THE STAFF TALKS

Evening Post, Volume CXXI, Issue 141, 16 June 1936, Page 7

THE STAFF TALKS

BRITAIN AND PRANCE

SAFEGUARDING BELGIUM

There still seems to be some confusion about the Staff consultations, said the "Manchester Guardian',' recently. They are prescribed in paragraph 3 of the non-German Locarno Powers' proposals that are commonly referred to as the White Paper. Under this paragraph the Powers in question undertake forthwith to instruct their General Staffs to enter into contact with a-view-to arranging the technical conditions in which the obligations .which are binding upon them could : be carried out'in case of unprovoked aggression.

This undertaking is the fulfilment of the pledge contained in article-4,"para-graph 3, annex A, of the Treaty of Locarno, the annex sometimes known as the Western Pact. According to this pledge the guarantor Powers, that is, Great Britain and Italy, "give immediate assistance" to the party against which "a violation or, a contravention" has been committed, whether in the form of actual hostilities or of the '.'assembly of artned forces ih the demilitarised zone." The Staff consultations are the form which this "immediate assistance" will' take.' Italy has not endorsed the White Paper and is - not fulfllling : her pledge as Great Britain is, although she may do so yet. ' '

SAFEGUARD FOR BELGIUM. Are the Staff consultations a fulfilment of the British pledge and no more; or are they a practical necessity as well? The demilitarised zone was not only , a safeguard for France —it was a safeguard for Belgium. But France is able to defend herself—it will be some time before Germany achieves a military preponderance over her, and the French system of fortifications is powerful enough to make a frontal attack a very hazardous undertaking. The inviolability-of Belgium is essential to the security/not only of France but also of Great Britain, now as' always. The Power that holds Belgium: threatens the Channel ports —and, therefore, the Narrow Seas.

It is agreed amongst the LoCarno Powers (including > Germany) that there should be a substitute . for the Treaty'of Locarno to" maintain Belgian, French, British,'and German security. It is for this purpose ■ that a new Western Pact, combined with an Air Pact,* has been proposed. ! It is also agreed that the new instrument shall be negotiated within the framework of a general settlement that will give security to Eastern and Central as well as to Western Europe. ; But; as the maintenance of the' demilitarised zone was the very-essence-of'the Treaty of Locarno it is doubtful'whether there can be a true, substitute for, that treaty. The prospect of a general settlement is also, very uncertain,. although the Governments of all the Powers concerned favour it'in principle. This makes it necessary for the Western Powers to provide for the possibility that the negotiations both for the particular and the more general settlements may not succeed.

LETTER OF GUARANTEE. It is for this reason that the "Letters to be addressed by the representatives of the United Kingdom'and Italy to the representatives of Belgium and France" (to be, found at the end of the White Paper) were drafted. These letters—or rather this letter, for the texts are identical—come into force if "conciliation" of the kind proposed in the White Paper should fail. The letters provide for the continuation of the British pledge to France and Belgium in accordance with the Treaty of Locarno. But they also provide for assistance to Great Britain 1 by France and Belgium in case Great Britain is the victim of unprovoked aggression. Assistance to Great Britain is an innovation, and is regarded as a necessity here (if conciliation fails) in view of German re-armament in the air and on the sea.

If. the letters come into force the "Staff consultations" are to be continued, or to be resumed, so that what will really be a new three-Power Treaty of . Mutual . Assistance, can be carried out forthwith. This treaty would consolidate the security of Belgium, France, and Great Britain. There are still some differences of opinion as to what shall be regarded as the "failure" of conciliation. One view is that conciliation will have failed if Germany cannot be persuaded to limit the remilitarisation : of the Rhineland. Another view—which seems the more likely to prevail—is that the I failure or non-failure of "conciliation" cannot be judged •in -advance, I but only in accordance with- circumstance and the general situation.