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NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

WAR IN THE AIR

A SORT OF D/EADLOCK

DEFENCE & OFFENCE

The air war lias reached a curious condition of stability. In the early stages of the war, it seemed that anything might happen in the way of unexpected methods. Soirfei of the things that were expected did not happen: for instance, "there has been no use of gas, a/ijainst which the most elaborate preparations were made. Incidentally, there has been no reported use of gas anywhere in E'jrope, apart from a German all egation, of dubious verity, that some gas shells were used in Poland. Nor has there been any 'evidence that gas-filled ammunition has been found anywhere. Since th«i end of the struggle in France, air?"raft have been used in.combined openntionfc in North Africa and Albania, in both cases playing an important pa?rt, but with no remarkable change in 'tactics. The Two Policies. It is ia the exchange of bombing raids between Britain arid Germany that the .most impressive changes of method tiave been seen, especially in the enerray's operations, British plans have altered little. There has been a continuo us series of British attacks upon military objectives, with a consistent : refusal to assail the civilian population as such, in spite of pressure to do rso. Dr. Hugh Dalton, Minister for Economic Warfare, was reported recently to have said he would rather see f ,he Leuna synthetic oil plant a smoking heap of ruins than .destroy every dwelling-house in Berlin. "Nothing, indiscriminate is good in this war. Bombs must be planted where they -will do the utmost harm to the enetnxy's war effort." And MajorGercoteral J. F. C. Fuller, in discussing wh.ether retaliation for setting fire to Landon is desirable, said that the bar-baa-.'ic principle of an' eye for an eye woi.ild not help to win the war or the subsequent peace. The Germans, on the other hand, have equally consistently battered non--11 lilitary objectives. It has repeatedly fcteen said that most of their attacks fciave been "indiscriminate," but the Jieavy toll of churches, hospitals, and c»ther institutions connected with the rjihysical and moral welfare of the people suggests that some, at least of ' their bombs have been aimed at or ! Jhave a natural inclination towards large buildings. Refuge in Darkness. ! In the course of these operations, the Germans have been forced to abandon daylight attacks except for sporadic minor raids. The great air battles in September, when their bombers were "clawed out of the sky" by the R.A.F. fighters, taught them a lesson which they were quick to learn. Night attacks were substituted. Just as the R.A.F. had been able to bomb targets in Germany almost without loss, finding their > objectives by navigation, and hidden - from attack by the darkness, so the Germans have been able to attack ' Britain. The bombing war has now settled I down t6* this '' position—that each side can attack the other's territory without J fear of great loss of machines and men, L and each air force can go on growing as fast as machines can be built and ; personnel trained. This implies simply '; a multiplication of attacks of the pre- - sent form, until possibly something new - arises to interfere. Reports that a Bri- ; tish answer to the night bomber has . been found and is being developed L are encouraging, but the problem is • obviously one of the greatest difficulty. t The Gun Barrage. > Britain's first reply against the night > bomber" was the famous artillery bari rage; but this is a defensive, not an . offensive weapon, and while it had a r deterrent effect on the enemy, it un- ; doubtedly does more material damage s on the ground than to the German i aircraft. Tons of shells fired into the i air come down again as tons of scrapiron. This tremendous barrage cannot ;be used everywhere; it can, on the : score of cost and effort, only be established where there is an important area to be protected, and its reach is limited. , The same problem as Britain has faced is also plaguing the enemy. He also uses artillery, but it does not seem to have been developed on the same scale as that which was set up to guard London and some other large centres. Britain's principal anti-air-craft gun is one of 3.7 in calibre, and larger are also used. The chief German gun is 3.4 in, and it is said that this is being replaced, or supplemented by, a new mechanically-loaded gun of ' 5.2 in calibre, firing a 661b shell. • Something New Wanted. • The orthodox plan of military evolution is the reply in kind. The answer to battleships is battleships; to submarines, submarines; to tanks, tanks— on the principle that if one side has them the other must also. But this, of course, leads to an absurdity. To answer night bombers by night bombers means simply a "war of attrition," in which each side goes on battering i the other in increasing degree. And : as the effective answer to the sub- ■ marine is a host of specialised weapons t of an entirely different kind, the night • bomber is a challenge to ingenuity in ■ devising active defences. But the scope I is limited, and the chief problem seems • to be to find a way of seeing in the ; dark, so that fighters can pick them -up. ; British bombers flying over Germany . have met German fighter patrols carrying searchlights, but these were > found of little use—as might be exs pected. A searchlight on a fighter is l not likely to be as useful as a battery i of searchlights on the ground. i Another Problem. In the meantime, the air forces con- • tinue to grow. With the advent of i American assistance on a large scale, i the British will grow faster than ever. ' And as these air armadas pile: up in i numbers, one is forced to ask, how i will they be used? This is another • great air-war problem, and one that i has not yet been answered. There is > a limit, and not a very high one, to the number of aircraft that can be : assembled in a specified space, and a • still lower limit to the number that ; can be controlled as a naval force is i controlled, by a commanding officer in > the air. If a solution to these difficuli ties can be found, the war in the air) ', will be changed in a way thaj will make its past seem .tarn^. , '■'" "

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19410111.2.90

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 9, 11 January 1941, Page 10

Word Count
1,078

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 9, 11 January 1941, Page 10

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 9, 11 January 1941, Page 10

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