NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXIX, Issue 137, 11 June 1940, Page 9

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

ITALY INTERVENES

STRENGTH EXAMINED

HER LIMITED ENDURANCE

Seeking to gather some of the spoils which he fears Hitler will not alllow him to share without active intervention, Mussolini has launched Italy into the European conflict, with a calculation and cold-bloodedness rare even in dictators. This move can have been made only in the hope that the struggle will be a short one, and that Italy will achieve gains at the expense of, sacrifices small enough to enable her renegade-Socialist leader to declare that he has added to her greatness. long Preparations. For months past the Italians have been preparing for this act of aggression, but their act remains the throw of a gambler, and of a gambler who is staking everything on a short war. It is not for nothing that Italian military theory has been based on the assumption that a sudden, sharp blow is capable of achieving military success, for the country is condemned to a lack of raw materials and vulnerable to distant blockade in a manner which makes it certain that a long war would be bitter and disastrous. Through the Mediterranean, of which the Allies command both ends, come 86 per cent, of Italy's vital imports. She lacks completely fourteen vital raw materials, including cotton, ..jpopper, rubber, nickel, manganese, and tin. Moreover, while Fascist rule has given Italy a sort of industrial self-sufficiency, the concentration of industry north of the valley of the Po constitutes a military weakness of the first order, for it is close to French attack. Mass and Mobility. The Italians have combined theories of mass attack with a worship of mobility which they have always planned to l>k with large-scale assaults from the air. The Douhet theory of a decision being gained by air power, indeed, is Italian in origin, though of late there has "been an indication that this theory has been modified. Consequently the Italians have usually given their biggest budget to their army. This includes about 525,----000 Black Shirt militia and there is equipment available in sufficient quantity to put an army of about 1,209,000 men in the field. Italy is reputed to possess about 20,000 guns, but until 1938 she had little modern heavy artillery and some of the pieces used were those taken from the Austnans in the World War. There are 65 millimetre and 75 millimetre field guns and 100 millimetre howitzers, while the mountain troops pack unassembled 75's. The anti-aircraft artillery js mostly 75 millimetres (3in) or half that size. * Over-rated Tanks. The Italians have been renowned for their tanks, but unjustifiably so cording to some observers. They had a^fiumber of light tanks which scampered around in mediocre fashion in Ethiopia and met disaster in Spam, mostly. 2-men Fiats mounting two machine-guns, and very vulnerable to anti-tank fire. However, there have been changes in design in the effort to improve these tanks, and much store has been set by (lame-throwing tanks, which were used both in Ethiopia and in Spain. Usually these are light Fiats. Two years ago new prototypes were being developed in the effort to remove this weakness, and what has happened since is shrouded in great mystery. The Ethiopian war showed the strength and weakness of the Italian military machine. It showed that the Black Shirt militia was contemptible as a fighting force (the regulars themselves sneered at the political troops). It showed that the regular infantry was still deficient in training. It showed that the high command, apart from General Badoglio, was inefficient and riddled with politics. The recent appointment of General de Bono, who has long been a politician and a creature of Mussolini, to an important command, hints that the army is still not free from politics, though when he succeeded to the command in Ethiopia Badoglio sent some of the generals home. Powers of Organisation. The virtues of the Italians as shown in the African campaign were their powers of organisation, supply, and sanitation. At one time the creation of a system of air-borne supply enabled a column of 20,000 men and 10,000 animals to be absent from its base for a week. The army is certainly better than it was in the World War (it would need to be), and it is equally certainly better equipped. The question is whether that equipment is good enough for the job ahead. ' In carrying out the Italian offensive the i-ole of the air force will be important. That air force had 1940 firstline machines in 1937 and Italy sought to raise the total to 4100 machines by 1941. The progress of that programme is the subject of dispute. Last year an American observer found that the Italian aircraft factories were operating skeleton staffs, that they had no orders for new types, and that everywhere there was a lack of money. Production Low. That the war has brought a sharpening up of activity may be expected, but even so Italian aeroplane production is not remarkably high. At present it is set at about 200 to 250 machines a month, built chiefly at only six factories, with four engine plants turning out at least 400 additional engines a month. The goal of the air force expansion plan was 4200 pilot officers on active duty by the end of this .year, 36,000 other flying personnel, a reserve of 6200 pilots, and about 160,000 nonflying men available for active duty if war came. Whatever reserves of machines Italy possesses have been built up in the last two years—at the beginning of 1938 she had none. The Italian navy consists of four prewar battleships which have been reconstructed, two newer ships of 35,000 tons, and mounting nine 15in guns, probably now completed, 22 cruisers, 56 destroyers, 72 torpedo-boats, and 105 submarines. Allied policy has apparently been to close the Mediterranean which this fleet and air power would make too perilous to keep open. Stocks of Materials. Though there is a chronic lack of raw materials it must not be thought that Italy is immediately vulnerable to blockade. Sanctions were followed by the development of a plan to create considerable reserves of oil, and as long ago as 1937 Mussolini' announced that the country had "several years' supply*' of manganese, aluminium, and tin. Italy could probably withstand a complete blockade for a limited time, but the time would be measured in months.