ECONOMIC WAR

Evening Post, Volume CXXXII, Issue 83, 4 October 1941, Page 10

ECONOMIC WAR

NOT ENOUGH TO WIN

NEED OF STRONG ARMY

AID TO RUSSIANS

(Rec. 1 p.m.) RUGBY, October 3. A warning that economic warfare —efficient as it may be—is not a substitute for military action was given by the Parliamentary Secre- . tary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare in a speech at Dundee.

"For two years," he said, "we have been blockading the enemy. We have cut off from the beginning his seaborne trade. .From neutral markets still within his reach we have bought up great quantities of goods he would like to obtain. We have a notable example this week in the failure of the German negotiations in spite of the strongest pressure to secure supplies of Turkish chrome.

"The march of events during the past four months has added very substantially to the effectiveness of our blockade. The Vladivostok leak is closed, and the Germans can no longer look to Syria, Persia, and Afghanistan for wool, cotton, and foodstuffs. The Bomber Command is hammering with growing effect at the German industrial centres, while the Coastal Command has taken a steadily increasing toll of the enemy's shipping, thereby throwing a far greater burden on the German railways. But nowadays the question is often heard, 'If economic warfare is effective, how comes it that the German armies can still drive forward without any apparent lack of oil or rubber tyres, or, indeed, any form of military equipment?' GERMAN SHORTAGES. f'The last place where you would expect to discover an actual shortage is among the fighting forces. This is true in the case of countries at war, but it applies particularly to the State which adopted the slogan of 'guns, not butter' and which, with unparalleled thoroughness, reduced civilian supplies, to a bare minimum in order to feed its war machine. In fact, if the blockade is successful the consequences are likely to appear in four successive stages: first, a growing scarcity of consumed goods and services; secondly, increasing'failure .to maintain and replace industrial plant and equipment; thirdly, gradual slowing down of all forms of production. It is only in the fourth stage and after a considerable lapse of time that essential military supplies would no longer be available for the armies in the field. There is clear evidence that in both Germany and Italy the first two stages are well under way "The Germans have avoided many ot their errors of the last war. They laid in great pre-war stocks. They have specialised in ersatz products and instituted a highly efficient system rationing. But these economic defences are not impregnable. While British rations improve, the German rations are deteriorating. Only a short time ago the Germans, in spite: of having all the resources of the occupied countries available, were com pelled to cut the meat ration. There are perpetual complaints about the quality of food obtainable. "But food is probably the least serious preoccupation of the German consumer. If he wishes to obtain a heavy overcoat he must give up no less than 75 per cent, of has clotiung coupons for the year and must hand hack his old overcoat into the bargain. the marked deterioration m Hying conditions constitutes the first visible lesult of our economic warfare. OTHER FORMS OF STRAIN. "It would be a great mistake, however to assess the consequence of the blockade simply in terms of dimmishing supplies. In so far as it has been successful, it produce's not only a shortage but strain on the administrative machine, strain on the resources of skilled labour, strain on transport resulting in serious loss of mobility, and last, if not least, strain on the endurance of the population. This, last form of strain is very substantially increased by the air raids over western Germany. The close connection between aerial bombardment and economic warfare has frequently been pointed out. Bombs and the blockade are a formidable combination. But it should never be supposed that they are sufficient in themselves to win the war. The German people endured immense privations in 1917 and 1918. But it was not until their armies were defeated iri the field that the collapse came. It would not have happened without the blockade, but neither could it have been brought about by blockade alone. That is why it is absolutely essential that in this war we snpuld continue to build up our. own army, and with the utmost possible dispatch we should send to our Russian allies the greatest assistance in our power."—B.O.W.