REGIONAL ASPECTS

Evening Post, Volume CXXII, Issue 96, 20 October 1936, Page 9

REGIONAL ASPECTS

CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN

PECULIAR CHARACTER

(By S.R.Q.) For the moment all attention in the ;ivil war in Spain is centred on the efforts of the rebel forces to take Madrid. Should they succeed, it does lot follow that the war will be over, rhe Government will still be occupyingi full third of the peninsula, with a stronghold in Barcelona much more difficult to capture than the isolated :apital. So far the rebels have had ill the resounding successes, but then they have had the initial advantages of surprise, of disciplined troops and superior armament, enhanced by what ;hey could obtain from outside Spain, rhey have also been much better led md have pursued a definite plan of campaign, whereas the Government's lefence has been characterised by a lotable lack of unity, which, unless overcome, is likely to lead to its ultimate downfall. It is clear that the first and, perlaps, fatal mistake of the Government was, in spite of having the greater part Dt the navy on its side, to lose command of the Strait of Gibraltar and illow General Franco to get his Foreign Legionaries and Moorish troops across ;o the European side. With these he was able to take possession of Huelva, consolidate the position of General Sueipo de Llano in Seville, and extend :he influence of his" party eastward toivards Cordoba and Granada and the iiinterland of Malaga, and northward :o effect a junction with the forces of General Mola. The capture of Badajoz m August 12 enabled the two chief rebel leaders, Franco and Mola, to join lands, and gave the rebels complete :ontrol of the frontier with Portugal md an undisputed channel of supplies and munitions. Franco's Moors and Foreign Legionaries were used cffec-

tively against the Government strongholds in the Biscayan Provinces at Irun, which fell on September 4, and at San Sebastian, which was entered on September 13. All that remains to the Government in this region and Asturias to .the west is the ports of Bilbao and Santander and Gijon. Oviedo, the capital of Asturias, is now definitely in the hands of the rebels, the siege by the Government troops having been relieved. The fall of Badajoz also enabled the rebels to divert the main attack on Madrid from the Guadarrama Mountains, where it had been held up since the start of the war, to the open valley of the Tagus. Toledo, on the southern side of the valley, where the citadel had been besieged by Government forces for two months, was relieved by the rebel advance on September 27. The rebels were now in a position to attack | Madrid on three sides —north, west, and south—and it is reported that they are now close tfe the beleaguered city and threatening the only remaining outlet—the railway east to Valencia. FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT. Apart from its most precarious hold on Madrid, the Government retains Barcelona and the whole of Catalonia in the north-east, cut off, however, from direct communication by rail with Madrid by the rebel garrison of Saragossa, which has not been ejected despite attacks from Barcelona. North of Saragossa is the important strategic town of Huesca, reported to have been captured by the Catalonian forces, based on Barcelona. The report has not yet been confirmed. The rebels also hold Teruel, far to the east of Madrid, in the mountains back from the coast between Barcelona and Valencia. This is a thorn in the flank of the Government and efforts to eliminate it have apparently failed. In the south the rebels now have Toledo, cutting the railway between Madrid and Malaga-, on the Andalusian coast, and Granada, at the northern foot* of the Sierra Nevada. The tenure of Cordoba and other centres in the country south of Madrid appears for the moment to be uncertain and Malaga itself is threatened by the rebels at Honda and Antequera. Thus, the rebels, if they failed in their original scheme of a surprise coup, which would have included Madrid, have steadily gained ground everywhere and are now far better placed strategically than their opponents. The cause of comparative failure on the part of the loyalists is not to be explained completely by inferiority in armaments. The main reason is lack of unity and lack of any strategic plan. Each province seems to have pursued its own little campaign regardless of the fate of the rest of the Government sitie. The Catalonians, safe in their own province, do not seem to have helped Madrid directly, but they lost heavily in a futile expedition to the island of Majorca, losing most of their men and equipment. They also failed to achieve anything in their war in Aragon with the object of eliminating Saragossa. The central portion, with its base at Madrid, failed to hold Badajoz, the key to the Tagus Valley, and could not retain its grasp on Toledo. In the south there has been a gradual loss of ground. The fleet, mainly in the hands of loyalists, has been very badly handled, failing utterly to keep command of the sea. It is hard to see much hope for the "final victory of the Government unless these defects are remedied. In the long run eVen guerrilla warfare will have to submit to the command of the air. The whole civil war is essentially of the Spanish type, with its atrocities and regional patriotism.