's instance the crews of the Askold and Grosovoi remain aboard their ships under the surveillance of Chinese -warA DENIAL. LONDON, September 22. (Received .September 23, at 7.52 a.m.) The authorities of the Argentine Republic deny the selling of warships to Russia,. NOTES ON THE AVAR. [By Kasuga.] —Kuropatkin to be Asked to Play the Foul.— i Cue of to-day’s cables states that the French Press correspondents in St, Petersburg _ state that military circles severely uit.ioi.-c General Kuropatkin’s tactics, and that, the Czar is disposed to accept the Minister of War's advice and order an offensive movement, owing to the increasing demoralisation of the army. If this piece ot news related to any of .the Great Powers other than Russia it might be dismissed as untrue without further consideration, but as it touches the military admini.-tration of a Power which apparently never knows its own mind, one must, always be prepared for any ridiculous thing. It is, of course, well known that there is no love lost between the, Russian Minister of War (General Sakabaroff) and General Kuropatkin, i and the history of Russia for a century back shows that the Russian military conscience is not above sacrificing the interests of its country for the sake of the gratitica- , t-ion of personal feeling. | —Russian Notions' of Strategy.— I It is a somewhat prevalent idea, too, that the Russian generals and admirals, arc great strategists—or at all events it was until the present war—but this is not home out by a close examination of Russian conflicts. Taking Russian campaigns for the last century, Skobeleff is generally held to have been facile princcps. But' it is somewhat misleading to speak of him as a strategist. He was a brilliant tactician, a perfect master in the art of using his reserves, but he never gave much indication of a master jrasp of strategy— a branch, uf warfare iu

—The Correspondents.— It will be noticed that the French war correspondents refer to the deterioration of the morale of the Russian troops owing to the frequent retreats. This is probably true, but it is one of the disadvantages of a Fabian policy which Kuropatkin is powerless to remedy until he has been suitably reinforced. Some of the East Siberian regiments—such as the 11th and 12th—fought splendidly around Turentchen during the progress of the battle of the Yalu, but the effect of continued defeat must by now have told its tale on all the East Siberian troops. At the battle of Liao-yang the brunt of the fighting seems to have been borne by the Ist, 10th, and 17th Corps, which are new troops from Europe, while East Siberian units, such , as Crieff's command, appear to have ! given way everywhere. Tbis is a serious consideration for Kuropatkin, and it is rather to be suspected that those correspondents who are being sent home 1 will make the most of it when they reach Moscow, St. Petersburg, and otner’places. I Wo sea the same thing on the Japanese side. At one time, the correspondents’ accounts, for the most part, conveyed a sort of impression that every man on the Japanese side was a good and brave man, while every man • on the other side was, from the very fact that he was on the other side, either a fool or a knave. It will be noticed, however, that since the ■ Japanese authorities imposed ceitain restrictions, the tone is, altering all round. “Japan is rapidly alienating the sympathy of the civilised world ” is the card which is being played now. It is pos-

sible that the Japanese will yet have to relax existing restrictions, as' even Lord Kitchener had to do in the Nile campaign. If so, the more's the pity. There is nothing radically wrong in the idea of sending out war correspondents who are prepared to siihmit to a necccssary censorship. What is wrong is the class of war correspondents who are sent. It is a fact that when Lord Methuen was on the Modder River the English papers containing amateur criticisms on his generalship, ofter worded in biting style, wore lying about in the camp, and being read every day by “Tommy,” thereby shaking “ Tomrpy’s ” faith in his leader, and tending to impair the efficiency of the British force in question. No traitor could have done worse for his country.

—The Manchurian Harvest.— “The millet crops,” we are told, “have been harvested, thus facilitating the fighting.” The obstacle offered by the Kaoliang crops (tall millet!, both-to manoeuvre and to logistics, has been already gone into in these notes, and the following extract from the London 1 Times ’—an extract which is probably accurate—will throw a little additional light on the subject:—“lt should be well understood that there are two harvest seasons in Manchuria. The first is that of wheat and barley, which m the central and southern provinces ripens at the end of June or early in July, immediately before the usual summer rains, v. hcreas in the northern provinces it follows the rainy season, being cut towards the end of August. The second or greater harvest commences in the extreme south early in September, and as one advances northwards—around Harbin, for instance—about the first neck in October. The small yellow>-gra;ned millet or kn-tze is the first, followed quicklv bv small rad millet or mi-tze; both of these, especially the former, produce the rich horse fodder on which hnimals thrive, in this climate much better than on the bast hay. The fanner devotes particular attention to these two. because the straw when properly harvested is a valuable asset, and the grain, if due care be not taken, is liable to scatter. Beans, winch arc the product par excellence of Manchuria, next claim the. rea.]wr's attention, and last, but not least, the kaoliang, or tall millet."