WAR POTENTIAL

Evening Post, Volume CXXVII, Issue 130, 5 June 1939, Page 8

WAR POTENTIAL

PROBLEM FOR BRITAIN

SLOWNESS OF ORGANtSATION

GAPS IN DEFENCES

(By "Senex.")

Under her new Budgetary plans Britain will spend £630,000,000 on defence in the next financial year, increasing her expenditure in the pre; vious year, by 46 per cent Universally, this is hailed as a sign that Britain means business. But certain disquieting factors remain in the British situation, and they will have to be faced in the near future. Several of these are problemsNwhich can be solved by the expenditure of some time and relatively small sums of money; others call for a sweeping reorganisation and will have to be tackled resolutely. Of the first class is the shortage of escort ships needed for protection of sea-borne trade against submarine attack, and the lack of Otter gear to- provide a defence against mines. The want of these is understandable in view of the need to build up the' strength of the larger units—battleships and cruisers—first, and undoubtedly the raising of the strength of, the battle fleet to a satisfactory leveL will be followed by the construction of more anti-submarine craft. A total of 22 of these escort vessels, 20 of them of a new type, was included in the Naval Estimates published early in March, and escort ships were twice as numerous as the next class of vessel which, significantly, was the minesweeper. So while these antisubmarine ships are badly needed (in 1917 Britain was using 277 destroyers to hunt for German submarines, and today she has only 189) the need will be filled. Of the second class is _ the multiplicity of types of aeroplanes which have been coming from British factories, and which will have to be reduced in the interests of efficiency. ORGANISING PRODUCTION.

But there is one factor which overshadows all • others, and which is not yet dealt with effectively, if reports! from London are to be trusted. That is the need to raise the war potential of Britain, and to do it by organisation today. It is reported on good authority that for some time past the defence chiefs have been urging the British Government to co-ordinate production so that the orders lodged by the services will receive first consideration, even utilising the materials which, would otherwise be employed for the manufacture of consumption goods—a sort of British guns or butter. But in taking this line the heads of the defence organisations have been moved not by any desire merely to .fill the "woeful gaps" admitted to exist in British safety-fences after Munich, but to place the national industrial organisation on a basis from which it would swiftly and efficiently expand m time of war. For modern warfare is not merely a matter of men; in it men are relatively unimportant save when they possess special skills to utilise the resources of their countries.- And the country which most efficiently employs those resources holds all the aces. Badoglio's victory in, Abyssinia with about 50,000 men in his flying force, Franco's conquest of Spain despite a chronic shortage of man-power are the answer to those who measure strength by counting heads. Britain's weakness today is due not to any lack of trained fighters, but to her shortage of equipment for such fighters as she already owns. TECHNICIANS WANTED.

In the case of the Territorial Field Army which was being recruited m April, just before the decision to apply conscription was made, virtually all the fighting units had reached' full strength and second-line units were in process of formation, but technicaland administrative corps were still lacking the necessary numbers because they had to be more selective in their recruits, and also (a significant fact) because they had a higher number to recruit. In addition the Territorial units were lacking in equipment and would need a big issue of arms before they were able to enter training camps., | The potential strength of Britain and is. much greater than that of the allies of the Rome-Berlin Axis. The peace-time production of automobiles in Britain and France, for instance, indicates a war-time aeroplane j output twice as great-as that in the territories of the Axis Powers. The production of steel by the two groups leaves the advantage with the Axis, but Britain and France produce in their own territories six times as much iron ore as Germany and Italy. They also' produce a greater proportion of coal. MUST BE MOBILISED. But this is potential strength, and before it can count in conflict it must be organised into actual strength. That this organisation has been badly in arrears was revealed at the time of the Czech crisis when it was discovered that there had been no attempt to mobilise brains, that there were no plans to staff the various -Ministries which would be required in war-time and that the plentiful supply of intellectual, administrative, and business ability which was offered to the Government could not be told what to do. This is the side of preparation which the defence leaders have been advocating for some time past, this and the fitting of the new industrial defence programme into the existing industrial life of the country so that there will be maximum efficiency in the work devoted to both and so that the organisation may be created for a possibly more serious day. As yet, it is reporteu, this organisation has not been carried out nor is there any (effort being made to carry it out. The new Ministry r-f Supply, .for instance, so long and reasonably advocated and so often refused, has been called into existence, but its' powers are strangely limited. For while the Ministry may obtain precedence for its orders when these are placed with firms which already have contracts with the J Government there is no provision for it to obtain preference when.it places orders with new firms. COMPETITIONS FOR SUPPLIES. I The result of this, it is feared, will be, to slow up the mobilisation of British industry by throwfhg the firms which are not . working on Govern-' ment orders into competition with Gov-ernment-employed firms for supplies of raw materials and labour. For the incursion of the Government into the armament field is sufficiently large to create shortages oi certain classes \£ goods and the resulting scarcity is going to result in price rises and in |- stimulation of output to the firms which remain outside .the armaments ring,

.It is clear that the biggest task con-' fronting "Jritaip is this mobilising of hex industrial strength. Beside the magnitude of this problem the recent introduction of corsciiption pales into nothing. bFor the existing situation it is difficult to blame the Government. The Administration wanted to re-arm f but it also wanted to re-arm with as

little disturbance to private industry as possible. In a democracy it is doubtful if Government interference in industry would be tolerated save when the country' was convinced that it was facing a state of emergency. Up to the time of the Munich settlement the Government leaders hoped' that Hitler could be appeased. They continued to hope after this, though a great portion of the public had lost faith, until the swallowing up of the Czechs. Today they have lost any faith in Hitler's word and are willing to have their energies directed into channels necessary for the national, welfare. It would not have been possible to throw the cost of air-raid shelters upon the employers at an earlier date, for instance, but today that responsibility is* accepted by the employers because they recognise that unless they face it they may lose theirwhole working force in war-time. So the temper for bigger changes has been created; it is to be hoped the changes will not be too slow.