NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 123, 27 May 1941, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

ISSUE IN CRETE

AIR V. SEA POWER

SPECIAL CONDITIONS

The opposing forces in Crete are still locked in a life-and-death struggle, which has already lasted over a week and shows little sign of a decision either way. The Germans are trying desperately to enlarge the small area they have managed to occupy in the extreme west of the island at Malemi and the defenders—New Zealanders are specially mentioned—are resisting \ as desperately, and counter-attack-ing. British marines have joined the defenders and the invaders have received reinforcements by air and, possibly, by small seasraft, but on a smaller scale.

The question is which "side can out- ; last the other in a contest of endurance. Can the. Germans continue their air operations of all kinds —mass-bomb-ing, dive-bombing, and troop-carrying —on a scale that will in the long run overwhelm the defenders? Can the defenders secure reinforcements, and supplies of food and munitions, including necessary weapons such as artillery and tanks, on a scale that will enable them to continue successful resistance, and ultimately expel or exterminate the invaders? The answers to the questions depend on a number of factors, the exact strength of which can only be determined by a process of trial and error. The existing conditions are certainly favourable, in many respects, to the invaders and the use of air power. The geographical situation of Crete close to the mainland of . Greece and to many islands of the ■ Greek Archipelago, all in enemy occu- ■ pation, exposes the island to air attack, under cover of fighter protection, from many quarters. The configuration and terrain of Crete render it impossible for the defenders to maintain aerodromes for their own craft there, and thus to give protection to the ground troops of the defence. In a certain measure this disability of ■ the defence has been overcome by the use of long-range fighter aircraft based on distant aerodromes. These and the bombers they escort have already done great damage to the landing grounds used by the enemy at Malemi and also destroyed many troop-carrying and other aircraft on the ground or aloft. Whether this factor can become effective on the side of the defence depends on whether sufficient damage can be done to deter enemy aircraft from successful operation. This has yet to be seen. Navy Hampered. Another highly-important factor is the use of sea-power. Can the Navy prevent any extensive disembarkations of troops and supplies for the enemy on the shores of Crete? Can it also supply our own forces adequately for the defence? So far the Navy has managed its first function by destroying one convoy and dispersing another. Axis radio claims to have inflicted losses oh the Navy in the course of these operations, and it would not be surprising if losses had been sustained. The Aegean Sea, with its host of islands —the Greek Archipelago—and its usually calm waters, is ideal for the activities of the modern pests that have sprung up to challenge the scope of sea-power, the submarine, the Eboat, and, above all, the dive-bomber. In such cramped waters, with a multitude of lurking places for these, attackers, the Navy is at a disadvantage; its style is cramped; it cannot do the job it does so well in the more open sea. Defence and the Air. Thus the conditions of the defence of an island, which normally the Navy could manage without difficulty, do not exist for Crete, except with the severe limitations outlined. The attackers are exploiting these abnormal advantages to the full in equalising the general balance. Normally, having got a foothold in one part of an island the attackers would have to fight their way foot by foot through the rest, the defenders taking up one position after another and making the enemy pay dearly for any advance. Here again ,local air superiority alters the conditions and troops landed by parachute tb the rear of the defended line undoubtedly embarrass the defenders. But for this the mountainous terrain of Crete would not be so difficult to defend. As it is, while there is Heavy fighting at Malemi to prevent any further encroachment in the vicinity of Suda Bay, detachments of enemy troops landed by air are still holding out far back near Retimo and Heraclion, in the centre of the island. The mopping up of all these forces may take a little time. The pace of reinforcement of the enemy by air in the meantime seems to have dropped. ! Not an Unequal Fight.

On the whole, therefore, it is not an unequal fight, and provided that the defenders can be adequately supplied and reinforced, and the enemy prevented from landing troops and heavy munitions by sea, the outlook is-not unfavourable for the defence. It need not be emphasised again here that Crete is an island of the greatest strategical importance to the campaign in the Middle East and that its loss to the enemy would inevitably have serious repercussions. If the defenders have their difficulties, so also have the attackers, and the cost to them already of the foothold they have secured must far exceed their anticipations.

Though America is not directly concerned in the Middle East, at least not sc directly and closely as in the Battle cf the Atlantic and the naval action off the coast of Greenland, resulting in the loss of the Hood, President Roosevqlt, in his broadcast, can fyardly overlook the consequences of the' struggle in the Mediterranean. The United States has many interests there and could not tamely submit to a decision in which America had no say. It is this that lends a peculiarly piquant flavour to the utterance of M. Laval, the greatest quisling of them all, when he reproached the U.S. as partly to blame for the French disaster and asked if America was going "to hinder our struggle to rise again." M. Laval's broadcast illustrates more than anything else where the chief danger to democracy lies.