GALE IN BRITAIN

Evening Post, Volume CXX, Issue 105, 30 October 1935, Page 11

GALE IN BRITAIN

MISHAPS ON THE THAMES

(British OHlcial Wireless.)

RUGBY, October 28. ■ Winds of gale force we,re again experienced during the weekend throughout Britain, and gusts of 7V miles per hour were recorded at Manchester. As a result of a sudde,n squall during a dinghy race .-on theTChames at! Putney 17 men and woman were thrown into the river. Five «iinghies capsized. Two racing eights which vqere at practice near Chelsea were also swamped. ' No lives were lost.

strategic insight, realised that t&e country was easier in the south ar*3 the Addis Ababa-Jibuti railway reallji vulnerable alone from this point. The* Abyssinians' defence in the north is the character of the country itself, and, though they have not been seriously opposed, the Italians have not made much headway towards the real difficulties of the march on Addis Ababa. The time that has elapsed will let both sides consolidate their positions, the Italians converging towards Makale and the Abyssinians further south towards Sakota. It is clear that the Italians are protecting their flank in the gorge of the Takkaze River, as attempts have been made by Abyssinian raiders to pass north and these have been foiled. There has been no big conflict as yet in this region. IN THE OGADEN. V In the south, in the Ogaden district, the Italians, under General Graziani, have not yet broken through the stout resistance of the Abyssinian posts, ranging from Dolo on the Juba River, where Kenya, Italian Somaliland, and Abyssinia meet, across %the deser.t plateau through Geledi, Gorahai, Gerlogubi, and Walwal to Damot on the British Somaliland border. The Italian Ogaden army is supplied from Bender Kassim, a new port, on the Gulf, of Aden, as well as from Mogadishu on the Indian Ocean. A military road has been driven from Bender Kassim, parallel with the frontier, down to the Shibeli River and on to Mogadishu. On the Abyssinian side there is a road from Harrar, which commands the railway and the Ogaden, to Jijiga, and from there lorries can get as far south along the River Fafan to Gorahai. The Abyssinian defences in this region appear to be better organised than in the north. So far the Italian's appear to have made little use of their third possible line of attack from the original Red Sea port of Assab. This Is 400 miles by air to Addis Ababa and 300 to Harrar, cutting out French territory, but in between, for land operations, are the malarial swamps of the Aussa, into which the River Hawash pours its waters. There have been few references to this line of attack in the cable news. It would probably be of greater use when the Italian forces both from the north and south get nearer to their objectives.. This may be months yet, as communications must be established before advances can be at all safe. In the Assab and Ogaden areas temperatures are exceedingly high. The prospector Nesbit recorded 158 degrees in a grotto in the Danakil desert and in the sun the temperature was up to 168 degrees. It is expected that the Italian troops from the north will stand these temperatures better than their southern compatriots, as they are superior physically. According to a semi-official account the Italian soldiers in Eritrea receive each day 270z bread, lOoz meat, and 7oz spaghetti. The potato ration .amounts to 4Joz and other vegetables to 2oz. They have also Soz coffee a day, but the Italians in Somaliland get double this ration and a double ration of sugar also. Bananas, dates, jam, and wine arc distributed two or three times a week. The troops in Eritrea receive two or three oranges a week; the Somaliland troops get the same number a day. The Somaliland troops are expected to face the bigger strain. COSTLY EXPEDITION. What the total Italian forces are in and around Abyssinia is not precisely known, but they probably number as much as 200,000. To maintain them with supplies and munitions and medical necessities so far from Italy must be a heavy- expenditure. This, .on top of enormous public works expenditure, is likely to cripple Italy. The cost of the war has been variously estimated at £1,000,000 a week upward, this is merely the cost of maintaining the troops in Africa at their present strength. It does not include equipment, transport, and Suez Canal charges. iThe Italian gold reserves are staled !ns being now less than £80.000,000. j The pressure of Hie League must add to the cost. Unless the Abyssinian resistance collapses through internal dissension, the task of the Italians must be heavy in expense, as a complete victory against a united defence would be most unlikely. Factors like these lore likely to upset the calculations of a long war.